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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research is to study the compliance problem that exists in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system. When a member state does 
not bring its trade policies into conformity with WTO obligations, the WTO dispute 
settlement system offers either compensation or retaliation as acceptable remedies to the 
aggrieved member states. However, there are inherent weaknesses to these remedies, 
leading some members to disregard them by maintaining their violations for lengthy 
periods, thereby resulting in ineffective compliance. 
   This dissertation assesses the problems associated with WTO dispute settlement 
remedies and considers possible improvements to them. First, I outline the applicable 
rules and procedures of WTO dispute settlement remedies in order to provide a general 
background for understanding this dissertation and examine their existing problems. I 
then attempt to clarify the purpose of WTO dispute settlement remedies, since knowing 
this purpose is an essential prerequisite for designing effective remedies. Finally, I offer 
suggestions to improve the remedies currently available through the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The increasing level of trade in the contemporary world has resulted in greater 
international economic interdependence among states. As a consequence, states perceive 
that a strong rule-based, multilateral institution regime may promote stability and 
cooperation in international economic relations. This belief led to the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, which replaced the old trading regime under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
In an effort to operate the WTO effectively, its members were cognizant of the need 
to fulfill their obligations and to have an effective instrument to deal with disputes. The 
successful negotiation of the Uruguay Round introduced the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). The DSU enhanced the legitimacy of the WTO by providing a 
rule-based, binding, and impartial mechanism through which members could resolve their 
disputes.
1
 The DSU confers compulsory jurisdiction on the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB), and is considered to be one of the most successful dispute settlement 
systems in public international law. 
The WTO dispute settlement system has contributed significantly to the fair 
resolutions of international trade disputes. WTO members have generally respected the 
process and the decisions of the panels and the Appellate Body. The high volume of cases 
shows that members are willing to participate in the WTO dispute settlement system. One 
analysis of the first ten years of the WTO dispute settlement system indicates a successful 
                                                          
1
 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments – Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
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compliance rate of 83 per cent, which is higher than any other comparable international 
tribunal.
2
 
   The dispute settlement system set forth in the DSU is a central element to the 
operation of the WTO, providing increased security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system.
3
 It is designed to moderate the behavior of WTO members by resolving 
disputes in an orderly fashion and ensuring rule enforcement. The DSB generally 
administers the DSU‟s implementation and surveillance procedure, which provides 
specific rules for remedies for non-compliance. Under the current system of remedies, if 
the complaining member prevails in a dispute, it may seek compensation from, or impose 
retaliation against, the violating member when the latter fails to comply with its WTO 
obligations.
4
 The general purpose of these remedies is meant to exert pressure on the 
violating member to bring its non-conforming measures into compliance. 
However, a number of concerns have been raised with regard to these remedies. The 
primary concern is that they seem to be inadequate in order to bring good quality and 
timely compliance. As experience has shown, some members often exploit such 
inadequacies and disrespect the current system of remedies by maintaining their 
violations for a lengthy period. In this circumstance, those members injured by such 
violations may be reluctant to engage in future panel and Appellate Body proceedings, 
which would undermine the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
                                                          
2
 See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. Int‟l Econ. L. 17, 
46-48 (2005). Wilson also confirmed that 90 per cent of disputes found violations of WTO obligations and, 
in virtually all of those disputes, the violating member indicated “its intention to bring itself into 
compliance and the record indicates that in most cases it has already done so.” Bruce Wilson, Compliance 
by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement Rulings, 10 J. Int‟l Econ. L. 397, 397 (2007). 
3
 See DSU art. 3.2. 
4
 “Retaliation” is a generic term for “suspension of concessions or other obligations” as used in the DSU 
and “countermeasures” as used in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
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Therefore, this dissertation attempts to examine the problems of WTO dispute 
settlement remedies and explore ways to improve compliance in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
The resources of this study are mainly academic writings and GATT/WTO 
documents including relevant legal texts, the adopted reports of panels and the Appellate 
Body, the decisions of arbitrators and the submitted papers of individual members. 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a general 
overview of WTO dispute settlement remedies. It explains the applicable rules and 
procedures for remedies and examines the current problems. The aim of this Chapter is to 
address the procedural stages of WTO remedies, thereby providing the general 
background necessary to understand this dissertation. I begin with a broad overview of 
remedies in the pre-WTO dispute settlement system, namely GATT, and examine how its 
rules and procedures have evolved and been incorporated into the WTO system. Then, I 
explore the rules and procedures for remedies in the WTO dispute settlement system and 
critically assess the problems with the current remedies in the following Section. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the purpose behind WTO dispute settlement remedies. This 
examination is a prerequisite to designing effective remedies because the types of 
remedies to be recommended will differ according to their purpose. Currently, the 
purpose of remedies is not explicitly provided in any of the WTO agreements. This 
ambiguity seems to create uncertainty and confusion among WTO members, which has 
led to bitter controversies spanning over a decade. In this Chapter, I attempt to ascertain 
the purpose by looking at WTO dispute settlement remedies from historical, contractual 
and practical perspectives. 
4 
 
In Chapter 4, I propose potential improvements to the remedy scheme of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. To this end, my proposed remedies are specifically tailored to 
the purpose that was discussed in Chapter 3, and are measured aimed at solving, or at 
least minimizing, the problems explored in Chapter 2. In this Chapter, I also address 
ways to enhance both retaliation and compensation remedies. 
In Chapter 5, I conclude with some comments. 
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CHAPTER 2: GENERAL OVERVIEW OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
REMEDIES 
 
   This Chapter explains the applicable rules and procedures of WTO dispute settlement 
remedies and examines their current problems in order to provide a general background 
for understanding this dissertation. It is important to examine the rules and procedures, 
and evaluate their problems squarely prior to proposing effective and better solutions. 
In Section I, I will begin with a general overview of remedies in the pre-WTO dispute 
settlement system, namely GATT, and examine how its rules and procedures have 
evolved and been incorporated into the WTO. In Section II, I will describe the rules and 
procedures of remedies in the WTO dispute settlement system and critically examine 
their existing problems, which can be viewed as a flaw in the international trade order. In 
Section III, I will conclude with some comments. 
 
I. Remedies in the Pre-WTO Dispute Settlement System 
There seems to be no clear lines of demarcation between WTO law and public 
international law in the sense that WTO law is widely recognized as a part of public 
international law.
5
 Especially, the dispute settlement procedure under the WTO has a 
common mechanism with the one under public international law with respect to remedies. 
                                                          
5
 See Debra Steger, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Jurisdiction, Interpretation and Remedies, in 
Agreeing and Implementing the Doha Round of the WTO 294, 294-307 (Harald Hohmann ed., 2008); John 
H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law 48 (2006); Donald 
McRae, The WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier?, 3 J. Int‟l Econ. L. 27, 27-
28 (2000); Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law – Lessons for the 
Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. Int‟l Econ. L. 189, 189-248 
(1999); David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Source of Law, 92 Am. J. Int‟l L. 
398, 413 (1998); John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic 
Relations 25-28 (2d ed. 1997). 
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In this regard, it is very useful to analyze the remedies available under WTO law in 
reference to the notion of state responsibility under customary and public international 
law.
6
 
The structure of WTO dispute settlement remedies can also be found in public 
international law. As explained by the International Law Commission‟s Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter the “ILC Draft”), 
international law recognizes three stages: cessation and non-repetition, reparation and 
countermeasures. The WTO follows these stages in the form of the withdrawal of 
inconsistent measures, compensation and retaliation. In detail, the WTO provides for the 
withdrawal of inconsistent measures as the primary remedy. If a violating member fails to 
withdraw its inconsistent measures, it may offer compensation as a secondary remedy. If 
neither remedy has been provided, a member state that prevails in a dispute may retaliate 
in the form of suspending concessions or other obligations as a last resort. The remedy of 
                                                          
6
 The panel in Korea – Government Procurement confirmed that: 
Article 3.2 of the DSU requires that we seek within the context of a particular dispute to 
clarify the existing provisions of the WTO agreements in accordance with customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law. However, the relationship of the WTO 
Agreements to customary international law is broader than this. Customary international law 
applies generally to the economic relations between the WTO Members. Such international 
law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not „contract out‟ from it. To put 
it another way, to the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a 
covered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the customary rules 
of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the process of treaty formation under 
the WTO. 
Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Government Procurement, ¶ 7.96, WT/DS163/R (May 1, 2000). 
Despite the unclearness of the applicability of customary and public international law in the WTO, the 
remedies under WTO agreements are lex specialis in relation to the remedies under public international law. 
Article 55 of the International Law Commission‟s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts recognizes the lex specialis principle which reflects the maxim lex specialis 
derogate legi generali (“special law prevails over general law”). See International Law Commission, Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 55, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (Jul. 26, 2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft]. For a general explanation of lex specialis in 
relation to public international law, see Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO 
Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 Minn. J. 
Int‟l L. 275, 308-310 (2010); Santiago M. Villalpando, Attribution of Conduct to the State: How the Rules 
of State Responsibility may be Applied within the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 5 J. Int‟l Econ. L. 393, 
393-399 (2002); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 
95 Am. J. Int‟l L. 535, 537-540 (2001). 
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the withdrawal of inconsistent measures in the WTO is in line with the remedy of 
cessation and non-repetition available under Article 30 of the ILC Draft, which provides 
that “[t]he State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) 
to cease that act, if it is continuing; (b) to offer appropriate assurance and guarantees of 
non-repetition, if circumstances so require.” Similarly, the remedy of compensation in the 
WTO is in line with the remedy of reparation available under Article 31.1 of the Draft 
which provides that “[t]he responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation 
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.” Reparation is provided in the 
form of “restitution,” “compensation” and “satisfaction” under Article 34 of the Draft. 
Further, the remedy of retaliation in the WTO is in line with the remedy of 
countermeasures available under Article 49.1 of the Draft which provides that “[a]n 
injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its 
obligations . . . .” It is important to bear in mind that a comparative analysis of the two 
legal structures, the WTO and public international law, may facilitate a better 
understanding of WTO dispute settlement remedies.
7
 
In this Section, I will begin with a general overview of remedies in the pre-WTO 
dispute settlement system and examine how their rules and procedures have evolved and 
been incorporated into the WTO dispute settlement system. It is important to discuss the 
pre-WTO dispute settlement system in order to gain a broader view of the remedies 
available in international trade disputes. Such discussion may also be helpful for 
                                                          
7
 For a comparative analysis of the two legal structures, see Patricio Grane, Remedies under WTO Law, 4 J. 
Int‟l Econ. L. 755, 756-763 (2001); James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 Int‟l & Comp. L.Q. 248, 292-293 (2001); Petros C. Mavroidis, 
Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 Eur. J. Int‟l L. 763, 766-774 
(2000). 
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understanding the historical background of WTO dispute settlement remedies. 
 
1. Preparatory Work for GATT 
   The negotiations on GATT progressed simultaneously with the negotiations on the 
Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO). In light of the view that problems 
with economic policy were one of the main causes of World War II, the international 
community was focused on building international economic institutions in the postwar 
period. In December 1945, the United States (US) issued a proposal for the establishment 
of the ITO, which was to be affiliated with the United Nations.
8
 In February 1946, the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted a Resolution calling for a United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment for the purpose of creating the ITO and 
also established a Preparatory Committee to elaborate a draft of the Charter. In 
connection with its proposal, the US published the “Suggested Charter,” which became 
the basis for drafting the Charter at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee.
9
 The 
negotiations on the ITO Charter were carried out over a two-year period, from 1946 
through 1948, in a series of meetings in London, New York, Geneva, and Havana, the last 
of which finally produced the “Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organization.”10 
                                                          
8
 See United States Department of State, Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on 
Trade and Employment, in Proposals for Expansions of World Trade and Employment, Pub. No. 2411; Com. 
Pol‟y Ser. 79 (1945). For a general overview of the ITO, see Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System 
and World Trade Diplomacy (2d ed. 1990); Herbert Feis, The Geneva Proposals for an International Trade 
Charter, 2 Int‟l Org. 39 (1948); Robert R. Wilson, Proposed ITO Charter, 41 Am. J. Int‟l L. 879 (1947); 
Kenneth R. Wilson, Geneva and the I.T.O., 2 Int‟l J. 242 (1947). 
9
 United States Department of State, Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization of the 
United Nations, Pub. No. 2598; Com. Pol‟y Ser. 93 (1946). For the Report of the First Session, see U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], London, Oct. 15-Nov. 26, 1946, Report of the First Session of the 
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33 
[hereinafter London Report]. 
10
 See Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: Havana Charter for an 
9 
 
   While such negotiations were mainly aimed at establishing the ITO and producing the 
final draft of the Charter, states‟ interest in reducing tariffs and other trade restrictions 
increased rapidly. Hence, it was decided at the First Session that a Second Session should 
be convened to continue working on the Charter and to hold trade and tariff negotiations, 
and a Drafting Committee was appointed to draw up a full draft of the General 
Agreement.
11
 The negotiations went on from April to October 1947 and, eventually, the 
final text of GATT and the schedules of tariff commitments were agreed upon by the 
GATT contracting parties.
12
 
   In this sense, GATT was influenced by the Draft Charter of the ITO in many respects. 
With regard to remedies, the introduction of a “consultation” procedure for the 
“satisfactory adjustment of the matter” (comparable to a “satisfactory solution through 
consultation” under Article XXII of GATT), the concept of “nullification or impairment,” 
“appropriateness” and “suspension” emerged during the negotiations for drafting the 
Charter.
13
 
   Of course, this is not to suggest that the dispute settlement procedures and rules under 
GATT were identical to those found within the Draft Charter. The Draft Charter‟s rules 
were more elaborate and provided for its own dispute settlement procedures. Further, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf. The Charter, however, never came into force due 
to the failure of the ratification by the United States. See generally William Diebold Jr., The End of the ITO 
(1952). For a critical view on the establishment of the ITO, see Huber Henderson, A Criticism of the 
Havana Charter, 39 The Am. Econ. Rev. 605 (1949). 
11
 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], New York, Jan. 20-Feb. 25, 1947, Report of the Drafting 
Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 65, 
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34 (Mar. 5, 1947) [hereinafter New York Report]. 
12
 Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Sales No. 1947.II/10 (1947); General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
13
 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Geneva, Apr. 10-Oct. 30, 1947, Report of the Second 
Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 53, 
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/186 (Sept. 10, 1947) [hereinafter Geneva Report]; New York Report, supra note 11, at 
30; London Report, supra note 9, at 33. 
10 
 
Draft Charter permitted referrals of questions to the International Court of Justice for 
advisory opinions, an option that is not included in GATT.
14
 GATT only incorporated 
two rules from the Draft Charter, which were “consultations” under Article XXII and the 
concept of “nullification or impairment” under Article XXIII. 
   These differences aside, the Draft Charter generally has been considered as 
interpretative material for GATT since GATT was originally anticipated to be adopted 
into the institutional setting of the ITO. Although the Draft Charter differs from GATT in 
parts, it had a profound impact on the parties seeking to establish remedy procedures 
under GATT. 
 
2. Remedies under GATT 1947 
GATT did not provide for any specific remedy procedures in cases of member 
violations. As mentioned above, only a few paragraphs touched upon this subject, which 
were Articles XXII and XXIII.
15
 Much later, these Articles were supplemented by the 
Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance of 28 
November 1979 (hereinafter the “1979 Understanding”), and its Annex entitled, Agreed 
Description of the Customary Practice of GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement 
(Article XXIII:2).
16
 
                                                          
14
 See, e.g., Geneva Report, supra note 13, at 53-54. See also John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT 
System 58 (1990); Seymour J. Rubin, The Judicial Review Problem in the International Trade 
Organization, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 81 & 93 (1949). 
15
 Mavroidis, supra note 7, at 774; Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT Dispute Settlement System and 
the Uruguay Negotiations on its Reform, in Legal Issues in International Trade 53, 54 (Petar Sarcevic & 
Hans van Houtte eds., 1990). For a general overview on GATT remedies, see Pierre Pescatore, William J. 
Davey & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (1997); William J. Davey, 
Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 Fordham Int‟l L.J. 51 (1987); Olivier Long, Law and its Limitations in the 
GATT Multilateral Trade System (1985). 
16
 Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute 
Settlement and Surveillance, L/4907 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) 
[hereinafter 1979 Understanding]. The legal status of an “Understanding” is quite unclear and it seems not 
11 
 
Article XXII provides for consultations in two stages: bilateral consultation between 
contracting parties and the involvement of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
17
 Each 
contracting party may consult with each other “on any matter affecting the operation of 
this Agreement.” If parties are unable to find a satisfactory solution, the matter may be 
referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 
   Article XXIII:1 provides a separate consultation procedure. It lists the types of 
disputes that could be brought to consultations. These types have been labeled violation 
complaints, non-violation complaints and situation complaints. In each instance, the 
complaint must allege nullification or impairment of benefits or impediment to the 
attainment of any objectives of the Agreement. If there is no satisfactory adjustment to an 
Article XXIII:1 dispute, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
under Article XXIII:2. In such a case, the CONTRACTING PARTIES are to promptly 
investigate the matter and make appropriate recommendations or give a ruling on the 
matter. The CONTRACTING PARTIES are also authorized to suspend concessions and 
other obligations as retaliatory actions if circumstances are serious enough. 
As a supplement to Articles XXII and XXIII, Paragraph 4 of the Annex to the 1979 
Understanding established a fairly precise procedure with respect to remedies. It provides 
that the first objective of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is to secure the withdrawal of 
the inconsistent measure and that compensation should be resorted to as a temporary 
measure only in instances when compliance is impracticable. Further, retaliation is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to be a stand-alone treaty. However, it may be adopted under Article XXV:1 for the purpose of facilitating 
and furthering the operation and the objectives of the General Agreement. See John H. Jackson, The World 
Trading System 96 (1989). 
17
 The term “CONTRACTING PARTIES” in capital letters is defined under Article XXV:1 of GATT: 
“[w]herever reference is made in this Agreement to the contracting parties acting jointly they are designated 
as the CONTRACTING PARTIES.” Each contracting party is a member of the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES where each party is entitled to have one vote at all meetings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 
12 
 
allowed as a last resort subject to the authorization of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. In 
the following, I will describe each of these remedies in greater detail, respectively. 
 
  2.1. Withdrawal of Inconsistent Measures 
Parties to a dispute normally seek a mutually satisfactory and acceptable solution 
through consultation.
18
 However, when a mutually agreed solution is not achieved, the 
first objective of the CONTRACTING PARTIES is “to secure the withdrawal of the 
measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the General Agreement.”19 
In Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, the panel noted that where a measure concerned 
was in contradiction with the General Agreement, it in all cases would recommend that 
“the measure in question be removed.”20 Thus, when a panel finds a violation of GATT, 
it recommends the “cessation and non-repetition” of the violation, which seems to be in 
accordance with the primary remedy under public international law. 
In Norway – Trondheim Toll Equipment, the panel found Norway to be in violation of 
its GATT obligations when it subsidized a Norwegian company that was constructing a 
toll ring system in the city of Trondheim.
21
 It asked Norway to acknowledge the 
                                                          
18
 See GATT art. XXII:2. 
19
 Annex to the 1979 Understanding, ¶ 4. Paragraph I.1 of the Decision of 12 April 1989 on Improvements 
to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures also provides that “[p]rompt compliance with 
recommendations or rulings of the CONTRACTING PARTIES under Article XXIII is essential in order to 
ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all contracting parties.” See Decision of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, ¶ I.1, 
L/6489 (Apr. 12, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61, 67 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Decision]. The 
Report of the Review Session Working Party also noted that “the first objective, if the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES decided, in the event of a complaint under Article XXIII, that certain measures were inconsistent 
with provisions of the Agreement, should be to secure the withdrawal of the measures.” Review Report of 
the Working Parties, Reports Relating to the Review of the Agreement on Organization and Functional 
Questions, ¶ 64, L/327 (Feb. 28 & Mar. 5 & 7, 1955), GATT B.I.S.D. (3rd Supp.) at 231, 251 (1955) 
[hereinafter 1955 Report]. 
20
 Report of the Panel, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, ¶ 20, L/1923 (Nov. 16, 1962), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(11th Supp.) at 95, 101 (1963) [hereinafter Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII]. 
21
 See generally Report of the Panel, Norway – Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of 
13 
 
illegality of the subsidies and to provide guarantees for non-repetition. However, the 
panel did not force Norway to make any revocations or reimbursements, nor did it require 
Norway to provide any reparations for the harm suffered by the complaining party, the 
US. Although it mentioned that one way for Norway to bring “the Trondheim 
procurement into line with its obligations under the Agreement would be by annulling the 
contract and recommencing the procurement process,” it concluded that such 
recommendations would be beyond the customary practice in dispute settlement under 
the GATT system and that they would be disproportionate in this case.
22
 
GATT provides a time frame for the implementation of panel recommendations. This 
recognizes the time it may take a member state to make the necessary changes to its 
domestic law in implementing the recommendations. Paragraph I.2 of the 1989 Decision 
provides that “[i]f it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Trondheim, GPR.DS2/R (Apr. 28, 1992), GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 319 (1993). 
22
 Id. ¶ 4.17. However, there were seven unusual cases dealing with anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties where retroactive remedies were provided. For adopted reports, see Report of the Panel, New 
Zealand – Imports of Electrical Transformers from Finland, L/5814 (Jul. 18, 1985), GATT B.I.S.D. (32nd 
Supp.) at 55 (1986); Report of the Panel, United States – Countervailing Duties on Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Pork from Canada, DS7/R (Jul. 11, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (38th Supp.) at 30 (1992); Report of the 
Panel, United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, SCM/162 (Oct. 27, 
1993), GATT B.I.S.D. (40th Supp.) at 358 (1995). For un-adopted reports, see Report of the Panel, Canada 
– Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Manufacturing Beef from the EEC, SCM/85 (Oct. 13, 
1987); Report of the Panel, United States – Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Import of Seamless 
Stainless Steel Hollow Products from Sweden, ADP/47 (Aug. 20, 1990); Report of the Panel, United States 
– Anti-Dumping Duties on Gray Portland Cement and Cement Clinker from Mexico, ADP/82 (Sept. 7, 
1992); Report of the Panel, United States – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Stainless Steel Plate from 
Sweden, ADP/117 (Feb. 24, 1994). However, the use of retroactive relief seems to be limited to anti-
dumping and countervailing duties practice. Hudec argues that these cases are merely an exception to 
ordinary GATT practice of denying reimbursement. See Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of 
Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement, in Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues & 
Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts & Tribunals 369, 379 & 382 (Friedl Weiss ed., 
2000). The decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES in Netherlands Measures of Suspension supports his 
argument by concluding that retroactive remedies would be inappropriate and a departure from GATT 
practice. Furthermore, it stated that such remedies were not within customary practice under GATT and 
would go beyond the terms of reference of the panel. See Netherlands Measures of Suspension of 
Obligations to the United States (Nov. 8, 1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32 (1953) [hereinafter 
Netherlands Measures of Suspension]. For more on the issue of retroactive remedies in GATT, see 
Mavroidis, supra note 7, at 775; Grane, supra note 7, at 765; Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International 
Trade Law: the Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System 253-254 (1993). 
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or rulings, the contracting party concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in 
which to do so.”23 For instance, the US government requested a reasonable period of 
time to repeal its domestic law, Section 104 of the United States Defense Production 
Act.
24
 
 
2.2. Compensation 
There is no specific provision on compensation under the General Agreement. Only 
the 1955 Report and the Annex to the 1979 Understanding note the provision of 
compensation. The term “compensation” first emerged in the 1955 Report. It provides 
that “the alternative of providing compensation for damage suffered should be resorted to 
only if the immediate withdrawal of the measures was impracticable and only as a 
temporary measure pending the withdrawal of the measures which were inconsistent with 
the Agreement.”25  Paragraph 4 of the Annex to the 1979 Understanding contains 
precisely the same sentence. The important implication here is that compensation is a 
remedy that is available only for as long as the inconsistent measures have not been 
withdrawn. Thus, only a member state‟s failure to comply with panel recommendations 
would lead to the provision of compensation. 
   Although the term “compensation” has not been defined, it is considered in practice 
to be the granting of concessions in the form of greater market access, i.e., tariff reduction, 
by the violating party. It is, to a certain extent, to return the disputing contracting parties 
                                                          
23
 Paragraph 22 of the 1979 Understanding also provides that recommendations by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES are to be implemented “within a reasonable period of time.” 
24
 See CONTRACTING PARTIES, Sixth Session, Summary Record of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting, Held 
at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, 8, GATT/CP.6/SR.27 (Oct. 30, 1951). In GATT practice, however, the 
Council has often not specified the “reasonable period of time.” See Petersmann, supra note 15, at 91. 
25
 The 1955 Report, supra note 19, ¶ 64. 
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to a mutual balance of tariff concessions.
26
 It is left to the contracting parties to 
determine compensatory concessions. Thus, it is a matter agreed upon by the parties 
concerned, and the panels do not adjudicate on specific matters of compensation.
27
 
   In practice, the panels declined to recommend or suggest compensation. In EEC – 
Dessert Apples, Chile argued that it was entitled to compensation due to the distortion of 
the competitive relationship on the basis of losses and lost opportunities to Chilean 
exporters.
28
 Although the panel recognized the possibility of compensation by recalling 
the 1965 Note and the 1979 Understanding, it noted that there was no provision in GATT 
requiring the parties to provide compensation. As such, it declined to suggest 
compensation.
29
 In US – Sugar Waiver, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
argued that the US restriction on imports on sugar-containing products was inconsistent 
with Article XI. It further argued that it was entitled to compensation due to nullified or 
impaired benefits from the US restriction. By referring to paragraph 4 of the Annex to the 
1979 Understanding, the panel relied on the same reasoning as EEC – Dessert Apples, 
finding that “[a] contracting party might, in conformity with that provision, choose to 
grant compensation to forestall a request for an authorization of retaliatory measures 
                                                          
26
 Compensation seems to accord in part with the notion of “reparation” under public international law. 
The purpose of reparation is to eliminate the consequences of the illegal act and restore the situation to the 
status quo ante. It is well pronounced in Chorzow Factory that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe 
out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if that act had not been committed.” Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13). Compensation in GATT, as noted previously, is prospective restoration of the 
status quo ante; it does not compensate for damages caused by the breach. 
27
 Committee on Trade and Development, Note by the Secretariat: Compensation to Less-Developed 
Contracting Parties for Loss of Trading Opportunities Resulting from the Application of Residual 
Restrictions, ¶ 10, COM.TD/5 (Mar. 2, 1965) [hereinafter 1965 Note]. 
28
 Report of the Panel, European Economic Community – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples – 
Complaint by Chile, ¶¶ 10.1-10.4, L/6491 (Jun. 22, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 93, 120-121 
(1990) [hereinafter EEC – Dessert Apples]. 
29
 Id. ¶¶ 12.34-12.36. 
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under Art. XXIII:2, but the Understanding does not oblige it to do so.”30 Hence, in 
practice, the CONTRACTING PARTIES or panels declined to provide compensation. It 
was optional available to the parties in the dispute to offer and determine compensation 
by mutual agreement. 
 
2.3. Retaliation 
2.3.1. Authorization of Retaliation 
Under GATT practice, retaliation was to be taken as a last resort in the form of 
suspension of concessions or other obligations and “at the discretion of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES in defined circumstances.” 31  The CONTRACTING 
PARTIES may authorize retaliation when a violating party does not comply with a panel 
recommendation within a reasonable period of time. In other words, retaliation should not 
be authorized unless compliance has not been achieved within such a period.
32
 
   The purpose of retaliation was to maintain a mutual balance of concessions and 
obligations.
33
 Thus, it was to offset the reduction in benefits resulting from non-
                                                          
30
 Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and Sugar Containing 
Products Applied under the 1955 Wavier and under the Headnote to the Schedule of Tariff Concessions, ¶ 
5.22, L/6631 (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 228, 262 (1991) [hereinafter US – Sugar 
Waiver]. 
31
 See Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, supra note 20, ¶ 11. 
32
 In French Import Restrictions, the panel found that the French import restrictions were inconsistent with 
Article XI and suggested “that the CONTRACTING PARTIES recommended to the United States 
Government that it refrain, for a reasonable period, from exercising its right, under the procedure of 
paragraph 2 of Article XXIII, to propose suspension of the application of equivalent obligation or 
concessions.” Report of the Panel, French Import Restriction, ¶ 7, L/1921 (Nov. 14, 1962), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(11th Supp.) at 94, 95 (1963) [hereinafter French Import Restriction]. 
33
 See John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 177 (1969). See also Sungjoon Cho, the Nature 
of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 763, 766-767 (2004) (Arguing that the form of 
remedies under GATT 1947 was “mainly a reciprocal tariff reduction mechanism.” He further notes that it 
was intended to “restore the delicate balance of interests that contracting parties had labored to establish 
through a series of tariff reductions”); Brendan P. McGivern, Seeking Compliance with WTO Rulings: 
Theory, Practice and Alternatives, 36 Int‟l Law. 141, 144 (2002) (Arguing that one of the primary purposes 
of retaliation under GATT was to restore balance of concessions between the complaining and defending 
member); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Verbatim Report of the Second Session of the 
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compliance. This notion was based on the reciprocity principle, one of the fundamental 
principles underlying GATT, that “each government‟s obligations are given in exchange 
for the obligations of the other parties to the agreement” in order to liberalize trade.34 In 
addition, another purpose was to prevent contracting parties from unilateral reprisals 
which were often unnecessary and excessive. Hence, the objective was to provide 
multilaterally authorized retaliation.
35
  
There was only one instance where retaliation was authorized under GATT. In 
Netherlands Measures of Suspension, the US did not remove its import restrictions, 
which were found to be inconsistent to the General Agreement. In response, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES authorized the Netherlands to “suspend the application to the 
United States of their obligation under the General Agreement to the extent necessary to 
allow the Netherlands Government to impose an upper limit of 60,000 metric tons on 
imports of wheat flour from the United States during the calendar year 1953.”36 However, 
the Netherlands did not retaliate against the US. After a number of years, a compromise 
was apparently reached as the US relaxed its quotas on Edam and Gouda cheese and the 
Netherlands no longer requested the extension of its authority to retaliate.
37
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/PC/T/A/PV/6 (Jun. 2, 1947) (Noting that “[w]hat we have really provided, in the last analysis, is not that 
retaliation shall be invited or sanctions invoked, but that a balance of interests, once established, shall be 
maintained”). 
34
 Long, supra note 15, at 10-11. 
35
 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, 
International Organizations and Dispute Settlement 82 (1997). 
36
 Report to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, Working Party 8 on Netherlands Action under Article XXIII:2, 
¶ 7, L/61 (Nov. 7, 1952) [hereinafter Working Party 8 on Netherlands Action]; CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
United States Import Restrictions on Dairy Products, Resolution of 5 November 1954, L/280 (Nov. 11, 
1954). 
37
 Naboth van den Broek, Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Reports, 37 J. World Trade 127, 144 (2003). For a detailed explanation on 
this case, see Hudec, supra note 8, at 191-198. 
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2.3.2. Requirements 
   In order for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to authorize retaliation, two essential 
requirements must be met. These requirements are explicitly set forth in Article XXIII:2. 
Under Article XXIII:2, retaliation is permissible only “if the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action” and “authorize 
a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or 
parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine 
to be appropriate in the circumstances.” Put simply, retaliation is authorized only (1) if 
the circumstances were “serious enough” and (2) to the extent that it is “appropriate” in 
the circumstances. 
 
2.3.2.1. Serious Enough 
The “serious enough” requirement consists of two elements. First, the circumstances 
are “serious enough” when the party concerned has exhausted all other appropriate 
remedies and, thus, retaliation is the only means to prevent nullification or restore the 
status quo ante. The 1955 Report notes as follows: 
 
[I]t was, therefore, desirable that resort should be had to retaliatory action 
only when all other possibilities had been explored. 
 
The requirement in paragraph 2 of . . . Article XXIII that the circumstances 
must be “serious enough” limits the possibility of authorizing a contracting 
party or parties to take appropriate retaliatory action to cases where 
endeavours to solve the problem through the withdrawal of the measures 
causing the damage, the substitution of other concessions, or some other 
appropriate action have not proved to be possible, and where there is 
considered to be a substantial justification for retaliatory action, as in cases 
in which such authorization appears to be the only means either of 
preventing serious economic consequences to the country for which a benefit 
19 
 
has been nullified or impaired, or the only means of restoring the original 
situation.
38
 
 
Second, the “serious enough” requirement is limited to cases where a benefit is being 
nullified or impaired. It seems quite clear from the language in Paragraph 5 of the Annex 
to the 1979 Understanding: “contracting parties have had recourse to Article XXIII only 
when in their view a benefit accruing to them under the General Agreement was being 
nullified or impaired.” In Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, the panel also noted that 
“the situation must be serious enough limits the applicability of the provision to cases 
where there is nullification or impairment; it would at any rate be difficult to conceive a 
situation in which the suspension of concessions or obligations could be appropriate 
where nullification or impairment was not involved.”39 Thus, the mere fact that the 
attainment of any objective of GATT was being impeded would apparently fail to meet 
the “serious enough” requirement. 
 
2.3.2.2. Appropriateness Standard 
The appropriateness standard is comprised of three elements. Two of these elements 
were mentioned by the Working Party in Netherlands Measures of Suspension. It 
considered (1) “whether, in the circumstances, the proposed measure was appropriate in 
                                                          
38
 The 1955 Report, supra note 19, ¶¶ 62-63. 
39
 Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, supra note 20, ¶ 13. See also Report of the Panel, Conciliation, 
Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, ¶ 2, L/2074 (Mar. 3, 1965), GATT B.I.S.D. (13th Supp.) at 35, 36 
(1966). The panel recommended as follows: 
These contracting parties concerned were asked to report by 1 March 1963 on action taken 
to comply with the recommendations or on any other satisfactory adjustment, such as the 
provision of suitable concessions acceptable to Uruguay. It was provided that, if by that date 
any recommendation has not been carried out and no satisfactory adjustment has been 
effected, the circumstances will be deemed to be “serious enough” to justify action under the 
penultimate sentence of paragraph 2 of Article XXIII and Uruguay will be entitled 
immediately to request authority to suspend obligations or concessions. 
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character,” and (2) “whether the extent of retaliation was reasonable in light of the 
impairment suffered.”40 With respect to the reasonableness of retaliation in light of the 
impairment suffered, the Working Party further recognized that although “it was 
appropriate to consider calculations of the trade affected by the measures and 
countermeasures in question, it was aware that a pure statistical test would not . . . be 
sufficient and that it would also be necessary to consider the broader economic elements 
entering into the assessment of the impairment suffered.”41 
   The third element requires retaliation to have an inducement effect for compliance. In 
the 1952 Meeting, the Working Party made it clear that the determination on the level of 
retaliation “would be more appropriate in the sense best calculated to achieve the purpose 
for which the measure was taken, i.e.[,] the removal of the [inconsistent measures].”42 
   Overall, retaliation meets the appropriateness standard when (1) it is appropriate in 
character, (2) the level of retaliation is reasonable in light of the impairment suffered, 
having regard to the value of trade affected and the broader economic elements, and (3) it 
achieves the eventual solution in accordance with the purpose of GATT. 
The appropriateness standard is deemed to require some level of equivalence between 
the nullification or impairment and the retaliation.
43
 However, it does not call for exact 
equivalence. Mathur, the GATT Deputy Director-General, emphasized that: 
 
Article XXIII:2, unlike Article XXVIII, did not speak about equivalent 
concessions and therefore, it was not really a question of authorizing the 
                                                          
40
 Working Party 8 on Netherlands Action, supra note 36, ¶ 3. 
41
 Id. ¶ 4. 
42
 CONTRACTING PARTIES, Summary Record of the Seventeenth Meeting, Held at the Palais des 
Nations, Geneva, ¶ 1, SR.7/17 (Nov. 18, 1952). 
43
 In Netherlands Measures of Suspension, the Working Party examined the appropriateness of the 
retaliation “having regard to its equivalence to the impairment suffered by the Netherlands as a result of the 
United States restrictions.” Working Party 8 on Netherlands Action, supra note 36, ¶ 2. 
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withdrawal of equivalent concessions as such. That was why the Secretariat 
had pointed out that Article XXIII did not require that amount of retaliation 
should be equivalent, and that the CONTRACTING PARTIES might wish to 
determine what other factors to take into account in examining the 
appropriateness of the proposed retaliatory measure.
44
 
 
Thus, the term appropriate is considered to be a less strict term than equivalence, 
which may, in fact, provide some flexibility in determining the level of retaliation. 
 
2.4. Multilateral Surveillance of Implementation 
Paragraph 22 of the 1979 Understanding provides that the “CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall keep under surveillance any matter on which they have made 
recommendations or given rulings.” It further reads that “[i]f the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES‟ recommendations are not implemented within a reasonable period of time, the 
contracting party bringing the case may ask the CONTRACTING PARTIES to make 
suitable efforts with a view to finding an appropriate solution.” 
The Ministerial Declaration of 29 November 1982, Decision on Dispute Settlement 
(hereinafter the “1982 Declaration”), specifies the role of the Council on surveillance. 
Under Paragraph (viii) of the 1982 Declaration, in furtherance of paragraph 22 of the 
1979 Understanding, it provides that “the Council shall periodically review the action 
taken pursuant to such recommendations. The contracting party, to which such a 
recommendation has been addressed, shall report within a reasonable specified period on 
action taken or on its reasons for not implementing the recommendation or ruling by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES.”45 In addition, unless the Council decides otherwise, “the 
                                                          
44
 GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting, Held in the Centre William Rappard on 22 September 1988, 19, 
C/M/224 (Oct. 17, 1988). 
45
 Paragraph I.2 of the 1989 Decision also provides that the “contracting party concerned shall inform the 
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issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings shall be on the agenda until 
the issue is resolved. At least ten days prior to each such Council meeting, the contracting 
party concerned shall provide the Council with a status report in writing of its 
[implementation] progress . . . .”46 
The purpose of surveillance is to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned, if 
they are found to be inconsistent with GATT. This mechanism has promoted “rule 
integrity” in the GATT system.47 
 
2.5. Problems of GATT Dispute Settlement Remedies 
Overall, the primary remedy under the GATT procedure is to secure the withdrawal of 
the inconsistent measures. If the immediate withdrawal is impracticable, compensation 
may be resorted to as a temporary measure upon the parties‟ agreement. And if the 
inconsistent measures have not been removed within a reasonable period of time, as a last 
resort, the CONTRACTING PATIES may authorize retaliation. 
   However, problems persisted in implementing these remedies. First, some parties 
retained legal authority not to obey their GATT obligations. This situation would arise 
when a losing party blocked the adoption of a panel report, which required the consent of 
all GATT contracting parties under the “consensus rule” to be adopted. 48  Absent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Council of its intention in respect of implementation of the recommendations or rulings.” 
46
 The 1989 Decision, supra note 19, ¶ I.3. 
47
 Jackson, supra note 16, at 113. 
48
 Long argues that “it has become more difficult to sustain consensus against the background of the 
growing diversity of trends and tendencies in trade relations; uncertainties in the world economy; 
differences in the economic strength, systems and priorities of GATT member governments; and last but 
not least, the constant pressure of national political constraints.” Long, supra note 15, at 88. For a general 
explanation on this issue, see also William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Ill. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-08, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=419943; Friedl Weiss, Improving WTO Procedural Law: Problems and Lessons 
from the Practice of other International Courts and Tribunals, in Improving WTO Dispute Settlement 
Procedures: Issues & Lessons from the Practice of Other International Courts & Tribunals 17, 22 (Friedl 
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adoption, a panel report would simply represent the personal views of the panel, and not 
an official report. Furthermore, a losing party had the option of blocking the 
implementation of panel recommendation and the authorization of retaliation, even if a 
panel report was adopted. In US – Superfund, US legislation, the so-called Superfund Act, 
imposed a tax that differentiated between domestic crude oil and imported petroleum 
products. The panel concluded that such a measure was in violation of the national 
treatment requirement of GATT.
49
 While the US did not block the adoption of the report, 
it refused to comply with the panel ruling by arguing that its trade effects were minimal 
and the measure concerned did not nullify or impair benefits of the European 
Communities (EC) and Canada. Authorization for retaliation was requested by the EC 
and Canada, but it was not approved due to the blockage of authorization by the US.
50
 
Thus, in reality, there was no binding requirement for the parties to follow panel reports. 
It was essentially left up to the discretion of the parties whether they would comply with 
their GATT obligations. 
Second, remedy procedures tended to drag on for years because parties would request 
time extensions to implement panel recommendations which would make their domestic 
laws consistent with GATT. In US – Section 337, the panel found that Section 337 of the 
United States Tariff Act of 1930 was inconsistent with Article III:4 of GATT and 
recommended that the US bring its procedure into conformity with its GATT 
obligations.
51
 However, the US dragged out its compliance until its negotiating 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Weiss ed., 2000); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the new 
GATT, 88 Am. J. Int‟l L. 477, 479-480 (1994). 
49
 See generally Report of the Panel, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances 
(Superfund), L/6175 (June 17, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988). 
50
 See Communication from Canada, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances 
Follow-up on the Panel Report (L/6175), L/6559 (Jul. 31, 1989). 
51
 See Report of the Panel, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶¶ 6.1-6.4, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 
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objectives on the treatment of patents were satisfied in the Uruguay Round.
52
 Similarly, 
in US – DISC, the US took twelve years to pass a new statute to replace their prior 
inconsistent measure.
53
 
   Lastly, in the light of the difficulties in dealing with politically sensitive issues, parties 
would often choose to enforce international trade rules on their own, disregarding the 
remedy procedures available under GATT. In particular, the US initiated proceedings 
under Section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974 to take unilateral retaliation. 
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) conducted 91 cases under Section 301 
and Special 301, imposing retaliatory measures in 11 of these cases.
54
 
These problems were left for the drafters of the WTO agreements to provide changes 
and improvements. 
 
II. Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
   Unlike GATT, which was purely an agreement, the WTO was established as an 
integrated organization. It covers a much wider range of trade, including services and 
intellectual property. 
   In the Uruguay Round, the governments agreed to replace the GATT dispute 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, 396 (1990). 
52
 See Ernest P. Shriver, Separate But Equal: Intellectual Property Importation and the Recent 
Amendments to Section 337, 5 Minn. J. Global Trade 441 (1996). 
53
 See generally Report of the Panel, United States Tax Legislation – “Domestic International Sales 
Corporation” (DISC), L/4422 (Nov. 12, 1976), GATT B.I.S.D. (23rd Supp.) at 98 (1977); Communication 
from the Commission of the European Communities, United States Tax Legislation – “Domestic 
International Sales Corporation” (DISC), Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by the European Communities, 
L/3851 (May 1, 1973). 
54
 See Norio Komuro, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism – Coverage and Procedures of the WTO 
Understanding, 29 J. World Trade 5, 74 (1995). For an excellent overview of the WTO case on Section 301, 
see Seung Hwa Chang, Taming Unilateralism under the Multilateral Trade System: Unfinished Job in the 
WTO Panel Ruling on U.S. Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 31 Law & Pol‟y Int‟l Bus. 1151 
(2000). For more on the issue of unilateral retaliation, see Rachel Brewster, Shadow Unilateralism: 
Enforcing International Trade Law at the WTO, 30 U. Pa. J. Int‟l L. 1133 (2009); Jackson, supra note 14, at 
69-73. 
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settlement procedure. Thus, there were a number of improvements to the dispute 
settlement procedure from the inception of the WTO. First, as mentioned earlier, the 
dispute settlement procedure was incorporated into a single text, the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, or more commonly referred 
to as the DSU. The DSU is arguably the most significant achievement of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. Many aspects of the WTO dispute settlement procedure were newly 
introduced, while some parts were inherited from its predecessor, GATT. The members of 
the WTO have affirmed, under Article 3.1 of the DSU, “their adherence to the principles 
for the management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of 
GATT 1947.” The DSU provides the basic rules and procedures of WTO dispute 
settlement. It applies to disputes between members concerning their rights and 
obligations under the WTO Agreement.
55
 
Second, the establishment of the Appellate Body, a standing body that hears appeals 
from panel cases, has strengthened the dispute settlement process of the WTO. The 
review at an appellate stage has led to more “judicial-like” settlement of disputes. 
   Third, the problems of delay and blockage that existed under GATT were resolved. In 
the event of non-compliance, a violating WTO member has no right to veto either the 
adoption of the panel or Appellate Body reports and their legal rulings or the 
authorization of retaliation. Reports are adopted and retaliation is authorized pursuant to 
the rule of “reverse-consensus” decision making.56 Moreover, the DSU has specified a 
strict time frame for every procedural stage in order to promote prompt resolution of 
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 See DSU art. 1.1. 
56
 The “reverse-consensus” rule is that the DSB must grant a request unless all WTO members, including 
the member that made the request, decide to reject it. It applies to the establishment of a panel, the adoption 
of panel and Appellate Body reports, and the suspension of concessions or other obligations. 
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disputes. 
In sum, the WTO dispute settlement procedure is automatically applied, without the 
possibility of blockage by its members, pursuant to strict time limits and through an 
articulated process, including appellate review. Thus, although it takes over the GATT 
remedies, in many respects, it is different from the GATT dispute settlement procedure. 
This has resulted in the strengthened enforceability of WTO obligations. In the following, 
I will examine the procedural stages of WTO dispute settlement remedies. 
 
1. Withdrawal of Inconsistent Measures 
   The remedies under the WTO dispute settlement procedure are clearly defined under 
Article 3.7 of the DSU. At the pre-litigation stage, a solution mutually satisfactory to the 
parties to a dispute, that is consistent with WTO obligations, is preferred. However, in the 
absence of such a solution, if litigation ensues, the first objective of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be 
inconsistent with WTO obligations. And if the immediate withdrawal of such measures is 
impracticable, compensation may be provided. As a last resort, a complaining member 
may request authorization of retaliation in the form of suspension of concessions or other 
obligations under WTO obligations. Both compensation and retaliation are temporary 
measures pending the withdrawal of inconsistent measures.
57
 
   The dispute settlement process normally results in the adoption of panel or Appellate 
Body rulings, which take the form of reports.
58
 If a panel or the Appellate Body finds 
                                                          
57
 DSU art. 3.7.  
58
 The report of a panel and the Appellate Body needs to be adopted by the DSB in order to obtain its legal 
status. The DSB administers the dispute settlement rules and procedures. It is composed of representatives 
of all WTO members. 
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that the measure concerned is inconsistent with WTO obligations, it recommends that the 
violating member should bring its measure into conformity with the WTO agreement.
59
 
A panel or the Appellate Body may also suggest ways in which the member concerned 
could implement the recommendations.
60
 
What is meant by bringing measures into conformity? The concept of compliance is 
well defined in Argentina – Hides and Leather. The arbitrators stated that the concept of 
compliance is a technical concept requiring specific content, meaning either 
“withdrawing such measure completely,” or “modifying it by excising or correcting the 
offending portion of the measure involved.”61 
Thus, the primary remedy for a breach of WTO obligations is the implementation of a 
panel or Appellate Body recommendation, which is the withdrawal of inconsistent 
measures.
62
 
 
1.1. Prompt Compliance 
The DSU calls for “prompt compliance” in order to ensure effective resolution of 
                                                          
59
 DSU art. 19.1. 
60
 Although there are cases where the panels and Appellate Body have made suggestions, they generally 
decline to do so, so as to give discretion to members in how they bring their measures into conformity with 
WTO obligations. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood 
Lumber from Canada, ¶ 8.6, WT/DS264/R (Apr. 13, 2004) (Noting that “a panel is not required to make a 
suggestion should it not deem it appropriate to do so”); Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Duty 
on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or above from Korea, ¶ 
7.4, WT/DS99/R (Jan. 29, 1999) (Noting that there is a “range of possible ways” for the US to 
“appropriately implement” the panel recommendation). 
61
 Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of 
Finished Leather, Arbitration under 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, ¶¶ 40-41, WT/DS155/10 (Aug. 31, 2001) (emphasis original). 
62
 In order to bring an inconsistent measure into conformity, it must have a “continuing character” at the 
time the panel report is adopted. Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.19, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996). See also Panel Report, Chile – Price Band 
System and Safeguard Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products, ¶ 7.112, WT/DS207/R (May 3, 
2002) (Noting that a panel could recommend a violating member to bring a measure into conformity only 
when that measure is “still in force”). 
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disputes to the benefit of all members.
63
 In order to achieve prompt compliance, a 
violating member has to begin to implement the recommendations right after the adoption 
of a panel or Appellate Body report.
64
 
 
1.2. Reasonable Period of Time 
However, if it is “impracticable to comply immediately with recommendations and 
rulings,” the member concerned is given a “reasonable period of time” to comply with its 
WTO obligations.
65
 In other words, a reasonable period of time is not always available 
unconditionally. It is provided only when prompt compliance is impracticable.
66
 In 
practice, however, a claim that a reasonable period of time is required to implement has 
not been successfully challenged. 
   The reasonable period of time is normally determined by agreement of the parties to a 
dispute.
67
 If the parties cannot agree on the period, it is determined through binding 
arbitration within 90 days after the date of adoption of a report. And the reasonable 
period of time to implement recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the 
date of adoption of a report.
68
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 DSU art. 21.1. 
64
 See Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Arbitration under 
Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, ¶ 46, 
WT/DS160/12 (Jan. 15, 2001). 
65
 DSU art. 21.3. For a detailed explanation on the “reasonable period of time,” see Shin-yi Peng, How 
Much Time is Reasonable? – The Arbitration Decisions under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, 26 Berkeley J. 
Int‟l L. 323 (2008). 
66
 See Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, ¶ 40, WT/DS217/14 & WT/DS234/22 (Jun. 13, 2003). 
67
 DSU art. 21.3(b). Parties to a dispute have to mutually agree on a period of time within 45 days after the 
date of adoption of a report. 
68
 DSU art. 21.3(c). 
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   In an arbitration proceeding, it is beyond the scope of the arbitrators‟ mandate to 
suggest ways or means of implementation. Their task is only to determine a reasonable 
period of time within which implementation must be completed.
69
 
   During the course of a reasonable period of time, a violating member does not have to 
provide relief for the past effect of its inconsistent measure. In US – Section 129(c)(1) 
URAA, the panel rejected a request for retroactive relief by recognizing “that a Member‟s 
obligation under the DSU is to provide prospective relief in the form of withdrawing a 
measure inconsistent with a WTO agreement, or bringing that measure into conformity 
with the agreement by the end of the reasonable period of time.”70 
 
1.3. Compliance Review 
When there is disagreement as to the consistency of measures taken to comply with 
the recommendations, such a dispute can be decided through recourse to “the original 
panel.”71 This is often called “compliance review.” The compliance review panel is to 
“circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral.”72 
Compliance review is not limited to the issue of whether a violating member has 
implemented the recommendations. It also reviews whether the adopted compliance 
                                                          
69
 See Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, ¶ 38, WT/DS26/15 & WT/DS48/13 (May 29, 1998). 
70
 Panel Report, United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, ¶ 3.93, 
WT/DS221/R (Jul. 15, 2002). Thus, a violating member may maintain its inconsistent measure until the 
expiration of the reasonable period of time. However, in Brazil – Aircraft, the Appellate Body noted that 
determining a reasonable period of time under Article 21.3 is not required under the prohibited subsidies 
provisions of the SCM Agreement. They state that a subsidy must be withdrawn without delay. See 
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 192, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 
2, 1999). For more on this issue, see Ch. 2. Sec. II. 3.3.3. 
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 DSU art. 21.5. 
72
 Id. 
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measure is consistent with WTO obligations.
73
 
Increasingly, WTO members have sought recourse through these compliance review 
procedures, which may be an undesirable trend. This implies that violating members are 
making only minor changes to the measures found to be inconsistent with WTO 
agreements.
74
 
  
2. Compensation 
If compliance has not been achieved within a reasonable period of time, the violating 
member can offer compensation as a temporary measure.
75
 Compensation is intended to 
ease the adverse effect of an inconsistent measure pending its full elimination. Thus, a 
complaining member cannot simply request compensation upon the determination of 
inconsistency of a measure. Only failure to comply with the recommendations and 
rulings can give rise to the remedy of compensation. 
The parties to a dispute may enter into negotiations “no later than the expiry of the 
reasonable period of time,” “with a view to developing mutually acceptable 
compensation.”76 Compensation normally involves a lifting of trade barriers such as 
tariff reductions or increases in import quotas by a violating member. 
However, compensation is hardly ever offered because of its voluntary nature. 
Moreover, since it has to conform to the requirements of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
                                                          
73
 See Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, Recourse by 
Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, ¶¶ 40-42, WT/DS70/AB/RW (Jul. 21, 2000). See also in US – Shrimp, 
the Appellate Body noted that, when the issue concerns the consistency of a new measure taken to comply, 
the task of compliance review is to consider that new measure “in its totality.” Appellate Body Report, 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 87, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter US – Shrimp]. 
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 See Davey, supra note 48, at 26. 
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 DSU art. 22.1. 
76
 DSU art. 22.2. 
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clause, a violating member may effectively have to provide compensation to all its 
trading partners. Thus, there is reluctance for the violating member to offer compensation. 
These conditions make compensation less attractive in terms of its implementation.
77
 
Up to the present, there have been only four cases where compensation was offered as 
a mutually acceptable solution. Three of them were provided in the form of trade 
compensation. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, Japan provided compensation in the form 
of tariff reductions with regard to certain products from the complaining members, the 
US, Canada and the EC.
78
 The compensation was provided because Japan delayed 
implementation of nondiscriminatory taxation with respect to a certain type of Sochu for 
five years, which was greatly beyond the reasonable time period of 15 months.
79
 In 
Turkey – Textile Imports, after the reasonable period of time had expired, Turkey agreed 
to provide compensation to India by removing quantitative restrictions on textile imports 
and carrying out tariff reductions on certain chemicals from India.
80
 The compensation 
remained effective until Turkey‟s compliance with the recommendations and rulings of 
the DSB.
81
 In US – Line Pipe Safeguard, Korea and the US agreed to increase the 
in-quota volume of imports from Korea as a temporary measure pending the quota‟s 
termination, if the safeguard measure had not been removed by the expiration of the 
reasonable period of time.
82
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 Under MFN treatment, a member has to treat all its trading partners equally in respect of such matters as 
tariff levels. For more in detail, see Ch. 2. Sec. II. 5.2.2. 
78
 See Mutually Acceptable Solutions on Modalities for Implementation, Addendum, Japan – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/17/Add.1, WT/DS10/17/Add.1 & WT/DS11/15/Add.1 (Jan. 12, 1998). 
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 See Award of the Arbitrator, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Arbitration under Article 21(3)(c) of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, ¶ 8, WT/DS8/15, 
WT/DS10/15 & WT/DS11/13 (Feb. 14, 1997). 
80
 See Notification of Mutually Acceptable Solution, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products, WT/DS34/14 (Jul. 19, 2001). 
81
 Id. 
82
 See Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/18 (Jul. 31, 2002). See also 
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Although monetary compensation is neither explicitly provided nor prohibited in the 
WTO, there was one case in which monetary payment was provided temporarily. In US – 
Copyright Act, Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act was found to be in violation of 
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
83
 
Section 110(5) exempted small bars, restaurants, and other public places from paying 
royalty fees for playing music. The panel found that the US Copyright Act was 
inconsistent with certain provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and recommended that the 
US bring its Act into conformity with the WTO agreement.
84
 When the US had not 
implemented the panel‟s recommendation, the EC requested the authorization to suspend 
concessions pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU.
85
 However, the US and the EC sought 
an arbitral award under Article 25 of the DSU to determine the appropriate monetary 
compensation for a three-year period as a mutually satisfactory temporary arrangement.
86
 
Distinctively, the case was first brought to arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, 
whereas such determinations are normally conducted by arbitration proceedings arising 
under Article 22.6.
87
 It determined the level of nullification or impairment of benefits, 
which amounted to €1,219,900 per year. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Rossella Brevetti, Bush Signs Proclamation to Implement Line Pipe Agreement with South Korea, 19 Int‟l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1518 (Sept. 5, 2002). 
83
 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
84
 See generally Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (Jun. 
15, 2000). For detailed explanations on this case, see Bernard O‟Connor & Margareta Djordjevic, Practical 
Aspects of Monetary Compensation: The US – Copyright Case, 8 J. Int‟l Econ. L. 127 (2005); Gene M. 
Grossman & Petros C. Mavroidis, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Recourse to 
Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU: Would‟ve or Should‟ve? Impaired Benefits due to Copyright 
Infringement, 2 World Trade Rev. 233 (2003). 
85
 See Recourse by the European Communities to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United States – Section 110(5) 
of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/19 (Jan. 11, 2002). 
86
 See Notification of a Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement, United States – Section 110(5) of 
the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/23 (Jun. 26, 2003). 
87
 For the determination of the level of nullification or impairment in the case, see Award of the Arbitrators, 
United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the 
DSU, WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
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3. Retaliation 
3.1. Authorization of Retaliation 
If no satisfactory compensation can be agreed upon within 20 days after the date of 
expiry of the reasonable period of time, a complaining member may “request 
authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations” under WTO 
agreements.
88
 Upon receipt of such a request, the DSB shall grant authorization within 
30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time.
89
 All other possible remedies 
under the DSU must be exhausted in order to request retaliation. 
Like compensation, retaliation is implemented in a temporary manner only when the 
inconsistent measure has not been removed within a reasonable period of time.
90
 
Retaliation is implemented in the form of suspension of concessions or other obligations. 
Thus, contrary to compensation, retaliation normally implies raising trade barriers by the 
complaining member. In addition, unlike compensation where a violating member has to 
compensate all its trading members under MFN treatment, it affects only the members 
involved in the dispute. 
Once the measure found to be inconsistent with the WTO agreement has been 
removed, retaliation is terminated. 
 
3.2. Cross-Retaliation 
In order to suspend concessions or other obligations, a complaining member has to 
follow the principles and procedures set out in Article 22.3 of the DSU. Accordingly, 
there are three types of retaliation to be considered in sequence. First, a complaining 
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 DSU art. 22.2. 
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 DSU art. 22.6. 
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 DSU art. 22.1 & 22.8. 
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member should seek to retaliate with respect to “the same sector(s)” where a panel or the 
Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment.
91
 This is often 
called “parallel retaliation.” In EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), the 
arbitrators have confirmed this principle by noting that it remains the “preferred option” 
for the complaining member to request retaliation under “one of the same agreements 
where a violation was found.”92 
   If a complaining member considers that it is “not practicable or effective” to retaliate 
in the same sector(s), it may seek to retaliate in other sectors under the same agreement.
93
 
This is often called “cross-sector retaliation.” 
   If a complaining member considers that it is “not practicable or effective” to retaliate 
in other sectors under the same agreement, and that the “circumstances are serious 
enough,” it may seek to retaliate under another agreement.94 This is often called “cross-
agreement retaliation.” 
   For the purpose of principles and procedures set out in this Article, “agreement” 
means the agreements listed in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, the Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements, the GATS, and the TRIPS Agreement.
95
 Thus, the obligations under the 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the DSU, and the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism are not subject to retaliation. 
The DSU does not provide any guidelines for the interpretation of the phrases: 
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 DSU art. 22.3(a). 
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 Decision of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sales and Distribution 
of Bananas, Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 33, 
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC)]. See also 
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 DSU art. 22.3(b). 
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 DSU art. 22.3(c). 
95
 DSU art. 22.3(g). 
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retaliation is “not practicable or effective” and “circumstances are serious enough.” Thus, 
the decisions of arbitrators are the only sources for their interpretation. 
 
3.2.1. Not Practicable or Effective 
In order to cross-retaliate in other sectors under the same agreement or in another 
agreement, a complaining member has to prove why parallel retaliation is “not 
practicable or effective.” The arbitrators in US – Gambling noted that when a 
complaining member considers the practicability and effectiveness of retaliation within 
the same sector of the agreement where a violation has been found, it does not need to 
find both requirements.
96
 Thus, a complaining member may consider whether it is either 
“not practicable” or “not effective.” 
With respect to the ordinary meaning of “practicable,” the arbitrators in EC – 
Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) held that it connotes “available in practice as well 
as suited for being used in a particular case.”97 In subsequent cases such as US – 
Gambling (Article 22.6 – US) and US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators 
also agreed that the term “practicable” relates to “actual availability and feasibility” in 
practice to the complaining member.
98
 
With respect to the meaning of the term “effective,” the arbitrators in EC – Bananas 
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 See US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), supra note 92, ¶ 4.29. For an excellent overview on this case, 
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 EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), supra note 92, ¶ 70. 
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(Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) held that it connotes “powerful in effect,” “making a 
strong impression,” and “having an effect or result.”99 Thus, the thrust of this criterion is 
to ensure the impact of retaliation is “strong” enough to “induce compliance” by the 
member that failed to bring its measure into conformity with the WTO agreement.
100
 In 
other words, the arbitrators recognized that the objective of inducing compliance could 
not be achieved if retaliation is neither “available in practice” nor “powerful in effect.”101 
However, the “likelihood of compliance” is not sufficient enough to determine the 
effectiveness of retaliation. Rather, it is “the ability of the complaining party to make 
effective use of the awarded countermeasures in order to induce such compliance.”102 
Moreover, when arbitrators considered two situations where there was an economic 
imbalance between a complaining member and a violating member and the former was 
highly dependent upon imports from the latter, they noted that retaliation may entail more 
harmful effects for the member seeking retaliation than for the other. In these 
circumstances, they determined that retaliation expected to be “least harmful” to the 
complaining member would seem to be sufficient.
103
 However, the arbitrators in US – 
Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) disagreed with the arbitrators‟ determination in EC – 
Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC).104  They argued that the term “effective” 
involves an assessment of the effectiveness of retaliation “in the same sector or under the 
same agreement,” rather than an assessment of the “relative effectiveness” of such 
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 EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), supra note 92, ¶ 72. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Id. ¶ 76. See also US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), supra note 92, ¶ 4.84 (Noting that “the thrust of 
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retaliation “in another sector or agreement.”105 Accordingly, a complaining member was 
not entitled “to freely choose the most effective sector or agreement under which to seek 
suspension.” Rather, it was found that a complaining member was entitled to “move out 
of the same sector or same agreement,” if retaliation “in that sector or agreement is not 
„practicable or effective.‟”106 However, they did agree with the arbitrators in EC – 
Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) that the question of whether certain retaliation 
entails more harmful effects for the party seeking retaliation than for the other would be 
pertinent to a consideration of the term “effectiveness.”107 
   In my view, the arbitrators in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) appear to be 
correct in the sense that Article 22.3(b) of the DSU clearly requires a complaining 
member to assess whether same-sector or same-agreement retaliation is “not practicable 
or effective.” Furthermore, under Article 22.3(d)(i), they have to consider “the trade in 
the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body has found a 
violation or other nullification or impairment.” 
   In US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), because of the low volume of imports on the 
sector where the violation was found and the likely trade impact on US service providers 
and Antiguan consumers, the arbitrators concluded that it was not practicable or effective 
for Antigua to retaliate in the same sector.
108
 In particular, they noted that Antigua, as a 
relatively small import-dependent economy, may suffer an adverse impact from 
retaliating not only in the same sector but also in the other sectors under the same-
agreement, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and there would be 
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“virtually no impact” on the US while making services more expensive for Antiguan 
consumers.
109
 
 
3.2.2. Circumstances are Serious Enough 
   In order to seek cross-agreement retaliation, a complaining member is required to 
determine that “the circumstances are serious enough,” in addition to determining that 
retaliation under the same agreement would be “not practicable or effective.” These are 
“cumulative conditions” that have to be met in order to retaliate under another 
agreement.
110
 
   With respect to the meaning of “circumstances,” the arbitrators in US – Gambling 
(Article 22.6 – US) noted that “the circumstances that are relevant may vary from case to 
case.” Thus, an assessment of “circumstances” is made on a “case-by-case basis.”111 
However, circumstances are considered “serious enough” only when “the circumstances 
reach a certain degree or level of importance.”112 In this regard, the arbitrators in US – 
Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) agreed with the arbitrators‟ determination in US – 
Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), which found that circumstances imply a “degree of 
flexibility in assessing what „circumstances‟ may be pertinent in a given case, so that 
these may not be the only relevant considerations in such an assessment.”113 Thus, the 
evaluation of whether circumstances are serious enough to warrant cross-agreement 
retaliation will differ depending on the circumstances of a particular case. 
   In US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators noted the considerable disparity 
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between Antigua and the US in terms of size, economy and natural resources, and the fact 
that Antigua is highly dependent on tourism and associated services.  The arbitrators 
found that these conditions “exacerbate the difficulties in finding a way to suspend 
concessions or other obligations in a practicable or effective manner” under the same 
agreement.
114
 As such, they concluded that the circumstances were serious enough to 
justify retaliation under another agreement. It appears that circumstances are deemed to 
be serious enough when “extremely unbalanced nature of the trading relations” between 
two disputing members exists and when a complaining member heavily relies on “the 
very sector that would be candidates for retaliation.”115 
Moreover, the arbitrators in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) held that the 
subsidies at issue in that case had created “an artificial and persisting competitive 
advantage for US producers over all other operators,” and, therefore, this had a “trade-
distorting impact” not only on the US market but also on the world market in cotton 
industries.
116
 In this regard, they concluded that the circumstances were serious enough 
to justify retaliation under another agreement because retaliation only in the same sector 
or the same agreement would have a disproportionate adverse impact on Brazil‟s 
economy.
117
 Thus, it appears that the arbitrators also consider the trade-distorting impact 
of an inconsistent measure in its determination of whether the circumstances are serious 
enough. 
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3.2.3. In Relation to Article 22.3(d) of the DSU 
In order to seek cross-sector and cross-agreement retaliation, a complaining party has 
to take into account two elements. First, it must consider the “trade in the sector or under 
the agreement” under which a violation has been found and the “importance of such 
trade” to the complaining member.118 Second, it must consider the “broader economic 
elements” relating to the nullification or impairment and the “broader economic 
consequences” of retaliation.119 
   As to the first element, the arbitrators in EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) 
held that the term “trade in the sector” is only the “trade nullified or impaired by the 
WTO-inconsistent measure at issue.”120 However, both arbitrators in US – Gambling 
(Article 22.6 – US) and US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) disagreed with such a 
view. Instead, they considered the entirety of the “trade in the sector or under the 
agreement” where a violation had been found.121 Thus, if there is a violation found in a 
particular good, the importance of all trade in goods has to be in consideration. 
   As to the second element, the “broader economic elements” relating to the member 
suffered from nullification or impairment and the “broader economic consequences” of 
retaliation must be considered, both from the perspective of the complaining member and 
the violating member.
122
 The reason for the latter criterion is that retaliation may have an 
adverse effect to the complaining member seeking it, “especially where a great imbalance 
in terms of trade volumes and economic power exists” between the two disputing 
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members.
123
 
 
3.3. Determination of the Level of Retaliation 
3.3.1. General Remarks 
If all of the above requirements have been met, the DSB shall grant authorization for 
retaliation. However, if one of the parties to the dispute disagrees with the level of 
proposed retaliation, or claims that the principles or procedures set out in Article 22.3 
have not been followed, “the matter shall be referred to arbitration.”124 “Such arbitration 
shall be carried out by the original panel” and “shall be completed within 60 days after 
the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time.”125  Retaliation would not be 
implemented “during the course of the arbitration.”126 
   With regard to the mandate of the arbitrator, it may determine (1) whether the level of 
retaliation is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment, (2) whether retaliation 
is allowed under the covered agreement, and (3) whether the procedures and principles of 
Article 22.3 have been followed.
127
 The arbitrator may not examine “the nature of 
retaliation to be implemented.”128 The arbitrators in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) 
(Brazil) (Article 22.6 – US) stated that it did not fall within their mandate “to recommend 
the suspension of specific obligations or the adoption of specific measures” by the 
complaining party.
129
 In addition, in US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US), when the 
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 Decision of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 4.11, WT/DS217/ARB/BRA 
(Aug. 31, 2004) [hereinafter US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Brazil) (Article 22.6 – US)]. See also 
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EC requested to suspend obligations in lieu of tariff concessions, the arbitrators ruled that 
this was not within the scope of their authority.
130
 
The members concerned shall accept the “arbitrator‟s decision as final” and “shall not 
seek a second arbitration.”131 
 
3.3.2. Standard of Equivalence 
   As mentioned above, arbitrators have to determine whether the level of retaliation is 
“equivalent” to the “level of nullification or impairment.”132 The term “equivalence” 
implies a balance between two levels and requires a stricter balance than what was 
required under the appropriateness standard of GATT. The level of nullification or 
impairment compares the trade value of the WTO-inconsistent measures in dispute with 
what they should have been had the measures been in compliance with WTO obligations. 
Then, it requires the level of retaliation to be identical to the calculated level of that trade 
value. Thus, the equivalence standard restricts the value of trade eliminated by 
suspension to the value of trade nullified by the violation. With respect to the meaning of 
equivalence, the arbitrators in EC – Bananas (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) noted that it is 
“equal in value, significance or meaning,” “having the same effect,” “having the same 
relative position or function,” “corresponding to,” “something equal in value or worth,” 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Decision of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), Recourse to the Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 19, 
WT/DS26/ARB (Jul. 12, 1999) [hereinafter EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC)]. 
130
 Decision of the Arbitrator, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 Act, Recourse to Arbitration by 
the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 3.7, WT/DS136/ARB (Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter US – 
1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US)]. 
131
 DSU art. 22.7. 
132
 Id. For an excellent explanation on the standard of equivalence, see Thomas Sebastian, The Law of 
Permissible WTO Retaliation, in The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute 
Settlement 89, 99-114 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010). Unlike GATT where an “appropriate” 
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and also “something tantamount or virtually identical.”133 Thus, they considered that the 
term equivalence “connotes a correspondence, identity or balance between two related 
levels, i.e., between the level of the concessions to be suspended, on the one hand, and 
the level of the nullification or impairment, on the other.”134  
 
3.3.2.1. Level of Nullification or Impairment 
In determining both the level of retaliation and the level of nullification or 
impairment, the same basis would be needed.
135
 However, neither the WTO agreement 
nor case law provides a clear definition of either criterion. Only a few precedents provide 
guidelines for determining the level of nullification or impairment. 
   First, the presumption of nullification or impairment set out in Article 3.8 of the DSU 
cannot be taken as evidence for proving the level of nullification or impairment under 
Article 22 of the DSU.
136
 This implies that a mere presumption of nullification or 
impairment would not be sufficient enough to determine the level of retaliation. Second, 
the “trade effect” approach can be a parameter for determining the level of nullification 
or impairment.
137
 Third, the loss of indirect benefits by a complaining member does not 
constitute nullification or impairment. The arbitrators in EC – Bananas (US) (Article 22.6 
– EC) concluded that the loss of the US exports to Latin America, which were the 
fertilizers that would have been used in the cultivation of bananas that would have been 
exported to the EC absent the violation, could not be considered for calculating 
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 Decision of the Arbitrator, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution 
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nullification or impairment.
138
 Fourth, a measure found to be inconsistent with the WTO 
agreement has to be quantifiable in order to be included in the calculation of nullification 
or impairment. In US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US), the EC had argued that “the 
most damaging effect of the 1916 Act is its „chilling effect‟ on the commercial behaviour 
of European companies and its potential use as a means of intimidation of European 
companies that are either already active on the US market or which consider entering the 
market.”139 However, the arbitrators concluded that, because the “chilling effect” could 
not be meaningfully quantified, it could not be included in the calculation of the level of 
nullification or impairment.
140
 
 
    3.3.2.2. Level of Retaliation 
   With regard to the determination of the level of retaliation, it involves both 
quantitative and qualitative assessments of the proposed retaliation. The arbitrators in EC 
– Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) found that the determination of the level of 
retaliation being “equivalent” to the level of nullification or impairment had to be 
determined in “quantitative” terms.141 Similarly, the arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 
– US) stated that “[t]he drafters have explicitly set a quantitative benchmark” to the level 
of retaliation.
142
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   However, in US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US), the EC, for the first time, 
requested “qualitatively” equivalent retaliation. 143  The arbitrators compared the 
“quantitative equivalence” from all previous cases to the “qualitative equivalence” in the 
present case and concluded that the mere fact that the requested retaliation had not been 
stated in quantitative terms “does not in and of itself render the EC request inconsistent 
with Article 22.”144 However, it further noted that it would be impossible to determine 
the WTO-consistency of a “qualitative equivalence” in the abstract, and thus, found that 
it would be necessary to “determine how the actual suspension resulting from such 
„qualitative equivalence‟ would be applied.”145 In order to make such a determination, 
the arbitrators noted that it would be necessary to determine “the trade or economic 
effects” on the EC of the 1916 Act “in numerical or monetary terms.”146 Given this 
finding, in assessing “qualitative equivalence,” the level of requested retaliation also has 
to be quantified and must not exceed the quantified level of nullification or 
impairment.
147
 
 
   3.3.3. Exception: Retaliation under the SCM Agreement 
    3.3.3.1. Special and Additional rules 
There is an exception to the rules and procedures of retaliation set forth in Article 22 
of the DSU. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) provides 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, ¶ 
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independent rules and procedures of dispute settlement including remedies.
148
 It uses a 
different term for retaliation, that is, “countermeasures.” 
The SCM Agreement rules are special and additional to the rules of the DSU. In 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), the arbitrators indicated that the provisions of 
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement must be read as “special or additional rules.”149 
Nonetheless, the arbitral procedure under Article 22.6 of the DSU remains applicable to 
the arbitration pursuant to the SCM Agreement, although the latter prevails in case of 
conflict.
150
 
There are two types of countermeasures under the SCM Agreement: countermeasures 
against prohibited subsidies and countermeasures against actionable subsides. I will 
explain them respectively in the following. 
 
    3.3.3.2. Countermeasures against Prohibited Subsidies 
Prohibited subsidies include export subsidies, which are “subsidies contingent, in law 
or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon export performance” 
and import substitution subsidies, which are “subsidies contingent, whether solely or as 
one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.”151 
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Article 4 of the SCM Agreement provides the rules and procedures of remedies with 
respect to prohibited subsidies. In contrast to the DSU, it provides a concrete method and 
period for implementation, which directs the violating member to “withdraw the subsidy 
without delay.”152 There are no provisions on compensation in case of non-compliance. 
Instead, only countermeasures are provided for. If the subsidizing member fails to 
withdraw the subsidy within the specified time period, the DSB shall authorize the 
complaining member to take “appropriate countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by 
consensus to reject the request.”153 In order to request countermeasures pursuant to 
Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, such countermeasures have to meet the 
appropriateness standard. 
 
     3.3.3.2.1. Countermeasures 
   The term “countermeasures” is another name for retaliation and is used only in the 
SCM Agreement.
154
 In US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators looked at dictionary 
definitions of the term “countermeasures”: 
 
Dictionary definitions of “countermeasure” suggest that a countermeasure is 
essentially defined by reference to the wrongful action to which it is intended 
to respond. The New Oxford Dictionary defines “countermeasure” as “an 
action taken to counteract a danger, threat, etc.” The meaning of “counteract” 
is to “hinder or defeat by contrary action; neutralize the action or effect of.” 
Likewise, the term “counter” used as a prefix is defined inter alia as: 
“opposing, retaliatory.” The ordinary meaning of the term thus suggests that 
a countermeasure bears a relationship with the action to be counteracted, or 
with its effects (cf. “hinder or defeat by contrary action; neutralize the action 
or effect of”). 
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In the context of Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, the term 
“countermeasures” is used to define temporary measures which a prevailing 
Member may be authorized to take in response to a persisting violation of 
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, pending full compliance with the DSB‟s 
recommendations. This use of the term is in line with its ordinary dictionary 
meaning as described above: these measures are authorized to counteract, in 
this context, a wrongful action in the form of an export subsidy that is 
prohibited per se, or the effects thereof.
155
 
 
   In this regard, countermeasures are temporary measures that are taken in response to a 
failure to withdraw a subsidy within a specified time period. However, the term 
“countermeasures,” in and of itself, does not necessarily indicate “an intention to refer to 
retaliatory action that „goes beyond the mere rebalancing of trade interests.‟”156 
The arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), however, disregarded the 
dictionary definitions of the term “countermeasures,” and referred to its meaning in 
public international law and the ILC Draft. Particularly, they considered the term 
“countermeasures” in Article 47 of the ILC Draft and noted that they are meant to 
“induce [the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act] to comply with 
its obligations.”157 Thus, the term “countermeasures” under the SCM Agreement also 
corresponds to the term used in public international law. 
 
     3.3.3.2.2. Appropriate Countermeasures 
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There are at least three factors to be considered when determining the appropriateness 
of countermeasures: bounded flexibility, proportionality, and the compliance-inducing 
effect. These are cumulative conditions that must be considered as a whole.
158
 
 
      3.3.3.2.2.1. Bounded Flexibility 
The arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) noted that, as far as the level of 
countermeasures is concerned, the expression “appropriate” does not in and of itself 
define “the precise and exhaustive conditions for the application of countermeasures.”159 
Thus, according to the plain meaning, “countermeasures should be adapted to the 
particular case at hand,” providing a degree of flexibility, “in the sense that there is 
thereby an eschewal of any rigid a priori quantitative formula.”160  Similarly, the 
arbitrators in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) agreed that, in assessing the 
“appropriateness” of proposed countermeasures, it connotes “the notion of something 
being „adapted‟ or „suited‟ to the particular situation at hand” and the relationship 
between countermeasures and “all of the circumstances of a particular case.”161 This 
implies that “it is appropriate to take into account not only the existence of the violation 
in itself, but also the specific circumstances that arise from the breach for the 
complaining party seeking to apply countermeasures.”162 
However, the degree of flexibility in what might be considered “appropriate” in a 
particular case does not mean that it is unbounded. The expression “disproportionate” in 
                                                          
158
 In Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada), the compliance-inducing effect 
alone was insufficient to determine the level of countermeasures as appropriate. See Canada – Aircraft 
Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada), supra note 140, ¶ 3.48. 
159
 US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), supra note 142, ¶ 5.10. 
160
 Id. ¶ 5.11. 
161
 US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), supra note 96, ¶¶ 4.46-4.47. 
162
 Id. ¶ 4.54. 
50 
 
footnote 9 to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement confirms that, “while the notion of 
„appropriate countermeasures‟ is intended to ensure sufficient flexibility of response to a 
particular case, it is a flexibility that is distinctly bounded.”163 
 
      3.3.3.2.2.2. Proportionality 
Footnote 9 to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement clarifies the term “appropriate” 
countermeasures. It provides that the term “appropriate” does not allow 
“countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt with 
under these provisions are prohibited.”164 The arbitrators in US – Upland Cotton (Article 
22.6 – US) understood this requirement to be a “protection against excessive 
countermeasures.”165 
In US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators held that the term appropriateness 
“entails an avoidance of disproportion between the proposed countermeasures and . . . 
either the actual violating measure itself, the effects thereof on the affected Member, or 
both.”166 They further noted that “the negative formulation of the requirement under 
footnote 9 is consistent with a greater degree of latitude than a positive requirement may 
have entailed,” which may not require “strict proportionality.”167 
 
      3.3.3.2.2.3. Compliance-Inducing Effect 
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The arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) considered the term 
“countermeasures” based on Article 47 of the ILC Draft and concluded that “a 
countermeasure is „appropriate‟ inter alia if it effectively induces compliance.”168 In this 
regard, the arbitrators in Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – 
Canada) adjusted the level of countermeasures by adding 20 per cent to the amount of 
the subsidy.
169
 They considered it appropriate because, at the time of the decision, 
Canada had indicated that it had no intention to withdraw the subsidy at issue and, thus, 
there was a need for “a level of countermeasures which can reasonably contribute to 
induce compliance.”170 
Distinctively, the arbitrators in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) also agreed 
that countermeasures under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement “serve to „induce 
compliance,‟” but noted that “this purpose does not, in and of itself, distinguish Article 
4.10 from the other comparable provisions in the WTO Agreement.”171 Rather, as they 
further noted, inducing compliance is the common purpose of all retaliatory measures in 
the WTO dispute settlement system, and thus, this factor may not “in and of itself provide 
specific indications as to the level of countermeasures that may be permissible under this 
provision.”172 
 
     3.3.3.2.3. Subsidy Amount vs. Trade Effect 
Before the arbitrators in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) determined the level 
of countermeasures, three preceding cases had determined the level of countermeasures 
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based on the amount of subsidy. 
In Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil), the arbitrators noted that appropriate 
countermeasures do not call for exact equivalence to the level of nullification or 
impairment, that is, adverse trade effects, and that the “concept of nullification or 
impairment is absent from Articles 3 and 4 of the SCM Agreement.”173 They found that 
there is no language in the context of Article 4.10 that the level of countermeasures could 
be read as amounting to the trade effect.
174
 They further noted that requiring 
countermeasures to be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment would be 
“contrary to the principle of effectiveness by significantly limiting the efficacy of 
countermeasures in the case of prohibited subsidies.”175 To this end, they concluded that 
the total amount of subsidy would be appropriate when dealing with prohibited 
subsidies.
176
 The arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) also observed that there was 
no presumption that “the drafters intended the standard under Article 4.10 to be 
necessarily coextensive with that under Article 22.4 [of the DSU] so that the notion of 
„appropriate countermeasures‟ under Article 4.10 would limit such countermeasures to an 
amount „equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment‟ suffered by the 
complaining Member.”177 Although they conceded that the trade effect of the subsidy 
was a relevant factor for determining appropriate countermeasures, the trade effect 
approach was excluded because it was not required as a criterion for this case.
178
 The 
arbitrators in Canada – Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada) also 
came to a similar conclusion. Although they noted that the trade effects approach could 
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be applicable to Article 4.10 countermeasures, they refused to follow this approach, 
concluding that the responding member, Canada, had raised sufficient doubts as to the 
validity of Brazil‟s attempts to calculate the trade effects. Canada conceded, however, 
that using the amount of subsidy would be appropriate.
179
 Thus, in the three prior cases, 
the arbitrators used the amount of the subsidy as the basis for the determination of 
appropriate countermeasures. 
   However, in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US), the arbitrators considered that 
“[t]he trade-distorting impact of the prohibited subsidy at issue on the complaining 
Member effectively reflects the manner in which the economic position of the 
complaining party to the dispute has been disrupted and harmed by the illegal 
measure.”180 For its analysis, they focused on the term “disproportionate” in footnote 9 
to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement: 
 
We considered that countermeasures would be “disproportionate” if they 
were excessive, having regard to the extent to which the trade between the 
parties in dispute has been affected. In other words, countermeasures that do 
not have a proper relationship to the extent to which the interests of the 
complaining Member have been adversely affected by the measure would be 
“disproportionate.”181 
 
Thus, the requirements that countermeasures be “appropriate” and not be 
“disproportionate” suggest that “there should be a degree of relationship between the 
level of countermeasures and the trade-distorting impact of the measure on the 
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complaining Member.” Although the arbitrators noted that the amount of the subsidy 
could be an appropriate standard, they also found that such a standard did not fully 
capture the trade-distorting impact of the subsidy.
182
 In this regard, they concluded that 
the level of countermeasures should be based on the calculation of the trade-distorting 
impact that arises from the failure to withdraw the subsidy within the specified time 
period. 
 
    3.3.3.3. Countermeasures against Actionable Subsidies 
Actionable subsidies adversely affect the interests of other members in the forms of 
“injury to the domestic industry of another Member,” “nullification or impairment of 
benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular 
the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994,” and “serious prejudice 
to the interests of another Member.”183 Article 7 of the SCM Agreement provides the 
rules and procedures of remedies with respect to actionable subsidies. In contrast to the 
remedies under prohibited subsidies, where the subsidizing member has no choice but to 
withdraw the subsidy without delay, where actionable subsidies are found, the 
subsidizing member may choose either to remove the adverse effects or to withdraw the 
subsidy.
184
 The disputing members may also agree on compensation. If the subsidizing 
member fails to remove the adverse effects of the subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within 
six months after the adoption of the report, and in the absence of agreement on 
compensation, the DSB shall authorize the complaining member to take countermeasures 
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“commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist, 
unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request.”185 
Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement is a “special or additional rule and procedure” that 
“may embody different rules” than Article 22.6 of the DSU.186 However, the arbitration 
proceeding under Article 22.6 remains relevant for the determination of the level of 
countermeasures against actionable subsidies.
187
 
In practice, the US – Upland Cotton case has been the only case where 
countermeasures against actionable subsidies were requested. Thus, the arbitration in that 
case is the only WTO interpretation on countermeasures against actionable subsidies. 
In order to request countermeasures pursuant to Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement, 
three elements have to be taken into consideration: “countermeasures,” “commensurate 
with the degree and nature,” and “the adverse effects determined to exist.” The distinctive 
feature of these elements is that, unlike Article 4.11, Article 7.9 explicitly refers to the 
trade effect approach in determining the level of countermeasures. In the following, I will 
explain each element in turn. 
 
     3.3.3.3.1. Countermeasures 
The arbitrators in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US II) understood the term 
“countermeasures” under Article 7.9 to mean the same as the term “countermeasures” 
under Article 4.10. They noted that the term “countermeasures” is another name for 
retaliation, which is only designated in the SCM Agreement, and it is a measure taken to 
“act against, or in response to, a failure to remove the adverse effects of, or withdraw, an 
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actionable subsidy within the required time period.” 188  However, the term 
“countermeasures,” in and of itself, does not necessarily indicate “an intention to refer to 
retaliatory action that „goes beyond the mere rebalancing of trade interests.‟”189 
   In addition, they also noted that the term “countermeasures” refers to its meaning in 
public international law and its nature as defined in the ILC Draft.
190
 In this regard, 
countermeasures are temporary measures that are taken in response to a failure to remove 
the adverse effects or to withdraw the subsidy within six months after the adoption of the 
report. 
 
     3.3.3.3.2. Commensurate with the Degree and Nature 
The permissible level of countermeasures that may be authorized under Article 7.9 is 
one that is “commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined 
to exist.” 
In light of dictionary definitions of the term “commensurate,” the arbitrators in US – 
Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US II) noted that it essentially connotes a 
“correspondence” between countermeasures and “the degree and nature of the adverse 
effects determined to exist.”191 However, it does not require “exact or precise equality” 
between the two. In this regard, the arbitrators stated that the term “commensurate” 
connotes a “less precise degree of equivalence than exact numerical correspondence.”192 
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With respect to the terms “degree and nature” of the adverse effects, they noted that 
these terms may encompass both quantitative and qualitative elements.
193
 As to the 
“nature” of the adverse effects, it is understood to refer to “the different „types‟ of 
adverse effects that are foreseen in Articles 5 and 6, and that this therefore invites a 
consideration of the specific type of „adverse effects‟ that have been determined to exist 
as a result of the specific measure in relation to which countermeasures are being 
requested.”194 As to the “degree” of adverse effects, it refers to the “„extent or scope‟ of 
the adverse effects „in terms of their intensity or capacity or potential for causing 
disruption of markets or trading relationships.‟”195 In assessing the “commensurateness” 
of the proposed countermeasures to the “degree and nature” of the adverse effects, the 
arbitrators must consider fully the “degree and nature” of these adverse effects in the case 
at hand.
196
 
 
     3.3.3.3.3. Adverse Effects Determined to Exist 
With regard to the “adverse effects determined to exist,” the arbitrators noted that this 
phrase refers to the “specific „adverse effects‟ within the meaning of Articles 5 and 6 of 
the SCM Agreement that form the basis of the underlying findings in the case at hand.”197 
They further noted that, in principle, “the „adverse effects determined to exist‟ in the 
underlying proceedings ultimately leading to a request for countermeasures under Article 
7.9 of the SCM Agreement may be in the form of injury to the domestic industry of a 
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Member, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice to the interests of another 
Member.”198 
This is different from countermeasures against prohibited subsidies in the sense that 
the concept of nullification or impairment is not expressed in Article 4 of the SCM 
Agreement, whereas Article 5 refers to nullification or impairment as one of three forms 
of adverse effects with regard to actionable subsidies. This provides a basis for 
determining the level of countermeasures on the trade effect that produced nullified or 
impaired benefits. 
  
4. Multilateral Surveillance of Implementation 
The DSB shall keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted reports. The 
issue of implementation shall be placed on the agenda of the DSB meeting after six 
months following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time and shall 
remain on the DSB‟s agenda until compliance has been achieved.199 At least 10 days 
prior to each DSB meeting, the member concerned shall provide the DSB with a status 
report in writing of its progress in the implementation of adopted reports.
200
 
In accordance with Article 22.6 of the DSU, the DSB shall also continue to keep 
under surveillance the implementation of adopted reports where compensation and 
suspension of concessions or other obligations are in place.
201
 
If compliance is found, then, the provision of compensation or the implementation of 
retaliation will be terminated. With regard to the termination of retaliation, the Appellate 
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Body in EC – Hormones stated that compliance review under Article 21.5 is appropriate 
and that the violating member has to “make some showing that it has removed the 
measure found to be inconsistent” with the DSB recommendations and rulings.202 During 
the course of review, the retaliating member could maintain its implementation of 
retaliation. 
 
5. Problems of WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies 
There is no doubt that the provision of remedies for violations encouraged WTO 
members to have confidence in the rules and procedures of WTO dispute settlement. This 
would be one of the reasons for the high number of complaints brought to the WTO 
dispute settlement system. In particular, the availability of retaliation improved the status 
of the WTO as a powerful institution in the international arena. As a remedy of last resort, 
retaliation can be implemented once the DSB authorizes it. A significant advantage of 
retaliation is that it is self-implementing in the sense that it does not require bilateral 
consent from a violating member and, thus, is easy to implement. 
   In addition, probably the most distinctive feature of retaliation is its threatening 
nature. Such threats would promote compliance and would probably be more rewarding 
than the actual imposition of retaliation.
203
 For instance, in Australia – Salmon, when 
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Australia did not bring its measure into conformity within the reasonable period of time, 
Canada made a request to the DSB for authorization to impose retaliation an amount of 
Can $45 million. Accordingly, Australia brought its measure into compliance by reaching 
a mutually acceptable solution on implementation.
204
 In this regard, the threat of 
retaliation worked as a means for causing the violating member to comply with the WTO 
rulings. 
Nonetheless, despite these advantages of WTO remedies, some have argued that the 
current remedies contain a number of problems which render them largely ineffective. In 
the following, I will examine and enumerate a number of problems that WTO remedies 
currently encounter. 
 
5.1. General Remarks 
So to speak, remedies provided in the WTO are not the same as those provided in 
other areas of law because they do not provide any actual reparation for damages caused 
by another member‟s non-compliance.205 WTO remedies are available only when a 
member does not bring its non-conforming measures into compliance within a reasonable 
period of time. In other words, if a member brings its measure into compliance within 
such a period, no further remedies are provided. This is well specified in Article 22.1 of 
the DSU that both compensation and retaliation are temporary measures and that neither 
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is preferred to full implementation. In this regard, compensation and retaliation are not 
general remedies for providing actual damages for violation, but temporary remedies for 
the failure to comply with the WTO rulings. 
In the following, I will examine the problems of compensation and retaliation 
respectively. 
 
5.2. Problems with Compensation 
From an economic perspective, compensation is preferred to retaliation in the sense 
that it is trade liberalizing rather than trade restricting. However, the option of 
compensation has rarely been used, perhaps owing to the difficulty in determining the 
level of compensation, i.e., equivalent market access.
206
 
   Generally, two problems have been mentioned for the limited use of compensation. 
They are the voluntary nature of compensation and the application of MFN treatment. 
 
  5.2.1. Voluntary Nature 
The prominent drawback of compensation is that it is offered only when the disputing 
members agree on its level and implementation. In other words, the violating member has 
to agree to provide compensation. According to Article 22.1 of the DSU, it clearly 
specifies that compensation is voluntary. This voluntary nature makes complaining 
members prefer retaliation to compensation because, with compensation, it is the 
violating member that retains control in the sense that it can unilaterally end 
compensation whenever it believes it has complied with WTO rulings. In contrast, the 
complaining member can continue to retaliate until the violating member demonstrates 
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compliance to a panel. 
Thus, in reality, the use of compensation rarely happens. One additional reason is that 
the violating member may have difficulty finding a domestic industry sector volunteering 
for granting, for example, tariff reductions to a competing foreign exporter in order to 
protect another sector that has benefited from violation. Moreover, in the same context, 
compensation concerns sectors different from those directly affected by the violation. It 
does nothing to eliminate the measure that has been found to be in violation.
207
 
 
5.2.2. In Accordance with MFN Treatment 
Although Article 22.1 vaguely states that compensation shall be consistent with the 
covered agreements, this implies that it must be consistent with MFN treatment in the 
WTO agreements. According to MFN treatment, “[w]ith respect to customs duties and 
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation . . . and 
with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges,” “any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the 
like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties.”208 
Thus, this feature means that, in the case of compensation in the form of tariff 
reductions on products, not only the complaining member but also any other members 
exporting the products to the violating member will receive the benefits of compensation. 
Thus, third members may have the same level of market access as the complaining 
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member. In this regard, the violating member may be reluctant to provide compensation 
because it has to allow a larger degree of market access than if it were to be provided 
only to the complaining member.
209
 Conversely, the complaining member may also be 
reluctant to agree on compensation because its benefits may be dispersed to other 
members exporting to the violating member when it can instead receive the full benefits 
of retaliation.
210
 
 
5.3. Problems with Retaliation 
A major problem of retaliation is that, while the purpose of the WTO is to minimize 
the power politics in international relations by introducing a rule-based system, it relies 
more on a state power to enforce its rules. This may illustrate the inability of the WTO 
dispute settlement system to provide the remedies of its own. Therefore, in a broad sense, 
the WTO may deny itself the rule of law. 
   Most importantly, there are serious concerns on the effectiveness of retaliation in 
achieving the objective of inducing compliance. Several cases have shown that it was not 
strong enough to achieve compliance, even though a significant amount of retaliation has 
been imposed.
211
  
In the following, I have enumerated a number of problems with retaliation. They are 
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the impediment of free trade, self-hurting nature, incentive to delay compliance, and the 
unbalanced ability to use retaliation. 
 
5.3.1. Impediment of Free Trade 
   Retaliation is in the form of suspending concessions, which means adding more trade 
barriers against foreign imports. Hence, it generally increases restrictions on trade. This 
seems to be based on the mercantile system, which was based on the premise that exports 
are economic gains and imports are economic losses. 
This proposition may undermine the free trade principle of the WTO by fostering the 
idea that protecting markets is advantageous. The benefits of free trade are reduced in the 
sense that retaliation results in a lower level of trade liberalization than the situation 
where the violation has not been committed.
212
 Moreover, it seems odd for a retaliating 
member to implement trade restrictions to promote free trade. As Charnovitz correctly 
points out, “the World Health Organization does not authorize one party to spread viruses 
to another. The World Intellectual Property Organization does not fight piracy with 
piracy.”213 It is an interesting paradox that a complaining member is fighting against 
protectionism by using protectionism.
214
 
 
5.3.2. Self-Hurting Nature 
   Retaliation has a negative impact not only on the violating member but also, 
simultaneously, on the complaining member. Because retaliation is meant to raise trade 
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barriers, the consumers and industries of the complaining member, who prefer cheaper 
imports, have to suffer.
215
 This may be the reason why it has been infrequently used 
since GATT in keeping with the proposition that retaliation is also detrimental to the 
interest of the member that does so.
216
 As Dam notes, “it often becomes painfully 
obvious that no one gains by retaliation.”217 
In this regard, the complaining member may end up being harmed as much as the 
violating member. Its consumers will have to pay higher prices for the imported goods 
concerned or for substitute goods. Businesses that specialize in importing the goods at 
issue will be particularly hurt. Even, in EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), the 
arbitrators were concerned that retaliation “may also entail, at least to some extent, 
adverse effects for the complaining party seeking suspension.”218 
Overall, a complaining member may be dissuaded by the high cost it has to bear for 
implementing retaliation. The complaining member is required to “shoot oneself in the 
foot” to do so.219 
 
   5.3.3. Incentive to Delay Compliance 
The level of retaliation is generally determined from the expiration of a reasonable 
period of time for compliance. In this sense, retaliation is prospective, not retroactive, 
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leaving damages for the past harm uncompensated.
220
 Hence, a violating member may 
enjoy a free ride from the time that the inconsistent measure came into effect until the 
expiration of the reasonable period of time. 
   The prospective nature of retaliation has a serious drawback. It gives the violating 
member a strong incentive to delay compliance by either seeking a long reasonable 
period of time or resorting to compliance review.
221
 In other words, it does not have a 
deterrent effect against potential violators and may encourage foot-dragging in the 
dispute settlement process.
222
 Therefore, the prospective nature of retaliation clearly 
undermines incentives for prompt compliance. 
 
                                                          
220
 See Anderson, supra note 209, at 129; Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 Stan. J. Int‟l L. 127, 
134 (2007). In a number of cases, panels have noted that retroactive remedies are not common in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Import Measures on Certain Products 
from the European Communities, ¶ 6.106, WT/DS165/R (Jul. 17, 2000) (Indicating that “[t]here are, 
however, no explicit DSU provisions providing for retroactive application of retaliatory measures”). In this 
sense, the WTO enforcement law lacks the remedy of reparation. In a traditional sense, it is significantly 
different from public international law where it considers both prospective, expected future injuries, and 
retroactive, past injuries, remedies. See Carlos M. Vazquez & John H. Jackson, Symposium Issue on WTO 
Dispute Settlement Compliance: Some Reflections on Compliance with WTO Dispute Settlement Decisions, 
3 Law & Pol‟y Int‟l Bus. 555 (2002). In addition, retaliation does not help the export industry that has been  
denied market access by the inconsistent measure of a violating member. Rather, it is the complaining 
member‟s import competing sector that benefits from retaliation. In the sense that retaliation is imposed on 
sectors that are unrelated to those benefitted from the WTO inconsistency, it does not provide any relief to 
the industry that was initially injured from the inconsistent measure in the first place. It does not punish the 
wrongdoer, but instead harms other innocent bystanders. This would be another reason that there is no 
actual reparation provided in WTO remedies. See Gary N. Horlick, Problems with the Compliance 
Structure of the WTO Dispute Resolution Process, in The Political Economy of International Economic 
Law 636, 641 (D. Kennedy & J. Southwick eds., 2002); Charnovitz, supra note 215, at 810-811; Anderson, 
supra note 209, at 130; McGivern, supra note 33, at 152. However, I will not address this issue more in 
detail because the paper mainly focuses on the effectiveness of WTO remedies, not on the private rights of 
their application. 
221
 See William J. Davey, Compliance Problem in WTO Dispute Settlement, 42 Cornell Int‟l L.J. 119, 125 
(2009); Horlick, supra note 220, at 637; Monika Butler & Heinz Hauser, The WTO Dispute Settlement 
System: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective, 16 J. L. Econ. & Org. 503, 528 (2000). As of 
October 31, 2010, WTO members have resorted to compliance review procedures under Article 21.5 of the 
DSU in 34 out of 117 disputes, or almost 30 per cent of the total cases. See Dispute Settlement Body, 
Annual Report (2010), Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes, Addendum, WT/DSB/51/Add.1 
(Dec. 3, 2010). 
222
 See William J. Davey, Implementation in WTO Dispute Settlement: An Introduction to the Problems and 
Possible Solutions 17 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-16, 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=862786. 
67 
 
5.3.4. Imbalanced Ability for the Use of Retaliation 
Because imposing retaliation is based on a member‟s economic power, retaliation by 
a relatively small country member will not likely have a great impact on a large country 
member. This fact results from the inevitable economic and political inequality between 
WTO members. In short, retaliation is highly dependent upon the relative economic 
power of the disputing members. Developing countries have expressed this concern by 
noting that “the tremendous imbalance in the trade relations between developed and 
developing countries places severe constraints on the ability of developing countries to 
exercise their rights” of retaliation.223 
Thus, in terms of its effectiveness, retaliation is ineffective when a small country 
member attempts to use it against a large country member because the impact on the 
latter is negligible.
224
 Given a small-sized market, the former will never put enough 
pressure on the latter. The arbitrators in EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) 
noted that Ecuador, a developing country, may find itself in a situation where “it is not 
realistic or possible for it to implement” retaliation against the EC, a developed 
country.
225
 A small country member may be clearly limited in its ability to use retaliation 
against a large country member, whereas it may be a very effective instrument for a large 
country member to use against a small country member. 
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   Furthermore, in the sense that small country members are generally trade dependent, 
retaliation would have an adverse impact because it is essentially an exclusion of foreign 
imports. In US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), Antigua was concerned that the 
imposition of retaliation on products or services from the US would have a 
“disproportionate adverse impact on Antigua by making these products and services 
materially more expensive to the citizens of the country.” 226  Given the economic 
inequality between the US and Antigua, retaliation would have a “much greater negative 
impact on Antigua than it would on the United States.”227 In addition, small country 
members may be reluctant to retaliate against large country members because they may 
fear counter-retaliation in non-WTO areas such as development aid.
228
 Overall, in a 
broad sense, this may be one of a number of reasons that deter small country members 
from seeking recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system.
229
 
 
III. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I examined the rules and procedures of remedies in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. Prior to this examination, I discussed the rules and procedures of 
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remedies in the pre-WTO dispute settlement system in order to achieve a broader view of 
WTO dispute settlement remedies. Such discussion seems very meaningful in the sense 
that it provided better understanding of the evolvement and conversion of WTO remedies. 
In the pre-WTO dispute settlement system, GATT, guidance on the rules and 
procedures of remedies was very minimal. Moreover, problems existed in terms of 
implementation. The losing party could block not only the adoption of a panel report but 
also the authorization of retaliation. Parties retained their legal authority and, often, chose 
to enforce their own domestic laws, disregarding the remedy procedure under GATT. 
In contrast, the WTO provides much more detailed rules and procedures of remedies. 
Unlike GATT, the dispute settlement procedure was incorporated into a single text, the 
DSU, in order to provide a concrete framework. The DSU specified a strict time frame on 
every procedural stage in order to promote prompt compliance with WTO rulings. The 
rule of “reverse-consensus” decision-making resolved the problem surrounding the 
blockage of the adoption of legal rulings and the authorization of retaliation. 
In terms of the effectiveness of remedies, the WTO introduced the option of cross-
retaliation and required an “equivalent” level of retaliation which is a stricter concept 
than an “appropriate” level of retaliation under GATT. It also clearly distinguished the 
countermeasures against prohibited or actionable subsidies from retaliation under the 
DSU. In this regard, a clear set of rules and procedures on remedies made members more 
willing to have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system. 
However, an examination of the current system of WTO remedies revealed a number 
of problems. With regard to compensation, its voluntary nature and the application of 
MFN treatment makes the use of compensation infrequent. With regard to retaliation, it 
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increases restrictions on trade which may undermine the free trade principle of the WTO. 
It is self-inflicted harm in the sense that the consumers and industries of the complaining 
member, who prefer cheaper imports, have to suffer. There is also a problem with free 
riding by a violating member because the level of retaliation is generally determined from 
the expiration of the reasonable period of time, which ultimately provides an incentive to 
delay compliance. Further, since retaliation is based on a member‟s economic power, it 
may be ineffective when a small country member attempts to impose it against a large 
country member. 
In this Chapter, I provided a general overview of WTO dispute settlement remedies 
and examined the problems associated with this system. By doing so, I provided the 
framework for understanding the purpose of this dissertation. The remedies available 
through the WTO dispute settlement process must be improved significantly in order for 
the WTO to operate effectively and to build its credibility and strong commitment. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PURPOSE OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REMEDIES 
 
This Chapter attempts to clarify the purpose of WTO dispute settlement remedies. It 
is an essential prerequisite for designing effective remedies because different aims may 
require completely different remedies. 
The purpose of remedies under public international law seems quite clear. Article 49.1 
of the ILC Draft provides that “[a]n injured State may only take countermeasures against 
a State which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that 
State to comply with its obligations . . . .” Thus, remedies clearly aim at inducing 
compliance. However, the purpose of WTO dispute settlement remedies is not explicitly 
provided in any of WTO agreements. WTO arbitrators sometimes have found difficulties 
in determining the level of retaliation without having a proper understanding of what 
WTO remedies are aimed at. They have expressed their concern by stating that they are 
not “completely clear what role is to be played by the suspension of obligations in the 
DSU and a large part of the conceptual debate that took place in these proceedings could 
have been avoided if a clear „object and purpose‟ were identified.”230 
Unfortunately, the uncertainty and confusion on the purpose of remedies has created 
controversy. One view tends to posit that the purpose of WTO remedies is to induce 
compliance. This view is deeply rooted in the discipline of public international law where 
countries are under a strict obligation to comply with their commitments.
231
 Thus, for 
proponents of this view, there is no option to breach and provide compensation in lieu of 
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 Decision of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 6.4, WT/DS234/ARB/CAN 
(Aug. 31, 2004) [hereinafter US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Canada) (Article 22.6 – US)]. 
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 This comes from the rule of pacta sunt servanda. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on Law of 
Treaties reads that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them 
in good faith.” Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
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complying with WTO agreements (hereinafter “compliance advocates”).232 Another view, 
on the other hand, tends to posit that the purpose of WTO remedies is to restore the 
balance of the trading relationship. It is deeply rooted in the discipline of law and 
economics and argues that, by equilibrating the mutual balance, a violating member may 
be relieved from its commitment if it offers adequate compensation, providing an 
efficient opt-out possibility. Thus, this view is completely contrary to the view of 
compliance advocates in the sense that it does not require a violating member to comply 
with WTO agreements (hereinafter “rebalancing advocates”).233 
This Chapter attempts to resolve this controversy by determining the true purpose of 
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WTO remedies, so as to allow more effective remedies to be designed, a task I undertake 
in the following Chapter. I have examined the purpose from historical, contractual and 
practical perspectives. 
 
I. The Purpose of WTO Remedies from a Historical Perspective 
   One method of discerning the purpose is by looking at WTO remedies from a 
historical perspective. In this Section, I will examine the historical background of WTO 
remedies, drawing particular attention to their conceptual and structural evolution. 
 
1. Conceptual Evolution of WTO Remedies 
GATT was mainly concerned with maintaining the balance of tariff concessions 
between contracting parties. Contracting parties negotiated for their market access rights. 
By reducing their trade barriers, they received increased access to other parties‟ markets 
in return. Thus, they were willing to permit access to their market only in exchange for 
equivalent access to other parties‟ markets.234 
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 See Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat‟s Jurisprudence, 4 J. World Trade 615, 616-
636 (1970) (Arguing that GATT negotiations were mainly to ensure the reciprocal balance of concessions 
which has been considered as one of the major goals of dispute settlement). Restoring balances has been 
also recognized in the Havana Charter. “The Charter . . . recognizes that [new protective measures] may 
upset the balance of mutual advantage that was established when the original contractual relationships were 
entered into. In conformity with the guiding principle that when this happens means should be found to 
restore the balance, it provides a remedy.” William Adams Brown, Jr., The United States and the 
Restoration of World Trade: An Analysis and Appraisal of the ITO Charter and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 205 (1950). Wilcox also noted that: 
[T]he possibility of suspending trade concessions under this procedure was regarded as a 
method of restoring a balance of benefits and obligations that, for any reason, may have 
been disturbed. It is nowhere described as a penalty to be imposed on members who may 
violate their obligations or as a sanction to insure that these obligations will be observed. 
But even though it is not so regarded, it will operate in fact as a sanction and a penalty. 
Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade 159 (1949). The idea of restoring balances could be found in a 
number of GATT articles. Under Article XIX, a member may impose protectionist safeguards when 
increased competition from imports causes or threatens domestic industry. If no satisfactory compensation 
is agreed upon, in response, the affected member may withdraw concessions that are substantially 
equivalent to the lost exports. Under Article XXVIII, a member may modify its tariff concessions. Again, if 
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However, whenever this balance is upset, it nullifies or impairs the benefits that had 
been previously negotiated. In this regard, the violations of these commitments were 
“considered serious not because they were violations but because a subtle balance of 
tariff concessions would be destroyed.”235 Thus, the original format of remedies under 
GATT was intended to restore the balance of benefits that contracting parties had 
negotiated in the first place. 
Dam confirmed that “the consequence of nonperformance is . . . merely the 
reestablishment, at the option of an interested party . . . of the preexisting situation.”236 
Long also confirmed that the purpose of remedies is “not to penalize a breach of the 
rules,” but “to restore, with the minimum interference with trade, the balance of 
concessions and advantage between the parties [to a] dispute.”237 He further argued that 
it should not mean more than “the re-establishment of the balance of concessions and 
advantage between member countries. Similarly, action by the Contracting Parties 
authorizing retaliatory measures does not take the form of a legal sanction. What is 
sought is a restoration of the balance upset by one of the member countries.”238 
   More recently, Hudec confirmed the views of both Dam and Long by stating that 
“[t]he official purpose of all retaliatory measures is to maintain the balance of reciprocity 
that has been upset. All GATT retaliation is limited to a „compensatory‟ amount – that is, 
an amount equivalent to the value of the trade obligation being nullified or impaired by 
the other party.”239 
                                                                                                                                                                             
negotiation breaks down, the member affected by such modifications may withdraw substantially 
equivalent concessions. Hence, both articles are aimed at rebalancing rather than rule enforcement. 
235
 Cho, supra note 33, at 766.  
236
 Dam, supra note 217, at 78. 
237
 Long, supra note 15, at 66. 
238
 Id. at 78. 
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 Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the US of Trade Measures against Foreign Environmental 
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   Thus, in case of violations, the purpose of GATT remedies under Article XXIII was 
to restore the balance of benefits between the parties to a dispute by providing for 
compensatory adjustment.
240
 With regard to the provisions that correspond to Article 
XXIII of GATT, the report of the Sixth Committee of the Interim Commission for the 
ITO stated that the nature of remedies is not punitive and the “term „appropriate‟ . . . 
should not be read to provide relief for beyond compensation.”241 
The purpose of remedies under the WTO seems not all that different from GATT. The 
WTO agreements are also created through a series of negotiations requiring members to 
exchange concessions. The preamble of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization explicitly confirms that parties desire to achieve these objectives “by 
entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the 
substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.”242 
   Thus, as was the case with GATT, in case of violations, the purpose of WTO remedies 
is also to restore the reciprocal balance of benefits between the parties to a dispute. 
Pauwelyn states that: 
 
What is actionable under the WTO is not so much the breach of obligation, 
but the upsetting of the negotiated balance of benefits consisting of rights, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Practices, in 2 Fair Trade and Harmonization 100 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
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 See Jackson, supra note 33, at 170-171. For an economic analysis of rebalancing, see Chad P. Bown, 
On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 811 (2004); Chad P. 
Bown, The Economics of Trade Disputes, The GATT‟s Article XXIII, and the WTO‟s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, 14 Econ. & Pol. 283, 288 (2002). 
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 Secretariat of the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization, Havana, Nov. 21, 
1947-Mar. 24, 1948, Reports of Committees and Principal Subcommittees of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment, 155, U.N. Doc. ICITO I/8 (1948), available at 
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 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
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obligations, and additional trade concessions. This approach directly 
parallels that of GATT . . . Even though . . . rebalancing the scales is, within 
the WTO, stated to be only a temporary solution.
243
 
 
   Along with the purpose of rebalancing, however, there was another purpose to be 
considered in providing dispute settlement remedies. In the transition period from GATT 
to the WTO, the global trading community began to be more interested in preserving a 
legal system. Perhaps, the explosion of non-tariff entitlements such as public morals, 
human health, the environment, government procurement, and subsidies called for a more 
judicial system in the determination of non-compliance in order to protect these 
entitlements. While GATT was more of the reciprocal exchanges of tariff concessions 
through contractual negotiations, the WTO is a rule-oriented international trade regime 
that produces a set of rules and legal norms.
244
 It is something greater than a mere 
contract where parties are only bilaterally bound. The WTO is rather an independent 
international organization established by its members to “multilateralize” and integrate a 
legal system for international trade that contains its own adjudicative system to manage 
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 Pauwelyn, supra note 228, at 339-340. See also Holger Spamann, The Myth of „Rebalancing‟ 
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 See Jackson 2004, supra note 232, at 121 (He further states that “[t]his drive to completing the contract 
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„trade constitution‟”). See also Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The Trade and … Conundrum – A Commentary, 
96 Am. J. Int‟l L. 135, 137-138 (2002). 
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disputes among contracting members.
245
 Thus, the WTO began to put more weight on 
the violation itself rather than injuries, i.e., nullification or impairment. In this context, 
Article 3.8 of the DSU provides that where the WTO agreement has been violated, there 
is a presumption of nullification or impairment. It also provides the possibility of a 
violating member to rebut that presumption. However, in practice, none of the violating 
members have been successful in providing sufficient evidence to set aside the 
presumption that complaining members have suffered nullification or impairment; indeed, 
few have even tried to rebut the presumption.
246
 
Overall, the additional (or maybe essential) purpose of WTO remedies seems to be to 
end violations by inducing the violating member to comply with its obligations. 
Therefore, along with the purpose of rebalancing the reciprocal benefits of the parties to a 
dispute, the legal transformation toward enforcement adds the purpose of inducing 
compliance to WTO remedies. 
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2. Structural Evolution of WTO Remedies 
There has been a structural evolution of remedies from GATT to the WTO. First, the 
binding nature of WTO decisions has been enhanced in the direction of bringing an 
inconsistent measure into compliance. Second, the procedure on remedies has been 
advanced towards a compliance-inducing mechanism. I will explain this in more detail in 
the following. 
 
  2.1. Binding Nature of WTO Decisions 
Generally, if a court‟s decision is meant to be binding, it implies that a court imposes 
a legal obligation on the violating party to comply with its order. In this regard, in order 
for a decision of the WTO adjudicatory system to be binding, it has to impose a legal 
obligation on the violating member to comply with its rulings.
247
 Historically, it has been 
at least from the last two decades of the GATT era that panel reports were considered as 
legally binding between the parties of a dispute.
248
 
Then, what are the binding decisions that the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system 
issues and makes? In the WTO, after making “an objective assessment of the facts of the 
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1994). 
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case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements,” a 
panel issues a report which is subsequently adopted by the DSB.
249
 The report of the 
Appellate Body is also adopted in the same manner. In their reports, when a measure in 
question is found to be inconsistent with WTO agreements, a panel or the Appellate Body 
recommends that the member concerned bring its measure into conformity with its 
rulings.
250
 Thus, a violating member has to comply with the WTO ruling, which is to 
implement the recommendations of a panel and the Appellate Body.
251
 
   There are at least two reasons that support the view of the binding nature of such 
recommendations. First, a number of cases have confirmed the binding nature of adopted 
reports. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body recognized that adopted 
panel reports are binding on the parties to a dispute.
252
 In US – Shrimp, the Appellate 
Body confirmed that its report shall be “unconditionally accepted by the parties to the 
dispute.”253 In EC – Bed Linen, the Appellate Body acknowledged that the reports of 
both panels and the Appellate Body must be “treated as a final resolution to a dispute 
between the parties to that dispute.”254  
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 See DSU art. 11 & 16. 
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(Dec. 21, 2001). 
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2003) (emphasis original). 
80 
 
Second, the DSU provides several mechanisms for ensuring the implementation of 
recommendations. Under Article 19.1, “the panel or the Appellate Body may suggest 
ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations.” Although 
these suggestions do not seem to be binding, it is expected to provide the member 
concerned with some guidance for implementing the recommendations. Under Article 
21.3(c), when it is impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations, the 
members concerned may request an arbitration to determine “the reasonable period of 
time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations.” This arbitration is 
expected to specify the time period for implementation and, thus, to prevent deliberate 
delays in compliance. Under Article 21.5, “[w]here there is disagreement as to the 
existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these 
dispute settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel.” 
This procedure is expected to determine whether the member concerned has complied 
with WTO recommendations.
255
 
In this regard, the recommendations of panels and the Appellate body are widely 
acknowledged as legally binding.
256
 A member, whose measures have been found to be 
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in violation, has a legal obligation to implement such recommendations. 
   However, some tend to misunderstand that the lack of enforceability makes law non-
binding and, thus, there is no legal obligation for members to comply with WTO 
recommendations.
257
 In the late 90‟s, Bello, who initially triggered the debate on the 
purpose of WTO remedies, argued that: 
 
Like the GATT that preceded them, the WTO rules are simply not “binding” 
in the traditional sense. When a panel established under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding issues a ruling adverse to a member, there is no 
prospect of incarceration, injunctive relief, damages for harm inflicted or 
police enforcement. The WTO has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue 
helmets, no truncheons or tear gas. 
 
Rather, the WTO-essentially a confederation of sovereign national 
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Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 Int‟l Org. 175 (1993). For a compromised view, see Oran R. 
Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications (1979) (Combining 
both enforcement and management technique to enhance compliance). See also Thomas M. Franck, 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among 
Nations (1990) (Arguing that states comply with international law because of legitimacy and fairness); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L. J. 2599 (1997) (Arguing that 
the “transnational legal process” would be required in norm internalization to enhance compliance). 
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governments-relies upon voluntary compliance.
258
 
 
Of course, the existing methods for dealing with WTO violations may not always be 
very effective. However, the fact that the WTO lacks a centralized political authority to 
enforce DSB recommendations does not mean that they are not binding. The lack of 
enforceability in the WTO is a different issue from the question of whether WTO 
obligations are binding in nature. So to speak, the weakness and ineffectiveness of 
remedies in the WTO cannot deny the nature of the legal binding power of the WTO 
adjudicatory system.
259
 
 
  2.2. Procedural Evolution of WTO Remedies  
There are a number of remedy procedures in the WTO dispute settlement system that 
can be characterized as compliance-inducing mechanisms. First, the WTO has 
compulsory jurisdiction over a dispute. The DSU explicitly provides that a member shall 
not make a determination that a violation has occurred “except through recourse to 
dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this understanding.”260 
Thus, a member can complain only through the process of consultation, followed by 
panel and Appellate Body proceedings, that the WTO dispute settlement system provides. 
In GATT, consensus was required for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to establish a 
panel. And even after the establishment, consensus was also required for the adoption of 
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a panel. Thus, a ruling was not binding until both parties had accepted it. However, a 
reverse-consensus rule has been adopted in the WTO to prevent this blockage. The 
consent of the violating member to establish a panel is no longer required.
261
 It can 
neither block the case nor reject the reports. Thus, the report of a panel and the Appellate 
Body is automatically adopted in WTO dispute settlement. 
Second, while GATT provided retaliation without any indication of when it would be 
ended, the WTO provides that compensation or retaliation does not end the dispute until 
the violation has been removed. Article 22.1 of the DSU explicitly provides that it is a 
temporary measure in a situation where the WTO recommendation or ruling is not 
implemented within a reasonable period of time. This implies that a violating member 
may not be exempted from WTO obligations simply by providing compensation or 
accepting retaliation. Rather, it requires the violating member to bring its measure into 
conformity with the WTO ruling. 
   Third, the WTO introduces cross-retaliation when retaliation in the same sector(s) is 
not strong enough to achieve compliance. If the purpose was simply to rebalance the 
concessions between the disputing members, there would be no need to impose such 
types of retaliation.
262
 
   Fourth, under Article 22.8 of the DSU, the DSB continues to keep the implementation 
of adopted recommendations or rulings under surveillance even when compensation has 
been provided or retaliation has been imposed. This strongly implies that remedies are 
aimed not at full compensation, but on full compliance.
263
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3. Concluding Remarks 
   In this Section, I have examined the purpose of WTO remedies from a historical 
perspective. In this examination, I discovered that the concept of remedies has changed 
from GATT to the WTO. While the purpose of remedies under GATT was initially to 
restore the balance of benefits between the parties to a dispute, the purpose of inducing 
compliance has been added in the WTO. 
   Moreover, I discovered that the structure of remedies has evolved from GATT to the 
WTO. First, the binding nature of WTO decisions has been enhanced in the direction of 
requiring members to bring inconsistent measures into compliance. Second, a number of 
procedures have changed or been newly introduced in the WTO with the effect of 
enhancing its compliance-inducing effect. 
Overall, historically, the legal transformation toward enforcement created the purpose 
of inducing compliance in WTO remedies along with the purpose of restoring the balance 
of reciprocal benefits between the disputing members. 
 
II. The Purpose of WTO Remedies from a Contractual Perspective 
In this Section, I will examine the purpose of WTO remedies from a contractual 
perspective. Figuring out the purpose in the contractual perspective would be meaningful 
in the sense that compliance and rebalancing advocates analogize their views with two 
                                                                                                                                                                             
scheme. Although its reports have no binding effect, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) can put 
pressure on a member to comply with its obligations. The purpose of the TPRM, by which the trade 
policies and practices of each member are reported on and reviewed by the Trade Policy Review Body, is to 
“contribute to improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments [under the WTO 
agreements] . . . by achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices 
of Members.” Trade Policy Mechanism, ¶ A(i), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. 480 (1994). For a general explanation on the TPRM, 
see Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules through Negotiations and Sanctions: 
The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. Pa. J. Int‟l Econ. L. 153 
(2007). 
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different rules of contract remedies. 
In the following, I will begin with a general explanation of WTO agreements in 
relation to contracts and examine how WTO remedies are viewed in the context of 
contract remedies. 
  
1. General Understanding of Contract Remedies 
 1.1. General Remarks 
International treaties have long been analogized to private contracts.
264
 This may be 
because treaties establish rights and obligations between parties similar to what are 
created under contracts. As Janis notes, “treaties are in the first place essentially contracts 
between states.”265 
Parties to a contract make a mutual exchange of promises that would normally be 
expected to result in the maximization of their individual interests. In this sense, the 
WTO agreement, as a form of international treaty, could also be considered as a contract 
where members seek to promote their mutual interests by entering into an agreement. 
Each WTO member would probably value the things received more highly than those 
given away by entering into the WTO agreements. Hence, they may maximize their joint 
gains by complying with WTO agreements. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, the 
Appellate Body acknowledged that “the WTO Agreement is a treaty – the international 
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 See generally Curtis J. Mahoney, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the 
Interpretation of Treaties, 116 Yale L.J. 824 (2007); Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of 
Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law (2006); John Norton Moore, Treaty 
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 Mark Janis, An Introduction to International Law 9 (2nd ed. 1993). 
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equivalent of a contract.”266 
Common features of WTO agreements and private contracts are that parties negotiate 
and sign them to bind themselves. Thus, contracts create a legal bond only to the parties 
and gain their validity from the agreement of the parties. This seems true because the 
membership of the WTO is achieved by the “contractual consent of states to be bound to 
the rules of that system.”267 In addition, it becomes more obvious when a dispute occurs 
because it arises only in respect of the members whose trade relations are disturbed, and 
not to all members of the system.
268
 
 
  1.2. Contract Remedies: Property Rules and Liability Rules  
Parties to a contract make a mutual exchange of promises that would result in the 
maximization of each of their interests. However, if one of the parties decides that those 
promises are no longer in its interest, it can deviate from such promises. Likewise, a 
WTO member may decide that it is no longer valuable for it to comply. 
In this circumstance, a breaching party (or a violating member in the WTO context) 
has to provide an adequate remedy in order to be relieved from the contractual 
obligations. There are two types of remedies under private contracts: property rules and 
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 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 252, ¶ 16 (emphasis original). See also Trans World Airlines 
Inc. V. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984) (Stating that “a treaty is in the nature of a contract 
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 See Pauwelyn, supra note 228, at 340. See also G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International 
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liability rules.
269
 A property rule results in an issuance of an injunction or a requirement 
of specific performance, whereas a liability rule results in an award of damages. The 
remedy of specific performance or injunction is an equitable remedy that is enforced 
within the court‟s discretion when an award of damages is inadequate or inappropriate. 
The remedy of specific performance requires precise fulfillment of contractual 
obligations or a waiver from those obligations by the breachee – a waiver presumably 
granted in exchange for payment. By definition, it is to force a promisor to perform its 
contractual obligations. Thus, it would be the most accurate form of compensation.
270
 
The remedy of injunction requires a “party to do or to refrain from doing a particular 
thing.”271 On the other hand, damages are generally the sum of money that a person is 
entitled to as compensation for loss or injury.
272
 In sum, contract rights are protected by 
requiring a breaching party either to perform its contract under property rules or to pay 
adequate damages under liability rules. 
A standard distinction has been made between these two rules. It is whether a holder 
has an absolute right to his entitlement. A property rule provides a right to a person to 
keep an entitlement unless he voluntarily chooses to part with it. It is a holder‟s exclusive 
and absolute right to retain or part with his entitlement. Thus, a promisor must get 
permission from a promisee to deviate from its contract.
273
 In this regard, the protection 
of voluntary exchange is offered only under property rules for stable and productive legal 
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 For a general understanding of contract remedies, see Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies: General, 
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arrangements.
274
 In contrast, a liability rule denies the exclusive right of a holder and 
provides that a promisor can take away the entitlement without getting permission from a 
promisee.
275
 
Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the general remedy for breach is the 
expectation measure of damages under liability rules. The purpose of awarding 
expectation damages is to place a promisee “in as good a position as he would have been 
in had the contract been performed.”276 In other words, the expectation measure of 
damages makes the promisee indifferent between the award and the performance. Thus, 
by definition, the former would be the value of the latter. Equitable relief, specific 
performance or an injunction may be ordered under property rules only when expectation 
damages are inadequate.
277
 Expectation damages would be generally considered 
inadequate when there are difficulties of proving damages.
278
 Another reason for 
restricting the use of property rules seems to arise from the practical difficulties of 
enforcing such rules.
279
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 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 484-516 (1978) (Arguing that a property rule is one of 
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 A court generally has a difficulty in enforcing specific performance. Judges have to invest greater time 
and efforts to supervise the quality of performance. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 751-756 
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A transfer of entitlements under property rules occurs only through a voluntary 
negotiation by the parties to a contract, employing a subjective standard of value for the 
transfer, whereas, under liability rules, it occurs only through a reassignment by a third 
party such as a court, employing an objective standard of value for the transfer. 
 
2. WTO Remedies from a Contract Remedy Perspective 
2.1. General Remarks 
How are these two different rules of contract remedies applied in the WTO context? 
Or, more precisely, which rule do WTO remedies follow in case of violations? 
   Compliance advocates argue that property rules apply in case of violations, whereas 
rebalancing advocates argue that liability rules apply in case of violations. These two 
views make the debate on the purpose of remedies serious because the two contract 
remedy rules have completely different legal consequences. While compliance advocates 
tend to keep within the agreement, rebalancing advocates tend to deviate from the 
agreement. Thus, depending on what rule applies, the purpose of WTO remedies will 
vary drastically. 
   In this sub-Section, I will examine WTO remedies in the context of the two contract 
remedy rules. It is worth mentioning, however, that the purpose of this dissertation is to 
examine which contract remedy rule WTO remedies follow in the case of violations 
rather than to find a more effective remedy rule over another. Thus, it will not examine 
which rule would be optimal in the situation of WTO violations. 
 
2.2. WTO Remedies in the Context of Property Rules 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(1985); Schwartz, supra note 273, at 273 & 292-293. 
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Recall that property rules guarantee a voluntary transfer by providing a holder‟s 
exclusive right on his entitlement. Thus, in order for a promisor to deviate from its 
contractual obligation, it has to get permission from a promisee. In other words, they 
have to enter into a negotiation in order for a promisor to be released from performing a 
contract by paying a certain amount of release costs. 
In this vein, compliance advocates argue that the WTO provides a remedy of specific 
performance that a violating member has an obligation to bring the inconsistent measure 
into conformity with WTO agreements. And, the only way to avoid the obligation to 
comply with WTO agreements is through negotiations between the parties to a dispute.
280
 
Does this really happen in WTO dispute settlement? 
 
   2.2.1. Dispute Settlement through Negotiations 
Generally, negotiations take place, as under property rules, to settle disputes between 
members in the WTO. Prior to a panel process, members attempt to settle a dispute 
through a consultation process. During this process, a violating member will try to 
negotiate deviation from compliance similar to the remedy of property rules in private 
contracts. Usually, an injured member will sell such deviation for an amount at least 
equal to the value of compliance and the violating member will buy it for an amount up 
to that value.
281
 The WTO takes over the dispute only when an injured member requests 
a panel upon the failure of the consultation process. This usually happens when an injured 
member is dissatisfied with the offers made by the violating member in the consultation 
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process.
282
 Thus, although the possibility of high negotiation and release costs exists, 
WTO members endure these costs in order to prevent a violating member from avoiding 
its contractual obligations at will.
283
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   Then, how are property rules applied at the stage of remedies? The remedy of 
property rules appears to clearly be evident in situations involving the provision of 
compensation. At first glance, the provision of compensation in the WTO seems to 
resemble the award of damages under liability rules. However, this perception is 
misleading. If the violating member fails to comply within a reasonable period of time, it 
voluntarily enters into a negotiation with the complaining member in order to determine 
mutually acceptable compensation.
284
 It is not a third party, whether a panel or the 
Appellate Body, that determines the amount of compensation. It is the parties to a dispute 
that determine its value. In this regard, compensation seems to be the temporary release 
cost incurred by the violating member for not bringing the inconsistent measure into 
conformity with the WTO agreement immediately. As mentioned in the previous Chapter, 
there were instances where disputing members entered into negotiations and agreed on 
mutually acceptable compensation as a temporary release by reducing tariffs, removing 
quantitative restrictions and increasing import quotas.
285
 
   When it comes to implementing retaliation, it seems quite difficult to apply contract 
remedy rules because it is the adversely affected party (promisee) who takes action that 
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provides it with relief in the WTO, while it is the violating party (promisor) who takes 
action by providing relief under private contracts. At first glance, however, irrespective of 
the “transaction” and concerning only the “remedy” itself, retaliation seems to resemble 
action under liability rules in the sense that it does not require the consent of both parties 
for its implementation and that a third party, the arbitrators in the case of the WTO, 
determines the level of retaliation. However, when it comes to the stage of actual 
implementation, the violating member attempts to negotiate with the complaining 
member to be released from suffering retaliation, which means the situation more closely 
resembles that of property rules. For instance, in EC – Bananas, the EC entered into 
negotiations with the US after enduring long-term retaliation and agreed not to 
reintroduce discriminatory measures among banana distributors based on the ownership 
or control of the distributors or the source of the bananas.
286
 Moreover, in EC – 
Hormones, the EC and the US entered into negotiations to settle a long standing 
retaliation, whereby the EC agreed to provide additional duty-free access for US beef to 
the European market. In return, the US agreed to eliminate all beef-related retaliation 
against the EC during the fourth year of the agreement.
287
 
In light of the above, it can be said that retaliation has shifted from being a liability 
rule-type remedy to becoming a property rule-type remedy by providing voluntary 
bargaining for entitlement protection. This is what is called a “pliability rule” remedy, 
building flexibility into the remedy rule by switching from property rules to liability rules, 
or vice versa, when a certain condition changes. A pliability rule is dynamic in the sense 
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that it combines the features of property and liability rules over the course of time, 
whereas property rules and liability rules are static. Thus, a court may demonstrate 
flexibility in applying the rule when economic efficiency or fairness so requires.
288
 
In sum, WTO remedies are ultimately applied in a way that is similar to the remedy 
found in property rules when it comes to providing compensation and implementing 
retaliation. A violating member generally enters into a negotiation with a complaining 
member and pays a temporary release cost if it is unable to comply immediately. This 
clearly indicates that the WTO guarantees voluntary bargaining for entitlement protection 
under property rules. 
 
   2.2.2. Targeting Ongoing Violations 
In comparing WTO violations with contractual breaches, it is important to note that 
there is a significant difference in the nature of the breach of obligations. Under a breach 
of a private contract, the assumption is that a promisor did not perform its part of the 
bargain. In that instance, a promisor would be required to pay damages equal to the 
benefit that a promisee would have received if the promise was performed. Thus, the 
promisee would be made whole by the payment for damages. Of course, there are similar 
instances in the WTO where reparations equal the harm of the injured member. For 
instance, when a state grants a one-time subsidy to its domestic enterprise, the affected 
members are injured only at the time when the subsidy is granted. And since the level of 
nullification from such subsidies could be easily determined, a payment would 
presumably make whole the injured member. In this situation, the non-recurring nature of 
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subsidies seems to resemble the nature of contractual breaches because an award of 
damages could fully repair the breach by bringing the injured member into the situation 
that existed before the subsidy was granted.
289
 
However, the above illustration is not a common occurrence in the WTO. Unlike one-
time contract violations, most WTO violations continue to have damaging effects on 
trade for as long as they are in force. Generally, the WTO dispute settlement system is 
built to deal with these types of violations. First, a panel or the Appellate Body 
recommends that a violating member bring its inconsistent measure into conformity only 
when that measure is still in force. Second, as mentioned above, the DSU is designed to 
stop this type of violation by setting up a reasonable period of time for compliance and 
introducing surveillance procedures until compliance is achieved. The surveillance 
procedure is designed specifically to monitor compliance, which is similar to the practice 
of courts when they seek to enforce and monitor specific performance that has been 
ordered. These factors strongly indicate that the WTO dispute settlement system 
resembles the remedy of specific performance available under property rules by requiring 
a violating member to precisely fulfill its WTO obligations. 
 
2.3. WTO Remedies in the Context of Liability Rules 
   So far, we have concluded that WTO remedies resemble property rule remedies by 
guaranteeing voluntary bargaining for entitlement protection. As such, it can be said that 
the WTO does not appear to provide liability rule remedies. 
Rebalancing advocates, however, attempt to argue that the remedy procedure under 
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the DSU resembles the award of damages for breach of contract under liability rules. 
They go one step further by arguing that the purpose of WTO remedies is to not only 
restore the balance of benefits, but also pay damages in the form of compensation or 
retaliation. Thus, in their view, a violating member has the option to remain in violation 
of its obligations and pay damages.
290
 The basis for their argument is the DSU provision 
that requires the authorized level of retaliation to be equivalent to the injury suffered, 
which prevents the price of breach from becoming too high. In other words, by providing 
a possibility for members to buy their way out of WTO obligations, this provision 
promotes efficient breach.
291
 
However, in my view, efficient breach cannot be justified in the WTO. There are at 
least two reasons which support this position. First, there is the problem of estimating 
expectation damages. WTO remedies do not provide compensation in a manner that is 
consistent with the liability rules of private contracts. Second, the introduction of the 
standard of equivalence was never intended to facilitate efficient breach. Rather, it was 
intended to prevent the abusive use of retaliation. 
In the following, I will begin with a general explanation of efficient breach and then 
examine the problems of efficient breach in the WTO context and the intended goal of the 
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standard of equivalence. In addition, I will discuss the difference between the purposes of 
rebalancing benefits and providing compensation. 
 
2.3.1. Efficient Breach in the WTO Context 
 2.3.1.1. General Understanding of Efficient Breach 
The discipline of law and economics teaches that the law should be aimed at 
maximizing the welfare of society by allocating resources to the parties who value them 
the most.
292
 In this sense, it should be designed to facilitate a breach of an obligation 
when it leads to the optimal allocation of resources among parties because this would 
avoid unnecessary performance. In other words, the law should not prevent a breach of 
contract when the breach brings an optimal outcome and the breaching party pays the full 
economic cost for its misbehavior. Accordingly, the notion of efficient breach flows from 
the idea that the law should promote efficiency. The key idea of efficient breach is that it 
is permissible to breach a contract if the breach makes one party better off, without 
making the other worse off than he or she would have been had performance occurred. 
Thus, the joint gain of both parties is paramount to the concept of efficient breach. 
Law and economics scholars tend to base their argument on price theory.
293
 From this 
perspective, the key to performance is the price of a breach. The argument is that when 
the price of a breach is considerably high, performance will result. On the other hand, 
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when the price of performance exceeds the price of a breach, a promisor is better off to 
breach rather than to perform a contract because the amount that a promisor has to pay 
for a breach is lower than the price of performance.
294
 
Then, how is it that the promisee is no worse off from such breaches? The answer 
seems quite simple. A promisee would be no worse off if a promisor could pay damages 
so as to place the promisee in as good a position as he would have been in had the 
contract been performed. As described earlier, the promisee‟s full expectation of gain is 
recovered by expectation damages. Perfect expectation damages would make the 
promisee indifferent between performance and breach. Thus, expectation damages deter 
inefficient breaches because a promisor will not wish to breach and pay damages unless it 
gains more from the breach than the promisee loses.
295
 Overall, this theory aims to deter 
inefficient breaches and to facilitate efficient breaches.
296
 
                                                          
294
 Then, when or why would the price of performance be high? Generally, a contract is always incomplete. 
It is hardly possible for the parties to anticipate every contingency that may materialize and to specify all 
the contingencies in the contract. From the very beginning, parties usually lack the foresight to deal with all 
possible situations at the stage of contract formation. In this regard, there may be a situation where a 
promisor faces an unexpectedly higher price of performance after the contract is signed. See generally Scott 
Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a Complete Contract World, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 
725 (2006); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 
56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187 (2005); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the 
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the 
Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1992). It is 
not all that different in the context of the WTO agreement. It is also incomplete in the sense that it is 
negotiated among members of having complex relationships and in the face of enormous uncertainty about 
the future. See B. Peter Rosendorff, Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO‟s Dispute 
Settlement Procedures, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 389 (2005); B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The 
Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 Int‟l Org. 829 (2001). For 
an economic analysis of the incompleteness of WTO agreements, see Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi & 
Robert W. Staiger, Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts (Nat‟l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 12745, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12745. In this regard, 
the price of compliance to a violating member may exceed the price of a breach because the price of 
compliance is recognized by the members after the agreement is signed. Considering the price of breach 
equal to the amount of damages, it would be undesirable for a violating member to comply with the WTO 
agreement because it has to pay more for compliance than breaching. Thus, the incompleteness of WTO 
agreements may result in a situation where compliance may impede economic growth and social welfare, 
which makes performance undesirable. See Simon A.B. Schropp, Trade Policy Flexibility and Enforcement 
in the WTO: Reform Agenda Towards and Efficient “Breach” Contract (2008). 
295
 A promisee‟s loss from breach would be equal to expectation damages, which would be the amount that 
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2.3.1.2. Problems of Estimating Expectation Damages  
Do WTO remedies provide expectation damages in an amount appropriate to 
facilitate efficient breach? In practice, this seems unlikely to happen. There are at least 
two reasons for this conclusion. First, the arbitrators‟ determination on the level of 
retaliation is a mere approximation. Estimating the value of WTO entitlements is 
necessarily approximate.
297
 The arbitrators in US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US) 
expressed their concern by stating: 
 
We, therefore, have no choice but to adopt our own approach. In so doing, 
we feel we are on shaky grounds solidly laid by the parties. The data is 
surrounded by a degree of uncertainty. For most variables, the data consists 
of proxies for what needs to be measured, and observations are too few to 
allow for a proper econometric analysis. Certain data that we have requested 
and that, to some extent, could have remedied this situation has not been 
provided. On methodological questions, parties, in a number of respects, 
have retained their extreme positions and have failed to propose alternative 
solutions that would have taken into account the exchange of arguments. 
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Hence, we are left with preciously little information and guidance. 
Nevertheless, we will attempt to stay as closely to the approaches proposed 
by parties as possible and to make a maximum use of the limited information 
base we were given, in particular to carry out some sensitivity analysis in 
support of our main approach.
298
  
 
To the extent that arbitrators‟ assessments of the level of nullification or impairment 
are only approximate, they may result in a level of retaliation that does not represent the 
true cost of the violation of the WTO agreement.
299
 If the level of retaliation is 
systematically undervalued, this could lead to an increase in breaches that cannot be 
economically justified.
300
 Indeed, in his article, Schropp argues that WTO arbitrators 
have generally assessed the level of nullification by focusing on the actual losses suffered 
by the complaining members, instead of taking into account the overall economic gains 
and losses resulting from non-implementation. By doing so, the arbitrators have 
constructed a counterfactual situation that opts for reliance damages that re-establish the 
status quo ante the breach, instead of constructing one that opts for expectation damages. 
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Schropp concludes that this inappropriate determination of the level of nullification falls 
systematically short of fully compensating the complaining members.
301
 
Second, there are systematic difficulties for providing expectation damages under the 
WTO dispute settlement system. Primarily, the level of retaliation is set from the 
expiration of a reasonable period of time, instead of the time at which the violation was 
committed. Since it lacks a retroactive effect, retaliation is an insufficient means to 
achieve any form of restitutio in integrum and leaves past injuries uncompensated. 
Instead of redressing past harms, it mainly seeks to prevent future harm to an injured 
member. Thus, in a strict sense, the prospective nature of retaliation makes it unlikely that 
expectation damages will be realized. Additionally, because the retaliating member bears 
its own economic cost for implementing retaliation, it hardly seems to provide redress in 
the form of full expectation damages. 
Overall, WTO remedies do not provide expectation damages that could be used as a 
basis to facilitate efficient breach. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine the 
exact level of expectation damages in WTO dispute settlement. The uncertainty of 
damage assessment would invite a member, depending on the level of damages 
anticipated, to engage in too much or too little breach. This systematic flaw will end up 
impeding members‟ trade liberalization commitments as they will be unsure of what they 
are obtaining in return for their concessions.
302
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2.3.1.3. Intended Goal of the Standard of Equivalence 
   The primary argument of rebalancing advocates is that the standard of equivalence is 
designed to facilitate efficient breach. Article 22.4 of the DSU clarifies that redress is 
limited to that which is equivalent to the injury suffered. It restricts the value of trade 
eliminated by retaliation to the value of trade nullified by the violation. Thus, in their 
view, the standard of equivalence seeks to ensure that the price of breach is not too high 
so that a member may have more opportunities to make efficient breaches. For this reason, 
they conclude that retaliation seems to resemble damages under liability rules, i.e., a form 
of compensation.
303
 
   However, those advocating this view seem to misunderstand the intended goal of the 
standard of equivalence. In public international law, without any adjustment, a violating 
state gains a benefit from an injured state for its wrongful act. In this situation, in order to 
restore a balanced relationship between the two parties, the injured state should receive a 
corresponding payment from the violating state either through compensation or 
countermeasures. 
Yet, the nature of countermeasures, in principle, is a violation of public international 
law, unless they are taken in response to a wrongful act. In other words, countermeasures 
are justified as long as they are targeted to cause cessation of such wrongful acts. In the 
same vein, the nature of WTO retaliation is also a violation of the WTO agreement, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
should be the purpose of WTO remedies. Here, in this paper, I am to discover what the actual purpose of 
WTO remedies is. The opt-out possibility of efficient breach is an ideal, but not reality. 
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unless it is taken in response to a violating member‟s inconsistent measure. Thus, it could 
be said that a noteworthy feature of both countermeasures and retaliation is their 
“„justified‟ illegality.”304 
Countermeasures and retaliation are self-redressing tools designed to achieve 
compliance. While their unilateral character makes implementing them easy, it also 
means that they are prone to abuse. In public international law, the principle of 
proportionality acts to prevent such abuses, which is reflected in Article 51 of the ILC 
Draft. It reads that “[c]ounter-measures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, 
taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in 
question.” Like public international law, the principle of proportionality is also reflected 
in the WTO. The term “equivalence” is intended to provide proportionality between the 
parties to a dispute by limiting the intensity of retaliation as a response to the level of 
violation concerned.
305
 
In this regard, the introduction of the standard of equivalence is to limit the potential 
abuse of power by a retaliating member and to prevent overreaching decisions by the 
WTO adjudicative system. It sets a ceiling which maintains multilateral control with 
respect to the level of retaliation. 
Overall, the standard of equivalence is not intended to make the price of breach 
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relatively lower than the price of performance in order to facilitate efficient breach.
306
 
Rather, it aims to establish an objective standard for determining the level of retaliation in 
order to prevent it from being excessive. As Breuss correctly points out, “the concept of 
equivalence draws more on notions of fairness than on economic accuracy.”307 The 
intended goal of the standard of equivalence is, therefore, not to undermine the purpose 
of compliance and to justify continued non-compliance by providing proportionate 
damages. Instead, it is to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of retaliation in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. 
 
2.3.1.4. Escape Clause and Schedule Modification 
Rebalancing advocates view Articles XIX and XXVIII of GATT as examples of 
efficient breach.
308
 Article XIX provides that, when increased competition from imports 
causes or threatens serious injury to domestic industry, the member may suspend its 
obligations or withdraw or modify its tariff concessions without securing permission 
from the exporting member. It requires compensation to be provided to the exporting 
member. However, if agreement on compensation is not reached, the affected members 
may also suspend substantially equivalent concessions.
309
 Under Article XXVIII, a 
member may also withdraw its tariff concessions for any reason at any time. Like Article 
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XIX, it does not have to secure permission prior to the withdrawal, but may offer 
compensatory concessions to the affected members.
310
 If the members cannot negotiate 
for satisfactory compensation, those affected members may also withdraw substantially 
equivalent concessions.
311
 Thus, from the perspective of rebalancing advocates, both 
Articles seem to create liability rules that are likely to facilitate efficient breach. 
However, the arguments of rebalancing advocates are untenable for several reasons. 
First, there are instances of both property rules and liability rules in these Articles 
textually. With regard to Article XIX, in order to apply a safeguard measure, the members 
concerned have to agree on compensation to maintain a substantially equivalent level of 
concessions, which resembles a negotiation for a release under property rules.
312
 
Moreover, it authorizes a safeguard only as a temporary measure, which implies that a 
member cannot permanently escape from its commitments. The safeguarding member has 
to comply with its obligations when such injuries due to increased imports are 
remedied.
313
 With regard to Article XXVIII, it also provides renegotiations to maintain 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions.
314
 
Second, it is questionable whether these Articles provide a possibility of efficient 
breach because, as discussed above,
315
 the suspension of concessions hardly provides 
compensation that leads to an expectation measure of damages.
316
 Third, and most 
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importantly, there is a difference between the suspension provided for under these two 
Articles and that provided for under the DSU. Articles XIX and XXVIII refer to 
equivalence between members‟ concessions, whereas Article 22 of the DSU refers to 
equivalence between the level of retaliation and the level of trade nullified or impaired. In 
this regard, the suspension under the DSU is fundamentally different from the suspension 
under Articles XIX and XXVIII, which purely concentrates on the balance between 
members. As Pauwelyn correctly points out, retaliation is, not “the „price‟ to be paid for 
defection, but the „sanction‟ for breach, pursuant to the „property rule‟ in the DSU.”317 
 
2.3.2. Difference between Rebalancing and Compensation 
   So far, we have found that an efficient breach would be difficult to visualize in the 
WTO because full compensation could never be achieved by the provision of WTO 
remedies. Thus, due to the fact that the WTO dispute settlement system is unable to make 
an injured member whole with its remedies, some may suspect that remedies will never 
restore balance between disputing members. 
However, this is not true. Restoring balance and providing compensation operate on 
separate planes in that they can be achieved at different levels. While equal balance can 
be achieved through restoring the status quo ante by raising the tariffs to the previous 
level, the full level of compensation can only be achieved by leaving an injured member 
in a position where it would have been had the agreement been performed.
318
 Thus, there 
may be a situation where the balance is restored between disputing parties without the 
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injured party being fully compensated. 
Generally, it is thought that retaliation would put the complaining member in the 
position it was in before the tariff concessions were negotiated, since it is returning back 
to a level above which it had been previously bound. Yet, in a sense, it can be said that 
the complaining member is restored at a lower level because retaliation de-liberalizes and 
decreases the trade flows. However, although retaliation sets the balance at the lower 
level, it has, at least, avoided an even worse situation where the nullified benefits are left 
entirely unrecovered. Of course, while neither side would benefit from this result, it 
would allow them to return to the status quo ante. In this sense, both disputing members 
are no worse off than they were had they not signed the agreement.
319
 
Overall, restoring balance and providing compensation are different remedies. They 
can be achieved at different levels. Thus, the fact that retaliation does not provide full 
compensation does not necessarily imply that balance between parties to a dispute will 
not be restored. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
In this Section, I have examined the purpose of WTO remedies from a contractual 
perspective. I found that WTO remedies resemble the property rules of contract remedies. 
In both the provision of compensation and implementation of retaliation, a violating 
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member attempts to negotiate with a complaining member and pays a temporary release 
cost for not bringing the inconsistent measure into conformity with the WTO agreement 
immediately. This clearly indicates that the WTO guarantees voluntary bargaining for 
entitlement protection under property rules. Moreover, the WTO dispute settlement 
system is specifically designed to deal with ongoing violations. Particularly, the WTO 
surveillance procedure seems to resemble the process by which a court enforces and 
monitors specific performance. This strongly indicates that the WTO dispute settlement 
system uses the remedy of specific performance under property rules by preventing a 
violating member from avoiding its obligations. 
I also found that WTO remedies do not resemble the liability rules of contract 
remedies in that they do not provide for the full compensation necessary to facilitate 
efficient breach. First, there are difficulties in estimating expectation damages. The 
determination of the level of retaliation is a mere approximation. And, systematically, the 
level of retaliation is primarily set from the expiration of a reasonable period of time, 
instead of from the time at which the violation was committed. As retaliation lacks a 
retroactive effect, past injuries are left uncompensated. It mainly seeks to prevent future 
harm to an injured member. Second, the standard of equivalence does not aim to make 
the price of breach relatively lower than the price of performance. Rather, it aims to 
establish an objective standard for determining the level of retaliation in order to prevent 
it from being excessive. Thus, it is not intended to undermine the purpose of compliance 
and to justify continued non-compliance by providing proportionate damages. In addition, 
there is no explicit language that allows for efficient breach in any of the WTO 
agreements. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that a violation will never be efficient in 
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the long term if it diminishes the credibility of the WTO to a considerable degree.
320
 
However, the fact that retaliation does not provide full compensation does not mean 
that it cannot achieve the purpose of restoring balances since issues of balance and 
compensation can be resolved at different levels. While equal balance can be achieved 
through restoring the status quo ante with the raising of tariffs to their previous levels, 
full compensation can only be achieved by leaving an injured member in the position it 
would have been in had the agreement been performed. Thus, the balance of benefits 
between members can be restored without an injured member being fully compensated. 
Finally, it should be noted that a member may confront a situation where compliance 
is difficult for domestic reasons. However, a state cannot violate international law 
because compliance would be costly or difficult in light of its domestic law or political 
situation. It is a long established principle of customary international law that parties to a 
treaty cannot rely on domestic law as justification for non-performance of treaty 
obligations.
321
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Overall, from the perspective of contract remedies, WTO remedies resemble property 
rules of contract remedies by requiring a violating member to precisely fulfill its WTO 
obligations. 
 
III. The Purpose of WTO Remedies from a Practical Perspective 
   In this Section, I will examine the purpose of WTO remedies from a practical 
perspective. There are two ways of discerning the purpose in practice. One is by 
examining the statements of WTO arbitrators in their decisions and the other is by 
examining the members‟ practice in their actual implementation of retaliation. In the 
following, I will explain them in turn. 
  
1. Statements of Arbitrators 
   Absent a clear indication in the legal text of the WTO, the statements of arbitrators 
are arguably the most reliable references from which one can define the purpose of WTO 
remedies. Unfortunately, these statements can oftentimes be ambiguous, leaving room for 
debate. As mentioned earlier, the arbitrators once stated that “it is not completely clear 
what role is to be played by the suspension of obligations in the DSU and a large part of 
the conceptual debate that took place in these proceedings could have been avoided if a 
clear „object and purpose‟ were identified.”322 
   Nevertheless, the intention of arbitrators can be inferred by putting pieces of their 
statements together. Two inferences can generally be drawn. First, the arbitrators have 
always stated that the purpose of remedies is to induce compliance. The concept of 
“inducing compliance” was first raised in EC – Bananas (US) (Article 22.6 – EC): 
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[T]he authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations is a 
temporary measure pending full implementation by the Member concerned.  
We agree with the United States that this temporary nature indicates that it is 
the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance.
323
 
 
They further stated that the purpose of inducing compliance did not mean that “the 
DSB should grant authorization to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent to the 
level of nullification or impairment . . . there is nothing in Article 22.1 of the DSU . . . 
that could be read as a justification for countermeasures of a punitive nature.”324 
The purpose of remedies as a means to induce compliance has been mentioned in 
other subsequent arbitrations. The arbitrators in EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) 
agreed with the arbitrators in EC – Bananas (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) by recalling that 
“the purpose of countermeasures is to induce compliance.”325 
Moreover, in cases of cross-retaliation, the arbitrators in EC – Bananas (Ecuador) 
(Article 22.6 – EC) and US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US) stated that the purpose is also 
to induce compliance: 
 
[T]he thrust of [effectiveness] criterion empowers the party seeking 
suspension to ensure that the impact of that suspension is strong and has the 
desired result, namely to induce compliance by the Member which fails to 
bring WTO-inconsistent measures into compliance with DSB rulings within 
a reasonable period of time.
326
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Our interpretation of the “practicability” and “effectiveness” criteria is 
consistent with the object and purpose of Article 22 which is to induce 
compliance. If a complaining party seeking the DSB‟s authorization to 
suspend certain concessions or certain other obligations were required to 
select the concessions or other obligations to be suspended in sectors or 
under agreements where such suspension would be either not available in 
practice or would not be powerful in effect, the objective of inducing 
compliance could not be accomplished and the enforcement mechanism of 
the WTO dispute settlement system could not function properly.
327
  
 
With regard to countermeasures against prohibited subsides, the arbitrators have 
consistently stated that the purpose of countermeasures is to induce compliance. The 
arbitrators in Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) stated: 
 
[W]e note that [according to the ILC Draft] countermeasures are meant to 
“induce [the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act] to 
comply with its obligations . . . .” We note in this respect that the Article 22.6 
arbitrators in the EC – Bananas (1999) arbitration made a similar statement. 
We conclude that a countermeasure is “appropriate” inter alia if it effectively 
induces compliance. 
 
Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement provides in this respect that if a measure 
is found to be a prohibited subsidy, it shall be withdrawn without delay. In 
such a case, effectively “inducing compliance” means inducing the 
withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy.
328
 
 
   The arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) also agreed with the arbitrators in 
Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Brazil) that “countermeasures are taken against non-
compliance, and thus its authorization by the DSB is aimed at inducing or securing 
compliance with the DSB‟s recommendation.”329 Subsequently, the arbitrators in Canada 
– Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (Article 22.6 – Canada) agreed with the arbitrators in 
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US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) by recalling that “the objective of the SCM Agreement in 
relation to Article 4.10 is to secure compliance with the DSB recommendation to 
withdraw the subsidy.”330  
   Interestingly, they decided to add 20 per cent to the amount of subsidy as the level of 
countermeasures. This raised a concern that the “appropriateness” standard may provide a 
justification for countermeasures of a punitive nature. However, although the standard 
provides some flexibility in assessing the level of countermeasures, the arbitrators 
repeatedly underlined that the higher level of countermeasures was aimed at inducing 
compliance.
331
 In my view, such amounts were considered because the amount of the 
subsidy itself in this case was substantially lower than its trade effect.
332
 By reading the 
decision, it is quite clear that it was not the intent of the arbitrators to authorize punitive 
countermeasures. As the arbitrators in US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US) stated, there is 
“nothing in the text or in its context which suggests an entitlement to manifestly punitive 
measures.”333 
Most recently, when the level of countermeasures was determined based on the trade 
effect, the arbitrators in US – Upland Cotton (Article 22.6 – US) confirmed that 
“countermeasures under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement serve to „induce 
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compliance.‟”334 
With regard to countermeasures against actionable subsidies, they also stated that the 
purpose of countermeasures is to induce compliance: 
 
As under Article 22.4 of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, 
countermeasures under Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement constitute 
temporary measures taken in response to a continued breach of the 
obligations of the Member concerned, and pending full compliance with the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. We consider, therefore, that 
countermeasures under Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement also serve to 
“induce compliance.”335 
 
   Second, the arbitrators in two arbitration proceedings left room for discussion on 
whether WTO remedies may serve other purposes. Although the arbitrators in US – 1916 
Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US) agreed that a fundamental purpose of retaliation is to induce 
compliance, they also acknowledged that there may be other considerations taken into 
account: 
 
[I]n our view, a key objective of the suspension of concessions or obligations 
– whatever other purposes may exist – is to seek to induce compliance by the 
other WTO Member with its WTO obligations.
336
 
 
The arbitrators in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (Canada) (Article 22.6 – US) 
went even further by stating that they were uncertain whether inducing compliance was 
the exclusive purpose of retaliation: 
 
The concept of “inducing compliance” . . . is not expressly referred to in any 
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part of the DSU and we are not persuaded that the object and purpose of the 
DSU . . . would support an approach where the purpose of suspension of 
concessions or other obligations pursuant to Article 22 would be exclusively 
to induce compliance . . . we cannot exclude that inducing compliance is part 
of the objectives behind suspension of concessions or other obligations, but 
at most it can be only one of a number of purposes in authorizing the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations. By relying on “inducing 
compliance” as the benchmark for the selection of the most appropriate 
approach we also run the risk of losing sight of the requirement of 
Article 22.4 that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of 
nullification or impairment.
337
 
 
   In this regard, they concluded that retaliation may simultaneously serve the purpose 
of inducing compliance and providing some form of temporary compensation: 
 
[T]he DSU does not expressly explain the purpose behind the authorization 
of the suspension of concessions or other obligations. On the one hand, the 
general obligation to comply with DSB recommendations and rulings seems 
to imply that suspension of concessions or other obligations is intended to 
induce compliance, as has been acknowledged by previous arbitrators. 
 
On the other hand, the requirement that the level of such suspensions remain 
equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment suffered by the 
complaining party seems to imply that suspension of concessions or other 
obligations is only a means of obtaining some form of temporary 
compensation, even when the negotiation of compensation has failed.
338
 
 
   What can be extracted from the statements of arbitrators? At least one thing is clear: 
the arbitrators in all cases recognized that inducing compliance is a purpose of WTO 
remedies. They generally focused on the temporary nature of retaliation pending full 
compliance by the members concerned. Although, as mentioned above, it has once been 
stated that retaliation may serve to provide some form of compensation, the arbitrators 
clearly expressed the view that compensation is a temporary measure and that a violating 
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member is still required to bring its inconsistent measure into conformity with its WTO 
obligations. 
 
2. Retaliation Practice 
   Another method of discerning the purpose of remedies is by examining the members‟ 
retaliation practice. Generally, the design of retaliatory actions reveals what the members 
are trying to achieve through retaliation.
339
 As I explain below, it appears that members 
design their retaliatory actions in order to induce compliance. This can be seen in two 
respects. 
   First, the targets of retaliation seem to be chosen to induce compliance. Retaliating 
members typically target the strongest supporters of the original violation and the 
products of politically influential exporters so as to pressure them into lobbying their 
governments for compliance. If a retaliating member were merely aiming to restore the 
balance of benefits between members, it would have targeted a broad range of products 
rather than strategically target a small number of politically influential exporters.
340
 
In EC – Bananas, the US drafted a retaliation list of non-agricultural products 
designed to put pressure on particular EC members, mainly the UK and France, which 
were the leading supporters of the banana regime.
341
 Products from Denmark and the 
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Netherlands were exempted from the list because they were generally against the new 
banana import regime within the EU. The items on the list were handbags, cotton bed 
linen, lead-acid storage batteries, coffee makers, bath preparations, wallets, uncoated felt 
paper, cartons, and lithographs.
342
 In EC – Hormones, the US targeted high-end 
agricultural products from France, Germany, Italy, and Denmark, which were the 
strongest supporters of the hormone ban. Retaliation was imposed mainly on Roquefort 
cheese, French mustard, and Danish ham.
343
 In the middle of the implementation process, 
pork products from Denmark were removed from the retaliation list because Denmark 
appeared to wield less political influence.
344
 In US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), 
although the main beneficiaries of the Byrd Amendment were producers of ball bearings, 
steel and other metal, household items, and some food products, Canada targeted items 
such as live swine, cigarettes, oysters, and certain specialty fish, such as ornamental fish 
or certain frozen fish like monkfish or tilapia. These products were selected because the 
strongest supporters of the Byrd legislation were from Virginia and Maine and these 
products were from their districts.
345
 In US – Steel Safeguards, the EC threatened to 
impose retaliation on products such as steel from Pennsylvania and orange juice from 
Florida, which were politically critical states for the 2004 presidential elections.
346
 Those 
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products were targeted instead of the US steel products that were directly benefitting 
from the WTO-inconsistent safeguard measure. Likewise, in US – FSC, apparel and 
footwear products were selected for the retaliation list, although they had not benefitted 
from the tax breaks.
347
 
Second, the method of implementing retaliation was aimed at inducing compliance. 
There have been instances where retaliating members attempted to change the retaliation 
list or increase the level of retaliation over time. Retaliating members attempted to 
change their method of implementation to exert greater pressure on the violating 
members to comply. If retaliating members were merely aiming to restore the balance of 
benefits between members, they would have sought to implement the full amount without 
any changes to their implementation method.  
In EC – Bananas and EC – Hormones, when the EC strongly resisted compliance 
notwithstanding long-standing US retaliation, the US sought to vary the products on the 
retaliation list through the so-called “carousel” provision to exert maximum pressure on 
the EC to comply with WTO decisions. The US Congress enacted this provision in order 
to enhance the effectiveness of retaliation. It required the USTR to revise the list of 
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targeted products every 6 months.
348
 Although the “carousel” provision has yet to be 
implemented, it is still being considered.
349
 
   In US – FSC, the EC used a different method to implement retaliation. It imposed 
incremental or partial retaliation, instead of implementing the full amount of retaliation. It 
imposed an additional 5 per cent import duty and increased it by 1 per cent every month 
for a period of one year, or until the duty level reached 17 per cent.
350
 In US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment), it implemented retaliation in the form of an additional 15 per cent 
duty which the Commission adjusted each year in order to ensure a level of equivalence 
between the retaliation imposed and the latest annual disbursement under the Byrd 
Amendment.
351
 Ehring terms this form of retaliation as “smart sanctions” which offer 
advantages both in terms of minimizing domestic harm and inducing compliance. He 
argues that increasing the level of retaliation over time would be useful in the sense that 
“a frustrated exporter can have a more powerful voice domestically than an eliminated 
exporter that has gone out of business entirely or that has lost a certain export market 
without hope of re-conquering it quickly.”352 
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In addition, as repeatedly underlined, there have also been instances where 
developing country members sought to cross-retaliate because retaliation in the same 
sector would be ineffective in terms of inducing compliance.
353
 They especially 
attempted to target intellectual property rights which were politically sensitive issues in 
order to incentivize those affected groups to lobby their governments for compliance.
354
 
Overall, current practice clearly shows that retaliating members have targeted the 
strongest supporters of the original violation or politically influential exporters to lobby 
their governments for compliance. Moreover, they have attempted to change their method 
of implementation in the form of rotating the retaliation list, increasing the level over 
time, and retaliating in other sectors or agreements to put more pressure on the violating 
members for compliance. If retaliating members were merely aiming to restore the 
balance of benefits between members or to compensate their injured domestic parties, 
they would have rather implemented retaliation for the full amount they were allotted or 
retaliated against those products that compete with the domestic industry harmed by the 
original violation. 
Recently, in US – Upland Cotton, Brazil released a list of US products and 
intellectual property measures which were sensitive targets subject to retaliation.
355
 
However, Brazil decided to delay the implementation of its retaliation. Instead, Brazil 
used the threat of retaliation to get the US to agree to change certain measures and to 
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establish a fund for technical assistance and capacity building related to the cotton sector 
in Brazil as temporary compensation.
356
 This fund was scheduled to continue and the 
implementation of retaliation remained suspended until the US complied with the DSB 
recommendations or a mutually agreed solution to the dispute was reached.
357
 
With regard to US – FSC, Lamy, who was the EU Trade Commissioner at that time, 
stated that “[t]he fundamental EU objective is . . . to ensure the repeal of the WTO 
incompatible . . . legislation which provides an illegal export subsidy. However . . . if the 
compliance process does not deliver swift results, the Commission will not hesitate to 
propose the adoption of countermeasures.” 358 
  
3. Concluding Remarks 
   In this Section, I examined the purpose of WTO remedies from a practical perspective. 
First, with regard to the statements of arbitrators, although their statements are at times 
ambiguous, they have consistently stated that one of the purposes, if not the sole purpose, 
of WTO remedies is to induce compliance. They generally focused on the nature of 
retaliation in that it is a temporary measure pending full compliance with WTO 
obligations. Second, with regard to members‟ practice, they use retaliation to induce 
compliance by specifically tailoring their target and implementation method. They 
generally targeted the strongest supporters of the original violation and the products of 
politically influential foreign exporters, who would be most inclined to lobby their 
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governments for compliance. Moreover, they attempted to change their method of 
implementation by varying the retaliation list, increasing the level over time and 
retaliating in other sectors or agreements to exert greater pressure on the violating 
members for compliance. 
   Overall, current practice clearly indicates that inducing compliance is the purpose of 
WTO remedies. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The debate on the purpose of WTO remedies has lasted for more than a decade 
because the DSU does not clearly specify its purpose. Nevertheless, it is important to 
define and understand what WTO remedies pursue as their purpose in order to design and 
propose effective remedies because different purposes require different means to achieve 
them. 
In this chapter, I attempted to find the purpose of WTO dispute settlement remedies 
by looking at them from historical, contractual and practical perspectives. In Section I, I 
examined the purpose of WTO remedies from a historical perspective and discovered that 
the concept and structure of remedies have changed from GATT to the WTO. While the 
purpose of remedies under GATT was simply to restore the balance of benefits between 
the parties to a dispute, the purpose of inducing compliance has been added in the WTO. 
The legal transformation toward enforcement created the purpose of inducing compliance 
in WTO remedies along with the purpose of restoring the balance of reciprocal benefits to 
the members in a dispute. 
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In Section II, I examined the purpose of WTO remedies from a contractual 
perspective. I discovered that WTO remedies are closer to the property rules of contract 
remedies, guaranteeing voluntary bargaining for entitlement protection. In the situation of 
both providing compensation and implementing retaliation, a violating member attempts 
to negotiate with a complaining member and pays a temporary release cost for not 
bringing the inconsistent measure into conformity with WTO obligations immediately. In 
addition, I found that WTO remedies do not resemble the liability rules of contract 
remedies in that they do not provide full compensation in order to facilitate efficient 
breach. The determination of the level of retaliation is a mere approximation and, 
systematically, its level is primarily set from the expiration of a reasonable period of time, 
leaving past injuries uncompensated. However, the fact that retaliation does not provide 
full compensation does not mean that it cannot serve the purpose of restoring balance. 
Restoring balance and providing compensation can be achieved at different levels. While 
equal balance can be achieved through restoring the status quo ante through the raising of 
tariffs to the previous level, the full level of compensation can only be attained by leaving 
an injured member in a position where it would have been had the agreement been 
performed. Thus, the balance of benefits between members can be restored without an 
injured member being fully compensated. Overall, WTO remedies resemble property 
rules of contract remedies requiring a violating member to precisely fulfill its WTO 
obligations. 
In Section III, I examined the purpose of WTO remedies from a practical perspective. 
I discovered that current practice clearly indicates that inducing compliance is the 
purpose of WTO remedies. With regard to the statements of arbitrators, they have, in all 
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cases, agreed that a purpose of WTO remedies was to induce compliance. They generally 
focused on the fact that retaliation is a temporary measure pending full compliance with 
WTO obligations. With regard to members‟ retaliation practice, they designed their 
retaliation in order to induce compliance by specifically tailoring the targeted products 
and varying the implementation method of retaliation. 
   In light of the above, I have reached three conclusions. They are as follows: 
 
(1) WTO remedies may provide some form of temporary compensation and may 
restore the balance between disputing members. 
(2) However, the WTO intends to maintain that balance only through compliance, not 
through violation-cum-compensation or violation-cum-retaliation.
359
 
(3) Therefore, the ultimate purpose of WTO remedies is to induce compliance. 
 
As stated in Article 3.2 of the DSU, the WTO dispute settlement system is meant to 
provide security and predictability to international trade relations. If a member were 
simply exempted from WTO obligations by providing compensation or accepting 
retaliation, it would seriously undermine these fundamental objectives.
360
 A dispute in 
WTO dispute settlement is resolved only when the violating member complies with the 
decision of the WTO adjudicative system and fulfils its obligations under the relevant 
WTO agreements. In this sense, WTO remedies as compensation or retaliation are not 
alternative options to compliance, but rather tentative remedies for the delay in 
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implementation pending full compliance with WTO obligations. 
   In the next Chapter, I will propose improvements to the currently available WTO 
dispute settlement remedies. To this end, I will take into account the purpose of inducing 
compliance and the problems with remedies, which were discussed in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 4: IMPROVEMENT OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REMEDIES 
 
   This Chapter proposes possible improvements to WTO dispute settlement remedies. 
To date, various alternatives to the remedies have been proposed. Yet, they should be 
considered carefully, as they present not only advantages but disadvantages, which may 
make them untenable. It is important that proposed remedies accomplish their ultimate 
purpose, which is to induce compliance, and, if possible, help to solve, or at least 
minimize, the problems that were considered in the previous Chapters.
361
 
Primarily, solutions to the problem of non-compliance should focus on strengthening 
the current system of remedies themselves. In Section I, I will reconstruct the current 
system of retaliation. In particular, I suggest some degree of retroactivity in determining 
the level of retaliation, changes in the method of implementing retaliation, the possibility 
of collective retaliation and the use of monetary payments as an additional tool of 
compliance enforcement. I will also underline the importance of TRIPS retaliation. In 
Section II, I will consider the more extensive use of the current system of compensation, 
as it is a preferable remedy to retaliation. In Section III, I will conclude with some 
comments. 
 
I. Reconstruction of Retaliation  
In this Section, I will focus on the improvement of the current system of retaliation, 
which is the remedy of last resort. I suggest practical improvements that could achieve 
the purpose of inducing compliance and help overcome the power imbalances that exist 
in international trade relations. 
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1. Introducing Retroactive Retaliation 
   In practice, the level of retaliation is determined as of the expiration of the reasonable 
period of time for implementation, with retaliation applied prospectively.
362
 In other 
words, a requesting member may not retaliate with respect to damage suffered prior to the 
expiration of the reasonable period of time. Thus, until the expiration of the reasonable 
period of time, an inconsistent measure can be maintained without cost. 
   Accordingly, the prospective nature of retaliation provides no incentive for “prompt 
compliance” with WTO rulings.363 Rather, it perversely may encourage the violating 
member to delay compliance by seeking a long reasonable period of time, taking 
unsatisfactory implementation measures that inevitably lead the complainant to resort to 
compliance review under Article 21.5 and requesting an arbitration proceeding under 
Article 22.6.
364
 
Thus, in order to create incentives for prompt compliance and discourage delay, one 
solution would be to determine the level of retaliation from any date prior to the date 
currently set for implementation.
365
 Mexico has proposed a determination of the level of 
retaliation that could start at any of the following moments in time: (1) the date of 
imposition of the measure; (2) the date of the request for consultations; or (3) the date of 
establishment of the panel. In Mexico‟s view, this would fairly allocate the balance of 
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concessions and rights.
366
 
   However, a number of countries and scholars are highly concerned about introducing 
retroactivity into the system. Canada, for example, has expressed reservations that it may 
not respect the right of members to seek a reasonable period of time in cases where 
immediate implementation is not practicable.
367
 Choi also strongly opposes 
determination of the level of retaliation so as to include a time period that starts before 
the date of the legal obligation for compliance because it would merely justify punitive 
retaliation, which would violate the basic principles of the DSU.
368
 
   However, in my view, a determination of retaliation so as to include time periods 
before the expiration of the reasonable period of time for implementation does not 
disregard the right to a reasonable period of time, since retaliation is implemented after 
such a period has expired. Accordingly, the purpose of introducing “retroactive” 
retaliation is to create incentives for prompt compliance or, at least, compliance within 
the reasonable period of time. There is no intent to strip the right of a member to such a 
period. 
   The earliest time from which to assess the level of retaliation could be when the 
inconsistent measure came into force, which may coincide with when it began to cause 
injury, and the latest appropriate point of assessment could be set at the adoption of the 
panel or Appellate Body report. Although there may be a preference for one moment over 
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the other, it is important to note that any proposed moment before the expiration of the 
reasonable period of time would create incentives for compliance and discourage delay. 
In my view, in the sense that the DSU calls for “prompt compliance,” which requires a 
violating member to implement the WTO ruling as soon as the panel or Appellate Body 
report has been adopted, the level of retaliation should be measured, at a minimum, as of 
the adoption of these reports.
369
 This may provide strong incentives for the violating 
member to comply immediately upon the adoption of such reports. 
   Although retroactive remedies occasionally have been granted in trade remedy cases 
to a limited extent,
370
 introducing “retroactive” retaliation under the DSU is a novel idea 
that has never been authorized by the DSB. Therefore, it requires a careful examination in 
deciding which moment would be the most optimal starting point for determining the 
level of retaliation. 
 
2. Changing the Method of Implementation 
While it may be true that a higher level of retaliation would create more incentives for 
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 See Ch. 2. Sec. II. 1.1. See also William J. Davey, Sanctions in the WTO: Problems and Solutions, in 
The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement 360, 366 (Chad P. Bown & 
Joost Pauwelyn eds., 2010). From the three moments proposed by Mexico, Shadikhodjaev argues that the 
date of the request for consultations seems most reasonable in the sense that it would create more incentives 
to reach a mutually satisfactory solution before the stage of panel proceeding. See Shadikhodjaev, supra 
note 304, at 170. 
370
 The panel in Australia – Automotive Leather not only recommended the withdrawal of the subsidy but 
also ordered the full repayment of the subsidy. The reasoning behind this decision was that the term 
“withdraw the subsidy” may not encompass repayment and this would raise “serious questions regarding 
the efficacy of the remedy in prohibited subsidy cases involving one-time subsidies paid in the past.” The 
panel distinguished Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement from Article 19.1 of the DSU by stating that the 
former is not limited to “purely prospective action.” Accordingly, it essentially permitted a “retrospective” 
remedy with respect to prohibited subsidies. See Panel Report, Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers 
and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, ¶¶ 6.31, 
6.35 & 6.39-6.42, WT/DS126/RW (Jan. 21, 2000). However, this decision has been intensely criticized for 
exceeding the panel‟s mandate under the DSU. See, e.g., Gavin Goh & Andreas R. Ziegler, Retrospective 
Remedies in the WTO after Automotive Leather, 6 J. Int‟l Econ. L. 545, 549-551 (2003). As mentioned 
previously, in GATT, retroactive remedies were also provided in a few cases dealing with antidumping and 
countervailing duties. See Ch. 2. Sec. I. 2.1. n.22. 
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compliance, as seen in practice, it is not so much the amount of retaliation that matters, 
but rather the implementation method of retaliation. Even where retaliation may lack an 
economic impact, it is important to study how retaliatory measures could send a strong 
political message by formulating its implementation method to enforce compliance. 
I strongly propose the rotation of retaliation targets and gradual changes of the level 
of retaliation over time as follows. 
 
2.1. Rotating the Retaliation List 
The list of products subject to retaliation could be rotated periodically to impose 
greater impact on the violating member. The advantage of such rotation is that, while 
exporters subject to retaliation remain on the list for a short period, it redistributes “the 
harm in such a way that its impact is individually lessened, though affecting more 
businesses.”371 Thus, by increasing the number of exporting industries that are affected 
by retaliation, there may be more interested groups willing to pressure the violating 
member‟s government into compliance. 
In EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), the EC raised an objection to the 
statement made by the USTR that the US is free to resort to such rotation “where the 
concessions and other obligations subject to suspension would change every now and 
then, in particular in terms of product coverage.”372 The EC argued that in doing so the 
US would unilaterally decide not only which concessions or obligations to suspend, but 
also whether the level of such suspension meets the standard of equivalence required by 
Article 22.4 of the DSU. In response, the US stated that “[a]lthough nothing in the DSU 
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prevents future changes to the list [of products subject to suspension] …, the United 
States has no current intent to make such changes.” Hence, the arbitrators concluded that 
it was not necessary to consider such an issue in determining the level of retaliation.
373
 
   Nevertheless, when the EC continued to maintain its inconsistent measures in EC – 
Bananas and EC – Hormones, the US Congress enacted Section 407 of Trade and 
Development Act of 2000, otherwise known as the “carousel” provision. It requires the 
USTR to modify the list of products to which retaliation applies on a regular basis. In 
particular, it was designed to revise the list of products after 120 days of the first 
application of suspension and then every 180 days thereafter in order to affect imports 
from members that have been determined by the US not to have implemented WTO 
recommendations.
374
 
The EC strongly opposed this provision and requested consultations on grounds that 
(1) it is a “unilateral action without any prior multilateral control” that “mandates 
suspension of or threatens to suspend concessions or other obligations other than those on 
which authorization was granted by the DSB”; (2) it creates a “structural imbalance 
between the cumulative level of the suspensions of concessions and the level of 
nullification and impairment” which is in breach of the standard of equivalence under the 
DSU; and (3) it creates a “„chilling effect‟ on the market-place, thus gravely affecting the 
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.”375 
However, this dispute has not yet moved beyond the consultation stage, which is 
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partly due to the fact that the US has not applied the provision. As such, to date, no such 
rotation of products on a retaliation list has occurred. 
The question under consideration here is whether the rotation of products on a 
retaliation list under the “carousel” provision is legitimate. There are two instances in 
which the rotation of products on a retaliation list would be permissible. First, in the 
event of suspension of tariff concessions, if the retaliation list is modified within the 
scope of the sectors authorized by the DSB, such rotation would be legitimate. 
Currently, although it is not required by the DSU textually, it has become standard 
practice to submit a retaliation list at the time a request for the authorization of retaliation 
is made.
376
 It is for the retaliating member to draw up the retaliation list that can be 
subject to suspension and to ensure the level of retaliation does not exceed the level of 
nullification or impairment.
377
 A requesting member typically issues a broad and 
provisional retaliation list in order to create uncertainty among exporters within the 
violating member state, which thereby incentivizes them to lobby their government to 
comply. Thus, it maximizes pressure by increasing widespread apprehension among 
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possible targets.
378
 It also creates pressure before the actual retaliation takes place. 
 The arbitrators in EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC) clearly stated that, in the 
event of suspension of tariff concessions, “only products that appear on the product list 
attached to the request for suspension can be subject to suspension.”379  And, the 
requesting member may freely “pick products from that list – not outside the list – 
equaling a total trade value that does not exceed the amount of trade impairment . . . .”380 
Thus, the legitimacy of “carousel” retaliation depends on whether a retaliation list has 
been submitted to and authorized by the DSB. It is up to the discretion of the requesting 
member to decide which items to target within the scope of authorized products.
381
 
   Second, there may be instances where a requesting member intends to rotate the list 
of products that are not submitted to or authorized by the DSB. This seems to be 
permissible so long as there are procedures which ensure that the level of retaliation does 
not exceed the level of nullification or impairment.
382
 
                                                          
378
 See Shaffer & Ganin, supra note 339, at 79; Ehring, supra note 346, at 252. 
379
 EC – Hormones (US) (Article 22.6 – EC), supra note 129, ¶ 16. They argued on the ground that this 
“follows from the minimum requirements attached to a request to suspend concessions or other 
obligations.” Id. 
380
 Id. ¶ 21. 
381
 In the event of suspension of other, non-tariff obligations, if the obligations are rotated within the 
agreements authorized by the DSB, such rotation would be legitimate. In practice, except for the 
suspension of certain obligations under the TRIPS Agreement where the complaining member normally 
identifies them in its request, arbitrators and potential targets do not generally examine which “obligations” 
a retaliating member seeks authorization to suspend. See, e.g., US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), supra 
note 92, ¶¶ 5.6-5.7; EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC), supra note 92, ¶ 173. A complaining 
member may request authorization from the DSB by simply stating that it intends to suspend the 
application of obligations under certain agreements. For instance, it could obtain authorization from the 
DSB to suspend unspecified obligations under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing with respect to 
certain sectors. See US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US), supra note 130, ¶¶ 3.10-3.11. Thus, arbitrators 
accept requests and grant authorization to suspend unspecified obligations, while allowing the requesting 
member to decide which particular obligations it wishes to suspend when it implements retaliation. See id. 
¶ 3.13. In this regard, it would be legitimate, if the obligations are rotated within the agreements authorized 
by the DSB. 
382
 See Davey, supra note 369, at 368-369. Davey further argues that there would be no problem, if “the 
uncertainty associated with a plan to use a carousel is considered in the setting of the level of retaliation.” 
Id. Mavroidis suggests that a paragraph should be added in the DSU that, in case of unilateral modification, 
a retaliating member must bear the burden of proof that the modified level of retaliation does not exceed 
the level of nullification or impairment. See Petros C. Mavroidis, Proposals for Reform of Article 22 of the 
134 
 
   In this regard, the Philippines and Thailand have proposed that a requesting member 
be allowed to submit a modified list of concessions to arbitrators for consideration of 
whether the level of such retaliation is equivalent to the level of nullification or 
impairment any time after authorization has been given by the DSB.
383
 The general 
intent of their proposal is to ensure that the standard of equivalence is respected by 
requiring a detailed list of products that a requesting member intends to suspend, and to 
prevent the suspension of concessions or other obligations other than those contained in 
the retaliation list considered by the arbitrators.
384
 
   Overall, as long as the modified retaliation respects the standard of equivalence, the 
rotation of a retaliation list or the suspension of any obligations within the agreements 
authorized by the DSB would be legitimate. Such changes in the implementation method 
would create strong incentives for compliance. 
 
2.2. Providing Gradual Changes of the Level of Retaliation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
DSU: Reconsidering the “Sequencing” Issue and Suspension of Concessions, in The WTO Dispute 
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The gradual change of the level of retaliation over time could be considered as an 
additional method of promoting implementation. As Shaffer and Ganin argued, 
“incremental or partial” retaliation rather than the full amount of retaliation would create 
more incentives for compliance.
385
 
The main advantage of adopting incremental or partial retaliation seems to be that 
such retaliation would lessen the negative impact on importers and consumers in the 
retaliating member, while maintaining sufficient pressure on the exporters in the violating 
member to lobby their government for compliance. They become “irritants without 
however blocking trade flows entirely.”386 In this regard, compliance can be achieved by 
retaliation in small amounts and by less prohibitive means. Moreover, such changes 
would be more powerful in the sense that frustrated exporters are in a better position to 
lobby their government than exporters who have entirely lost their markets without any 
hope for reclaiming it.
387
 In addition, they would inculcate the perception in the violating 
member that retaliation is not merely an alternative to compliance.
388
 
   In US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), a partial amount of retaliation was 
implemented by the EC in the form of 15 per cent additional duty, which the Commission 
adjusted each year in order to ensure the level of equivalence between the retaliation 
imposed and the latest annual disbursement under the Byrd Amendment.
389
 In US – FSC, 
the EC increased the level of retaliation over time instead of initially implementing the 
full amount of retaliation. Retaliation was applied in the form of an additional 5 per cent 
import duty, which was increased by 1 per cent every month for a period of one year, or 
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until the duty level reached 17 per cent. This ultimately resulted in the US repealing the 
FSC regime in a WTO-consistent manner, even though the total amount of retaliation was 
not applied.
390
 
   Overall, as long as the gradual change of the level of retaliation, in the form of 
incremental or partial implementation, meets the standard of equivalence, there would be 
no problem for a retaliating member to use it. Combining the rotation of products on a 
retaliation list with the gradual change of the level of retaliation would create strong 
incentives for compliance. 
 
3. Introducing Collective Retaliation 
Because the effectiveness of retaliation is based on a member‟s economic power, 
retaliation by a relatively small country member will not likely have a great impact on a 
large country member. Arbitrators have observed that, as a practical matter, obtaining the 
purpose of inducing compliance may be extremely difficult in cases where there is a great 
imbalance in terms of trade volume and economic power between the parties to a 
dispute.
391
 
While retaliation seems to work well when threatened by a developed country against 
a developing country or when threatened by one developed country against another, it 
may not be sufficient or effective for a developing country to attempt to use retaliation to 
force a developed country into compliance with WTO obligations. Therefore, the 
imbalance in compliance enforcement capacity constrains the ability of developing 
countries to exercise their right of retaliation. 
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   In this regard, a number of scholars have proposed the concept of collective 
retaliation as a means to provide developing country members with a means to ensure 
better enforcement.
392
 They argue that, while bilateral retaliation cannot deter non-
compliance in disputes where there is an imbalance of power between members, 
collective retaliation would provide an effective means for small country members to 
bring their claims to the WTO dispute settlement system and have a formidable impact to 
exert pressures on large country members to comply with WTO rulings.
393
 
   The idea of collective retaliation was first raised in GATT in 1965, when a number of 
developing countries, Brazil and Uruguay, claimed that they lacked the ability to enforce 
compliance against developed countries.
394
 Recently, this issue has been raised a number 
of times in the WTO. The African Group and the Least Developed Countries (LDC) 
Group have proposed that all developing members be authorized to “collectively suspend 
concessions to a developed member,” notwithstanding the normal requirement of 
equivalence, on the basis of special and differential treatment.
395
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   In assessing these proposals, however, there are a number of practical problems in 
implementing collective retaliation. First, if the standard of equivalence were to be 
respected, how could the collective level be allocated to other WTO members? If the 
standard of equivalence were to be disregarded, collective retaliation could be punitive, 
which would contradict the very nature and purpose of WTO retaliation. 
Second, it is questionable whether members not affected by the violation would be 
willing to share the cost of implementing retaliation. Since implementing retaliation hurts 
them and aggravates trading relations with the complained-against member, they may 
feel uncomfortable supporting retaliation efforts.
396
 
   Third, and most importantly, non-party members to the dispute would have no 
incentives to implement retaliation in a way that induces the violating member to comply 
with WTO rulings. With bilateral retaliation, an injured member generally administers 
retaliation that is most likely to exert pressures on politically powerful exporters so as to 
cause them to lobby their government to withdraw its WTO-inconsistent measure. On the 
other hand, with collective retaliation, non-party members who are not affected by the 
violation would probably administer retaliation that is most likely to benefit their 
protectionist groups.
397
 This strategy would have nothing to do with the purpose of 
inducing compliance. Rather, it could increase the global trade barriers, leading to the 
adoption of more protectionist policies.
398
 
   Thus, although collective retaliation seems to offer an effective way for a small 
country member to stand against a large country member, these practical aspects make its 
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use problematic. In political reality, none of the members would be willing to participate 
in collective retaliation in order to settle unrelated trade disputes.
399
 
   However, there is a possibility to incorporate collective retaliation in limited 
circumstances. As long as the standard of equivalence is maintained, multiple 
complainants in the same dispute may collectively retaliate against the violating member, 
i.e., five complainants in EC – Bananas: Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the 
US. More specifically, instead of implementing retaliation individually based on each 
authorized amount, parties to collective retaliation could coordinate their efforts and take 
proportional shares in the total level of retaliation corresponding to their retaliation 
capacity. For instance, the US might take some portion of Honduras‟ and Guatemala‟s 
authorized level of retaliation and, thus, retaliate more than the initially authorized 
amount. 
   This strategy would not only indirectly provide small country complainants with 
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effective retaliation but would also create more opportunities to inflict sufficient harm on 
the most politically powerful exporters in the violating member to lobby their 
government for compliance. 
 
4. Renewing TRIPS Retaliation 
Along with the introduction of collective retaliation among multiple complainants in 
the same dispute, retaliation by suspending TRIPS obligations could also be considered 
as a strong tool to solve the problem of imbalance in the compliance enforcement 
capacity and to provide sufficient pressure on the violating member for compliance. 
Many developing members have proposed unconditional cross-retaliation, since they 
view the conditions enumerated under Article 22.3 of the DSU for cross-retaliation as 
being too cumbersome. They proposed to insert a new paragraph, Article 22.3bis, stating 
that in disputes where a complaining member is a developing member and a complained-
against member is a developed member, the complainant shall have the right to seek 
authorization for retaliation “with respect to any or all sectors under any covered 
agreements.” 400 Hence, it would be unnecessary to state reasons why retaliation in the 
same sector or under the same agreement is not practicable or effective and why the 
circumstances are serious enough to request the authorization of cross-retaliation.
401
 
   Considering the negative and disproportionate effects of tariff retaliation on its own 
economy, retaliation by suspension of TRIPS obligations is of significant value for a 
developing member in a dispute with a developed member because intellectual property 
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protection generally tends to serve the interests of developed members.
402
 There is a high 
demand for protection of intellectual property rights in developed members, and such 
retaliation would not easily be endured by those industries which rely on the protection of 
intellectual property rights. As such, they would likely apply considerable political 
pressure for compliance on their government. 
   In this sub-Section, I will examine the effectiveness of expanding the use of cross-
retaliation on TRIPS obligations and the practical considerations associated with this 
proposal. 
 
4.1. Effectiveness of TRIPS Retaliation 
The critical issue is whether implementing TRIPS retaliation would work 
significantly better than tariff retaliation in inducing compliance by developed country 
members. 
   There are a number of reasons that TRIPS retaliation is preferable to tariff retaliation 
in terms of its effectiveness. First, with tariff retaliation, the economic harm to 
manufacturers, service providers and consumers in the retaliating member will often 
outweigh the economic harm inflicted on the complained-against member.
403
 On the 
contrary, TRIPS retaliation reduces the payment outflows for intellectual property rights 
during its implementation without inflicting harm on local manufacturers and consumers. 
Thus, from an economic standpoint, it is more desirable in that it does not generate the 
adverse impacts which result from raising tariff barriers or restricting services.
404
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Second, there may be situations where the market of a developing member is so small 
that retaliation under GATT or GATS commitments would not have a significant impact 
on the economy of the developed member.
405
 In US – Gambling (Article 22.6 – US), the 
arbitrators agreed with Antigua that, given the low level of imports in the service sectors, 
such as transportation, travel and insurance services, it would have virtually no impact 
upon the US in implementing retaliatory measures on these sectors.
406
 However, 
intellectual property rights protected under the TRIPS Agreement are generally important 
assets in most developed members. Effective protection of intellectual property rights is 
one of their essential concerns. The TRIPS Agreement confers enormous benefits to 
information technology industries, pharmaceutical industries, owners of trademarks and 
industrial designs, patent holders, film and music companies. These various intellectual 
property owners from developed members also comprise their most powerful political 
constituencies.
407
 If a retaliating member targets these industries and aims to suspend 
their TRIPS benefits, these industries will have sufficient political power to lobby their 
government for compliance.
408
 Thus, TRIPS retaliation can be expected to have a 
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significant impact on the economy of the violating member, which may generate strong 
incentives for compliance. 
   Third, TRIPS retaliation could increase the bargaining position of a developing 
member against a developed member.
409
 In EC – Bananas, when Ecuador threatened to 
retaliate on TRIPS obligations, it entered into a successful negotiation with the EC.
410
 
   Lastly, TRIPS retaliation could be welfare-enhancing if implemented strategically 
since it “facilitates technological development and domestic innovation through imitation 
and technological learning.”411 It is better for the retaliating member in the sense that it 
reduces prices, while simultaneously increasing the availability of those products in its 
market. 
Overall, TRIPS retaliation offers a strong compliance enforcement tool for 
developing members in disputes against large developed members. It does not create an 
adverse impact on the member implementing retaliation but generates economic benefits 
and encourages strong TRIPS-connected lobbies in the targeted member to exert 
considerable political pressure on their government for compliance. 
 
4.2. Practical Considerations of TRIPS Retaliation 
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Apart from the effectiveness of TRIPS retaliation, there are a number of practical 
considerations in its implementation. 
First, intellectual property rights are rights acquired by private individuals and are 
widely protected under domestic legislation. In this regard, TRIPS retaliation may 
undermine private rights protected under domestic law and even be challenged by private 
individuals in their respective domestic courts as being illegal.
412
 In this vein, the 
arbitrators in EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) raised a concern that the 
implementation of TRIPS retaliation may “give rise to legal difficulties or conflicts 
within the domestic legal system of the Member so authorized (and perhaps even of the 
Member(s) affected by such suspension).”413 To the extent that such difficulties or 
conflicts may exist, it may be difficult to implement TRIPS retaliation. 
Thus, an effective use of TRIPS retaliation would require a retaliating member to 
establish a domestic legal system that allows its implementation. In particular, domestic 
legislation should specify that intellectual property rights may be suspended in cases 
where the member obtains the authorization to implement TRIPS retaliation from the 
DSB.
414
 
Recently, Brazil considered establishing a legislative scheme for TRIPS retaliation in 
order to avoid this problem. In 2008, the bill, PL 1893/2007, which allows derogation 
from the domestic intellectual property legal framework and simplifies the procedure for 
the implementation of TRIPS retaliation, was approved by the Commission on Economic 
Development of the Chamber of Deputies.
415
 In addition, with regard to US – Upland 
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Cotton, the Brazilian government issued a decree in February 2010 which authorizes the 
use of TRIPS retaliation against the US.
416
 The decree seems to speed up the 
implementation process, which could ultimately induce effective compliance. 
   Second, intellectual property rights subject to TRIPS retaliation may also be protected 
under other international agreements. Thus, the possibility of conflict always exists when 
these rights are to be suspended by TRIPS retaliation. For example, if Antigua in US – 
Gambling allows US copyrighted products to be posted on websites for downloads, it 
may conflict with the exclusive right of reproduction under the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which Antigua is a signatory of. 
   Article 2.2 of the TRIPS Agreement reads that “[n]othing in Parts I to IV of this 
Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other 
under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty 
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.” With regard to this Article, 
however, the arbitrators in EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 22.6 – EC) observed that: 
 
Article 2.2 only refers to Parts I to IV of the TRIPS Agreement, while the 
provisions on “Dispute Prevention and Settlement” are embodied in Part V. 
This Part of the TRIPS Agreement contains, inter alia, Article 64.1 which 
provides that the DSU applies to disputes under the TRIPS Agreement unless 
otherwise specifically provided therein . . . . However, nothing in Article 64 
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or other Articles of the TRIPS Agreement provides specifically that Article 
22 of the DSU does not apply to the TRIPS Agreement.
417
  
 
   They further observed that Articles 22.3 (f)(iii) and (g)(iii) of the DSU clearly specify 
that Sections of the TRIPS Agreement are “sectors,” and that the TRIPS Agreement is an 
“agreement,” in respect of which the suspension of TRIPS obligations may be sought, 
pursuant to Article 22.3 (b) and (c), by a complaining member and authorized by the DSB. 
And, if the requesting member has fulfilled all the requirements of Article 22 to 
implement TRIPS retaliation, “neither Article 2.2 read in context with Article 64 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, nor any other provision of the WTO agreements indicate that an 
authorization by the DSB of that request would in theory be prohibited under WTO 
law.”418 They also added that it was not within their jurisdiction to determine whether a 
WTO member implementing authorized TRIPS retaliation measures would “act 
inconsistently with its international obligations arising from treaties other than the 
agreements covered by the WTO.”419 
   Moreover, retaliation under TRIPS would be precluded from being wrongful under 
public international law even if it breached another international agreement, as long as it 
was taken in response to a violating member‟s WTO-inconsistent measures. Article 22 of 
the ILC Draft provides that “[t]he wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity 
with an international obligation towards another State is precluded if and to the extent 
that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter state in accordance with 
[the conditions set out in Articles 49 to 54].” The implementation of TRIPS retaliation 
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seems to satisfy these conditions, since it is directed against a member who is 
maintaining a WTO-inconsistent measure,
420
 it is a temporary measure until compliance 
has been achieved,
421
 and it does not involve any departure from fundamental obligations 
including peremptory norms of public international law.
422
 And its level is equivalent to 
the level of nullification or impairment, which reflects the principle of proportionality 
under Article 51.
423
 
 
4.3. Implementation of TRIPS Retaliation 
In the event of TRIPS retaliation, TRIPS obligations are suspended for the retaliating 
member during the time of non-compliance. Here, the existence and scope of TRIPS 
retaliation is restricted to the territory of the retaliating member. In other words, it is only 
extended to intellectual property rights that are protected under the domestic law and 
exploited in the domestic market of the retaliating member.
424
 
In this regard, a retaliating member cannot trade products violating TRIPS 
requirements with any other WTO member. The arbitrators in EC – Bananas (Ecuador) 
(Article 22.6 – EC) stated that an authorization of TRIPS retaliation does not exonerate 
any other WTO member from any of its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Thus, 
other members are under an obligation to enforce Article 51 of the TRIPS Agreement on 
special border measures in order to prevent the importation of products violating TRIPS 
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requirements, even if the violation is permitted in the retaliating member state.
425
 
The question then becomes how the retaliating member can guarantee that products 
are sold only in the domestic market and not exported to other members. This is an 
important issue because, if those products are exported to other members, there may be a 
possibility of excessive retaliation. 
In US – Gambling, Antigua at first considered posting US copyrighted products for 
downloading online as an option for retaliation.
426
 However, considering the worldwide 
availability of these products through the Internet, there were no means to limit them to 
users located only within the territory of Antigua. Thus, the existence and scope of 
retaliation in a form such as this may not only expand beyond the territory of the 
retaliating member but also exceed the level of nullification or impairment.
427
 
   In contrast, if the products were strictly controlled or supervised at the member level, 
i.e., the government exercises the exclusive right on those products for the time of 
suspension, it would be easier to prevent exportation to other members and limit the 
potential for excessive retaliation. This was the case in EC – Bananas (Ecuador) (Article 
22.6 – EC), where Ecuador considered “installing a system whereby companies or 
individuals established in Ecuador could obtain an authorization from the Ecuadorian 
government to [implement retaliation] . . . within the Ecuadorian territory.”428 This 
authorization was to be awarded through a “licensing system” which would limit 
retaliation “in terms of quantity, value and time . . . [reserving the government‟s] right to 
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revoke these licences at any time.”429  The arbitrators were in favor of Ecuador‟s 
intention to exercise control over the distribution of rights rather than adopting a 
suspension of all the related rights.
430
 Overall, so as to ensure the authorized level of 
retaliation, it would be important to install a government-controlled system that would 
ensure that the products violating TRIPS requirements were only to be sold in the 
domestic market. 
In addition, as argued in the previous sub-Section, TRIPS retaliation in a collective 
manner should be carefully considered. Since a sufficient domestic market and consumer 
demand are required for TRIPS retaliation in order to impose a significant impact on the 
violating member, small developing members as sole complainants often lack the markets 
or demand for intellectual property to effectively utilize retaliation as a remedy. Thus, in 
cases where there are multiple complainants that all have been authorized and have 
fulfilled the requirement of Article 22.3 for TRIPS retaliation, they could freely trade 
products violating TRIPS requirements from the violating member among themselves.
431
 
This collective enforcement strategy would particularly be effective, for example, in the 
public health perspective in the case in which one of the complainants manufactures 
patented pharmaceuticals that could then be exported to all other complaining members at 
a cheaper rate where a manufacturing capacity is insufficient.
432
 
   In sum, a request to cross-retaliate through the suspension of TRIPS obligations has 
been a huge development in WTO dispute settlement remedies, especially for developing 
members in disputes against developed members. TRIPS retaliation encourages strong 
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TRIPS-connected lobbies in developed members where there is a high demand for 
protection of intellectual property rights to put considerable political pressure on the 
government for compliance. In this regard, it is important to promote its use. 
 
5. Introducing Monetary Payment 
Considering the negative and disproportionate effects of retaliation on the country 
using it, monetary payment could be seriously considered in lieu of retaliation. It would 
often be more beneficial for developing members to receive a monetary payment rather 
than to implement retaliation. 
   An introduction of monetary payments would generally provide more options to the 
complaining member that may feel uncomfortable with implementing retaliation. As 
Gray opined with respect to state responsibility under public international law, “the 
determination of the consequences of a breach of international law is left initially to the 
discretion of the injured state.”433 Hence, more options for remedies for the complaining 
member would provide more opportunities to encourage the violating member to achieve 
compliance and, ultimately, build the stability and security of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. 
In this sub-Section, I will examine the effectiveness of and practical considerations 
related to monetary payments and suggest how they could be implemented. 
 
  5.1. Effectiveness of Monetary Payment 
   The remedy of monetary payment is not a novel idea in international trade disputes. It 
was first raised in 1964 when Brazil and Uruguay proposed an amendment of Article 
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XXIII of GATT.
434
 Their proposal was intended to provide monetary compensation as an 
additional remedy for developing countries in disputes against developed countries, 
where an illegal trade measure seriously impaired the trade capacity of developing 
countries. It has been also proposed quite a number of times in the WTO in connection 
with Doha Round negotiations. Pakistan first proposed to clarify that the term 
“compensation” used in Article 22 includes monetary compensation.435 The African 
Group also proposed “mandatory” monetary compensation to be made until the 
withdrawal of the measure in breach of WTO obligations.
436
 Later, the LDC Group 
proposed that monetary compensation should be equal to the injury suffered, i.e., injury 
“directly arising from the offending measure or foreseeable under the offending 
measure.”437 
   There are a number of reasons why monetary payment could be preferable to 
retaliation. First, monetary payment is not trade-restrictive, while retaliation increases 
restrictions on trade by adding more trade barriers.
438
 Thus, monetary payment does not 
undermine the free trade principle of the WTO. 
Second, there may be a possibility of direct compensation to the private entities that 
are injured by WTO violations. On the one hand, the violating member may collect funds 
from the beneficiaries of the violation. In any event, the wronged member could use such 
                                                          
434
 It reads that “[i]f the measures complained of have been applied by a contracting party recognized as a 
developed country, the organ of arbitration may recommend, in particular suitable financial compensation.” 
Report of the Committee, Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework of GATT in Relation to 
Less-Developed Countries, Annex 4, L/2195/Rev.1 (Apr. 13, 1964). See also Brazilian & Uruguayan 
Proposal, supra note 394, ¶ 7. 
435
 See General Council, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: The Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), Communication from Pakistan, WT/GC/W/162 (Apr. 1, 1999). 
436
 See African Group Proposal, supra note 395, ¶ 5. See also African Group Text, supra note 395. 
437
 See LDC Group Proposal, supra note 395, ¶ 13. 
438
 See Rebecca Ullman, Enhancing the WTO Tool Kit: The Case for Financial Compensation, 9 Rich. J. 
Global L. & Bus. 167, 182-183 (2010). 
152 
 
payments to compensate those injured by the WTO-inconsistent measure.
439
 In this 
regard, monetary payments could be analogized to reparation, which is different from 
retaliation, where burdens are imposed on sectors unrelated to a dispute.
440
 
Third, monetary payment does not impose any burden on consumers and industries of 
the complaining member as is often the case with retaliation. In this sense, monetary 
payment does not hurt “innocent bystanders” that are unrelated to the dispute.441 From an 
economic standpoint, it would be better for the complaining member to receive monetary 
payment rather than to implement retaliation. 
 
  5.2. Practical Considerations of Monetary Payment 
Apart from its desirability, there are a number of practical considerations in providing 
monetary payment. First, perhaps the most critical point of monetary payment is whether 
it is significantly better than retaliation in terms of inducing compliance. In general, 
retaliation can be expected to have a significant impact on the economy of a violating 
member creating sufficient political pressure on the government for compliance. By 
comparison, monetary payment is just a payment that is simply paid out of the general 
revenue of a government. It does not create the political pressure that retaliation does in 
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order to induce compliance.
442
 In this regard, it may be true that monetary payment 
would have a less compliance-inducing effect than retaliation. 
However, as suggested in the previous sub-Section, if retroactive remedies can be 
introduced, they may generate strong incentives for compliance. In doing so, not only the 
past injuries can be redressed to some degree, but also the violating member can be 
deterred from delaying compliance.
443
 In addition, it rather seems to be fair that the 
amount would be paid out of the general revenue of a government because it is the 
government, and not private entities, that is acting inconsistently with WTO obligations. 
Accordingly, it may generate more incentives for compliance than retaliation in the sense 
that the government has to make payment for the violation itself rather than shifting the 
cost to private entities.
444
 
Second, monetary payments may result in large members continuing their violation 
and simply paying compensation for a long period of time. In other words, they may 
create room for them to buy out their breach of WTO obligations with a certain amount 
of money. Choi has expressed concern that a large member, such as the US, which 
provides a large amount of money in international aid, could simply reduce aid so as to 
fund monetary payments. Moreover, he is concerned that there may be a possibility of 
two large members offsetting different monetary payments against each other, for 
example, between the non-compliance of the US in US – FSC and the non-compliance of 
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the EC in EC – Hormones.445 
However, in any event, monetary payment will not be a substitute for the primary 
remedy, which is the withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent measure. It is not a one-time 
payment. It would be due periodically as long as such measures are in place. The WTO 
Consultative Board opined that monetary payment is “only a temporary fallback 
approach pending full compliance, otherwise the „buy out‟ problems will occur.”446 
Overall, the violating member that has made monetary payment still has the legal 
obligation to bring its measure into conformity with WTO obligations. In addition, one 
should recall that the complaining member who has prevailed in a case would not 
automatically receive a monetary payment. It is an alternative remedy for a failure to 
comply within a reasonable period of time. Thus, as long as compliance is achieved 
within such a period, there would be no requirement of monetary payment.
447
  
Third, while retaliation is implemented by a complaining member without requiring 
any consent of a violating member, such is not the case for monetary payment. In other 
words, it is up to the violating member whether to make monetary payment and it thereby 
has great control over procedure.
448
 Since there is no supra-national authority that can 
enforce such payment, the problem of enforceability always exists. 
   However, enforceability may be not the problem that it initially appears to be. One 
                                                          
445
 See Choi, supra note 364, at 1066. 
446
 Peter Sutherland et al., The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New 
Millennium ¶ 243 (2004), available at http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf. 
See also Bronckers & Broek, supra note 440, at 118-119. 
447
 See Adebukola A Eleso, WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: Monetary Compensation as an Alternative 
for Developing Countries 32 (Berkeley Elec. Press Legal Series, Paper No. 1378, 2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1378. 
448
 See Nuno Liamo & Kamal Saggi, Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation in the Enforcement 
of International Trade Agreements 2 (World Bank Pol‟y Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3873, 
2006), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/3873.html. See also Anderson, supra note 209, at 
126. 
155 
 
way to examine the enforceability is to examine whether members are willing to resolve 
their disputes through the WTO dispute settlement system. As Hudec considers, all WTO 
members are repeat players that appear as both complainants and defendants. He opines 
that: 
 
In considering the various positions taken by WTO member countries on 
remedial issues, it may be helpful to remember that all WTO governments 
are repeat players in this game, and that they have more or less equally 
frequent roles as both complainants and defendants. Consequently, all WTO 
governments . . . must view remedial issues from both perspectives. The 
optimum legal system . . . [is the one] that will be most helpful in enforcing 
one‟s trade agreement rights as complainant, while at the same time 
preserving the desired degree of freedom to deal with adverse legal rulings 
against one‟s own behavior.449 
 
In this regard, if the violating member is obliged to make monetary payment, it may 
not easily refuse to do so. 
And, as experience shows, there are a number of international agreements that 
provide a remedy in the form of monetary payment. For instance, monetary fines can be 
imposed against the member state that fails to comply with the rulings of the European 
Court of Justice.
450
 In state-investor disputes, Article 1135 of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides that a final award of an arbitral tribunal requires 
either the payment of monetary damages or restitution of property. The side agreement of 
NAFTA on environment also provides that if a party persistently fails to effectively 
enforce its environmental law, the panel may impose a monetary enforcement 
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assessment.
451
 Furthermore, monetary payment has been introduced in recent FTAs 
concluded with the US. For example, a violating party may agree to pay an annual 
monetary assessment instead of having concessions suspended. If the parties are unable 
to agree on an amount, the amount of monetary assessment is set at 50 per cent of the 
level of nullification or impairment determined by the arbitration or the complaining 
party.
452
 Hence, the introduction of monetary payment in FTAs suggests that parties are 
willing to make such payments. And, most convincingly, in one WTO dispute, US – 
Copyright Act, the US voluntarily made a monetary payment for temporary non-
compliance with WTO obligations. 
   Moreover, practical solutions could be considered. As Davey suggests, monetary 
payment could be enforced through a domestic court under the New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards as most of WTO members 
are signatories to the Convention.
453
 
   In addition, another solution would be to require members to create government funds 
for the payment of settlement of WTO disputes. This would allow compensation to be 
paid without any need for legislative approval.
454
 For instance, in 2002, the US 
established separate funds for the payment by the USTR of the amount of the total or 
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partial settlement of any WTO dispute.
455
 
   In sum, the willingness of the parties to make monetary payments in international 
disputes along with the consideration of practical solutions suggested above would mean 
that the use of monetary payments in the WTO is feasible. 
 
  5.3. Implementation of Monetary Payment 
As Davey suggests, the possibility of monetary payment should be available when 
parallel retaliation is not adequate.
456
 In other words, a requesting member that has been 
authorized to cross-retaliate would also have the option of receiving monetary payment. 
Hence, it would have the choice of remedy between the two. 
While some WTO members have been reluctant to introduce monetary payments as 
an option because of the problem of disparity in the payment ability between developed 
and developing members, this strategy, in fact, avoids such a problem because it would 
usually be small country members that are authorized to cross-retaliate and, thus, would 
have the option of receiving monetary payment.
457
 Moreover, this strategy would 
effectively make small country members demand monetary payments without requiring 
the need for special and differential treatment to obtain the right to receive them.
458
 
In addition, since the level of nullification or impairment has been already determined 
by the arbitration proceeding under Article 22.6 for the authorization of cross-retaliation, 
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there would probably be no need to incur additional cost to determine the level of 
monetary payment. 
As proposed with regard to retaliation, the retroactive determination of the level of 
monetary payment should be introduced. This would not only redress past injuries to 
some degree, but also create incentives for prompt compliance and discourage delay.
459
 
No matter when the starting pointing of retroactive determination would be, it should be 
determined in the same way as the level of retaliation. 
   In sum, the introduction of a monetary payment as a remedy would provide benefits 
to the complaining member that is unable to gain benefits from retaliation. Of course, 
monetary payment appears to be already available in the WTO at the stage of 
compensation, which is a mutually agreed solution by the members to a dispute. However, 
such solutions often break down, and thereby undesirable retaliation remains the only 
remedy. Thus, it would be desirable to provide monetary payment at the stage of 
retaliation as an alternative remedy, when a complaining member finds that this is better 
able to achieve compliance or is in line with its interests. It is not a replacement for 
retaliation but an additional choice for the complaining member. If the violating member 
does not make a monetary payment, there is always the fallback of retaliation as a last 
resort.
460
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Perhaps, most importantly, it should be remembered that monetary payment is only a 
temporary remedy until the violation is removed. The violating member still has the 
obligation of bringing its measures into conformity with WTO obligations. 
Having more diverse remedies may offer a greater chance of compliance in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. It seems to be expected that the introduction of a monetary 
payment would ultimately lead developing members to a more frequent use of the 
system.
461
 
 
II. More Extensive Use of Compensation 
In this Section, I will consider whether it would be desirable to promote the more 
extensive use of the current system of compensation. From an economic standpoint, 
compensation is considered to be the preferred remedy over retaliation in the sense that it 
increases trade liberalization and economic welfare, at least temporarily, in both 
complaining and complained-against members. 
Unfortunately, however, the use of compensation has been rather limited because of 
its voluntary nature and the application of MFN treatment. These constraints dissuade 
members from agreeing on mutually acceptable compensation. 
In the following, I consider the possibilities of extending the use of compensation. I 
will discuss the more extensive use of trade compensation and of monetary compensation 
in separate sub-Sections. 
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 1. Trade Compensation 
   Because of the limits of voluntary compensation, Ecuador has proposed compulsory 
compensation as a last resort with “the additional advantage of providing a new 
maximum reasonable period of six months during which the Member concerned must 
necessarily pay compensation.” 462  The LDC Group has also proposed that 
“compensation under Article 22.2 should be made mandatory by the elimination of the 
phrase „if so requested‟ in that paragraph.”463 
   The idea of mandatory compensation is that a member that has prevailed in a dispute 
but is faced with non-compliance or the DSB could choose in which sectors the violating 
member should offer compensation.
464
 This seems, however, unrealistic because there 
are no ways to compel a member to provide compensation in any sector. “Just as the 
WTO has no power to compel compliance, it has no power to compel compensation.”465 
Moreover, this may tarnish the very meaning of compensation, which is to negotiate 
seriously to find mutually agreed solutions, one of the objectives of WTO dispute 
settlement. 
Moreover, the application of MFN treatment makes the use of compensation less 
attractive. It means that not only the complaining member, but also any other member 
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exporting to the violating member, receives the benefits of compensation. In this regard, 
the violating member may be reluctant to provide compensation because it has to allow a 
level of market access that would be higher than the level of nullification or impairment 
suffered by the complaining member. Conversely, the complaining member may also be 
reluctant to agree on compensation because its benefits may be dispersed to other 
members exporting to the violating member when it can instead receive the full 
“benefits” of retaliation.466 
   However, as proposed earlier, if the level of retaliation is measured from an earlier 
point of time than the expiration of the reasonable period of time, the violating member 
would be more willing to provide compensation in part because the amount of 
compensation would be lower than the amount of retaliation. Thus, such a measure would 
encourage parties to a dispute to negotiate seriously for compensation as a mutually 
agreed, temporary solution. 
 Furthermore, in a case in which a complaining member cannot effectively retaliate, 
taking part of the benefit of MFN trade compensation would rather be an attractive option. 
At the stage of compensation, it is for the parties to a dispute to negotiate and choose the 
products whose tariffs are to be reduced, not the third members. In this sense, they could 
strategically agree on products for compensation that would confer the most benefits to 
the complaining member, thereby, to some degree, alleviating the disadvantages of MFN 
treatment.
467
 
In sum, retroactive retaliation along with the strategic negotiation on products for 
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compensation could provide the parties to a dispute the possibility of more extensive use 
of trade compensation. 
 
2. Monetary Compensation 
   The difference between monetary compensation and monetary payment, as proposed 
in the previous Section for an alternative to cross-retaliation, is that monetary 
compensation is negotiated by the parties to a dispute, whereas monetary payment is 
determined by the arbitration proceeding under Article 22.6 of the DSU.
468
 
   Like monetary payment, if members concerned desire to have an objective 
assessment on the level of compensation, the arbitration proceeding under Article 25 may 
be held as an alternative means of dispute settlement, as seen in US – Copyright Act. 
Otherwise, if the members prefer to have a non-binding opinion on its level, they may 
resort to the conciliation or mediation procedures under Article 5 of the DSU. 
   Here, again, the problem with monetary compensation is whether it should be 
administered in accordance with MFN treatment. Some argue that the negotiating history 
and the decisions of the Appellate Body clearly provide that any form of compensation 
must be compatible with MFN treatment.
469
 In this regard, the receipt of monetary 
compensation only by the EC in US – Copyright Act could be considered as an 
“advantage” that is not “accorded immediately and unconditionally” to all other WTO 
members within the meaning of Article I:1 of GATT and Article 4 of the TRIPS 
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Agreement. Australia raised this concern a number of times in the DSB meetings that 
such arrangements were apparently applied on a discriminatory basis.
470
 
However, in my view, it is questionable whether the payment of monetary 
compensation confers an “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” within the meaning 
of MFN treatment. Under Article I:1 of GATT, “advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity” refers to “custom duties and charges,” the “international transfer of payments” 
or “rules and formalities” imposed relating to importation or exportation. The payment of 
monetary compensation does not fall under any of these criteria. It is neither a custom 
duty nor a rule in connection with importation or exportation that distorts the trading 
position of third members.
471
 Moreover, in practice, the majority of WTO members did 
not object to the allegedly discriminatory nature of monetary compensation. Although 
Australia has continuously argued that monetary compensation has to be compatible with 
MFN treatment, it has not pressed its claim in a dispute settlement proceeding.
472
 
   Thus, in my view, monetary compensation does not have to be administered in 
accordance with MFN treatment, and this seems to be an obvious reason for 
distinguishing monetary compensation from trade compensation. 
In sum, the inapplicability of MFN treatment along with retroactive retaliation could 
provide the violating member with the possibility of more extensive use of monetary 
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compensation. 
 
III. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I attempted to provide some possible improvements to the remedies 
available through the WTO dispute settlement system. In doing so, I proposed remedies 
in consideration of accomplishing their ultimate purpose, inducing compliance, along 
with an idea of solving the problems that they are facing currently. 
In Section I, I focused on the improvement of the current system of retaliation. First, I 
proposed retroactive retaliation in order to create incentives for prompt compliance and 
discourage delay. In detail, as the DSB calls for “prompt compliance,” I argued that the 
level of retaliation should, at a minimum, be calculated as commencing as of the date of 
the adoption of the panel or Appellate Body reports. This may provide a strong incentive 
for the violating member to comply soon after such reports have been adopted. 
Second, I proposed some changes to the method of implementation of the retaliatory 
measures: the rotation of products on retaliation lists and gradual changes to the level of 
retaliation over time. The products on a retaliation list could be rotated periodically to 
give more impact on the violating member thereby affecting many exporting industries 
that may provide more opportunities to press their government for compliance. Such 
rotation seems to be legitimate as long as the level of retaliation does not exceed the level 
of nullification or impairment and is authorized by the DSB. The gradual change of the 
level of retaliation, in the form of incremental or partial implementation, would also 
create more incentives for compliance than the full level of retaliation. Such changes 
would be more powerful in the sense that frustrated exporters are able to exert more 
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pressure on their government and thereby become irritants than those eliminated 
exporters who have entirely lost their markets without any hope for reclaiming it. 
Third, there is a possibility of introducing collective retaliation in limited 
circumstances. As long as the standard of equivalence is ensured, multiple complainants 
in the same dispute may collectively retaliate against the violating member by sharing the 
total level of retaliation in proportion to their retaliation capacity. This strategy would not 
only indirectly provide small country complainants effective retaliation, but also create 
more opportunity to inflict sufficient harm on the most politically powerful exporters in 
the violating member to lobby their government for compliance. 
   Fourth, I proposed monetary payment as an alternative remedy to retaliation. In its 
implementation, it should be made available to a member that has been authorized to 
cross-retaliate. This strategy would, in fact, avoid the problem of disparity in the payment 
ability between developed and developing members. The introduction of monetary 
payment is to provide benefits to the complaining member that is unable to gain benefits 
from retaliation. It is to provide an additional option for the complaining member when it 
finds that this is better to achieve compliance or in line with its interests. If the violating 
member does not make monetary payment, there is always the fallback of retaliation as a 
last resort. It should be remembered, however, that monetary payment is only a 
temporary remedy until the violation is removed. Thus, the violating member still has the 
obligation of bringing its measures into conformity with WTO obligations. 
   In addition, I stressed the importance of the impact and effectiveness of TRIPS 
retaliation. Retaliation on TRIPS obligations is of significant value for a developing 
member in a dispute with a developed member. It solves the problem of imbalance in the 
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compliance enforcement capacity and provides sufficient pressure on the violating 
member for compliance. The most important consideration of TRIPS retaliation is that it 
should be implemented only in the domestic market of the retaliating member and not 
exported to other members. As seen in EC – Bananas, one solution would be to install a 
government-controlled system that would trace the products violating TRIPS 
requirements to ensure they are sold only in the domestic market. 
   In Section II, I considered the more extensive use of the current system of 
compensation. I emphasized that compensation is a preferable remedy to retaliation. In 
case of trade compensation, retroactive retaliation along with the strategic negotiation on 
products for compensation could provide the parties to a dispute with the possibility of its 
more extensive use. In the case of monetary compensation, the inapplicability of MFN 
treatment along with retroactive retaliation could also provide the violating member with 
an incentive to use it more extensively. 
   Besides the possible improvements of retaliation and compensation, improvement of 
the dispute settlement procedures could also be considered in order to solve the problem 
of non-compliance. First, a number of WTO members have proposed to determine the 
level of nullification or impairment at an early stage. Korea proposed that, if the level of 
nullification or impairment could be determined at the stage of compliance review under 
Article 21.5 of the DSU, it would facilitate the implementation of WTO 
recommendations without reference to an arbitration proceeding under Article 22.6. It 
further argued that if the level of nullification or impairment has been determined before 
the expiration of the reasonable period of time, it would provide strong incentives for 
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compliance and, substantially, facilitate the negotiation for compensation.
473
 
Subsequently, Mexico has also proposed to “incorporate” the procedure under Article 
22.7 into the original panel process. The arbitration proceedings could then start after the 
interim panel report has been issued and determine the level of nullification or 
impairment based on the panel‟s interim findings and conclusions, which could be 
reviewed by the Appellate Body. The DSB could then authorize retaliation upon adoption 
of the panel or Appellate Body reports. In Mexico‟s view, this would create incentives for 
prompt compliance, satisfactory solutions and time saving.
474
 However, in my view, the 
early determination of the level of nullification or impairment seems to disregard the 
member‟s right to a reasonable period of time.475 Moreover, given the overall successful 
compliance record in WTO dispute settlement, it would be time-consuming and costly to 
determine the level of nullification or impairment, for example, in the panel process, 
since few cases ultimately require such a determination. 
Second, specifying binding suggestions for implementing DSB recommendations 
could be considered. Generally, when the measure concerned has been found in violation 
of WTO obligations, a panel or the Appellate Body simply recommends nothing more 
than bringing the measure into conformity with its ruling. Of course, it may make 
suggestions about specific ways to achieve compliance. Yet, the violating members 
usually oppose such suggestions, which seem to be non-binding on the parties of a 
dispute, and prefer their own ways of bringing compliance. Moreover, although 
compliance review is available under Article 21.5 and the violating member has to submit 
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status reports to the DSB under Article 22.6, there is no requirement for it to specify the 
measure it intends to use for compliance. Thus, the way of achieving compliance is 
entirely left to the discretion of the violating member thereby, often, resulting in 
procedural delays and inadequate implementation.
476
 Therefore, one solution would be 
for a panel and the Appellate Body to specify binding suggestions for implementing their 
recommendations. The use of specific suggestions would help arbitrators readily 
determine whether the recommendations have been implemented. Furthermore, this 
would particularly be beneficial to small developing members that have an insufficient 
ability of monitoring compliance.
477
 In addition, in terms of monitoring compliance, 
opening DSB meetings to the public would create greater transparency to increase public 
awareness of non-compliance. The violating member may feel strong pressure by the 
public‟s awareness of its non-compliance and, ultimately, be shamed into compliance.478 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation attempts to examine the problems of WTO dispute settlement 
remedies and consider possible improvements to them. It is generally a study of how to 
improve compliance in WTO dispute settlement. In Chapter 2, I discussed the applicable 
rules and procedures of WTO dispute settlement remedies in order to provide a general 
understanding of this dissertation and examined the current problems of that system. In 
Chapter 3, I explored the purpose of WTO dispute settlement remedies as an essential 
prerequisite for designing effective remedies. In this examination, I determined that WTO 
remedies serve as deterrent instruments preventing non-compliance with WTO 
obligations and future cases of nullification or impairment. Thus, the ultimate purpose of 
remedies is to induce compliance, while some form of compensation may be provided 
and trade balance may be restored temporarily until compliance is achieved. In Chapter 4, 
I provided some possible improvements to WTO dispute settlement remedies in 
accordance with their purpose and in a way to solve their current problems. Here, the 
essential point is that it would be appropriate to consider these proposed improvements as 
one set of instruments rather than as distinct options. By and large, they would likely 
contribute to building effective remedies and improving compliance, in terms of quality 
and timeliness, in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
   Given the present trends towards globalization, states are willing to hand over their 
part of sovereignty for benefits received from international cooperation. And, a strong 
multilateral system is needed to promote such cooperation that may correspond to the 
imperatives of global governance. 
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The WTO is considered as a strong multilateral trading system. In particular, its 
dispute settlement system, which is governed under the DSU, has brought significant 
improvement in the sense that it provides good quality and adequately reasoned decisions 
in dealing with disputes, thereby enshrining the rule of law in international trade relations. 
However, in order to be an effective dispute settlement system, it must not merely 
generate rules or decisions, but also provide an effective means of settling disputes.
479
 
With the improvement and reform of WTO dispute settlement remedies, the WTO will 
take a progressive step towards becoming a more effective dispute settlement system. 
Thus, steady efforts should be made for the study on the improvement of WTO dispute 
settlement remedies in order to ensure effective compliance and, ultimately, the stability 
and credibility of the world trading economy. 
While the interpretation of WTO rules is the responsibility of a panel or the Appellate 
Body, the application and legislation of such rules are the responsibility of the member 
states. Therefore, as long as the WTO remains an attractive venue for settling 
international trade disputes, it is the responsibility of the member states‟ governments to 
prevent violations and serve as guardians for the system. 
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